The decision of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) to unanimously leave without consideration the request of the acting Minister of Justice Andrey Yankulov to remove the acting Prosecutor General Borislav Sarafov and to refer the matter to the Prosecutorial College seems at first glance like a procedural decision. In reality, however, it is a symptom of a deeper institutional problem - the continuing ambiguity as to who and under what conditions exercises the power of a Prosecutor General in Bulgaria.
According to Minister Yankulov's reasons, based on an opinion of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Cassation (SCC), after July 21, 2025, the country will actually have no legitimately acting Prosecutor General. This position is based on an interpretation of the legal restrictions on the temporary performance of functions and on the principle that the temporary cannot become indefinitely.
The counterposition defended by representatives of the Prosecutorial College is that it is the competent body to appoint a temporary head of the prosecution service, by analogy with the election of administrative heads in the system. From this point of view, the plenum has no reason to interfere.
Here the dispute is no longer simply procedural, but conceptual: whether the acting Prosecutor General is an ordinary “temporarily acting“ administrative head, or a figure with a specific constitutional status, equated in importance to the so-called “big three“ in the judiciary.
Different standards for the “big three“?
Representatives of the Judicial College logically raise the question: since the presidents of the supreme courts are elected by the plenum of the SJC, why should a different procedure apply to the Prosecutor General? This raises the problem of symmetry in institutional model.
The Bulgarian constitutional framework (Art. 129 of the Constitution) stipulates that the Prosecutor General is appointed by the President upon a proposal from the SJC plenum. Although this concerns a titular and not a temporary acting Prosecutor General, it is difficult to ignore the fact that an acting Prosecutor General exercises almost the same amount of powers – including personnel and disciplinary powers.
This is precisely what Yankulov emphasizes: when a temporary acting Prosecutor has practically the full power of the titular, the issue of legitimacy is not a formality, but a fundamental problem of the rule of law.
The larger context
The Sarafov case is not isolated, as it is part of a broader debate on accountability and control over the prosecution service – a topic on which Bulgaria has been the subject of criticism by European institutions in recent years. The lack of a clear mechanism for temporary replacement and control over the Prosecutor General undermines trust in system.
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Council to refer the case to the Prosecutor's Office can be interpreted as an attempt at institutional "withdrawal" from a politically sensitive issue. But this postpones, not resolves, the problem: who is responsible for the legitimacy of the highest prosecutor in the country?
Ultimately, the debate is not personal - it is structural. If the law allows for prolonged interim management without a clear procedure and deadlines, then the regulatory framework itself needs to be refined. And until this happens, any decision will look like a temporary construction on an unstable legal basis.