"The warnings to Damascus are over - now painful blows will come." That's how Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz described the airstrikes on the Syrian capital, which damaged the headquarters of the Syrian Defense Ministry. The bombings followed several days of clashes in the city of Sweida between Syrian security forces and members of the Druze religious minority, whom Israel claims to be protecting with these strikes. Later on Wednesday, the Syrian government and Druze leaders announced a preliminary ceasefire, but Israeli strikes continued. Below, Atlantic Council Middle East experts answer pressing questions about the roots of the crisis and what it means for Syria, Israel, the Druze, and the wider region.
Who are the Druze, and how did they end up at the center of this conflict?
The Druze are a religious and ethnic minority concentrated in southern Syria, particularly in the Sweida region. Historically, they have maintained a strong communal identity and a degree of autonomy. Their relations with Damascus have long been strained, with the Druze often resisting centralized authority, whether during the French mandate or under successive Syrian governments. Tensions between Druze militias and neighboring Sunni Bedouin tribes predate the modern Syrian state and tend to flare up again at times of national fragmentation.
During the Syrian uprising, the Druze have taken a different path: rather than aligning with the regime or the opposition, they have chosen to protect their local communities and remain largely neutral. This autonomy has long frustrated Damascus, first under Bashar al-Assad and now under President Ahmed Sharaa, who has sought to reassert state control over the south.
Since the fall of the Assad regime, Sheikh Hikmat Hijri, one of the most influential Druze spiritual leaders in Syria, has called for international protection for the community. This marks a major shift, highlighting the growing alienation from Damascus. Yet Hijri is not the only Druze voice. Other community leaders have taken different positions, with some warning against seeking external protection - especially from Israel - fearing that this could deepen their isolation and jeopardize any future national consensus.
The Druze also have deep family and political ties to communities in Lebanon and Israel, adding a regional dimension to their situation and increasing the risk of escalation beyond Syria's borders.
The involvement of Israel, which positions itself as the Druze's protector, has further complicated matters and fueled suspicions among other Syrian communities. The situation has reached a climax in Sweida, where violent clashes with neighboring Sunni Bedouin tribes have erupted, driven by long-standing socio-economic and sectarian tensions.
Following the recent escalation, Syrian government forces have intervened to quell fighting between Druze militias and armed Arab tribal groups. Seizing the opportunity provided by the security vacuum, the state has taken steps to reassert its control over Sweida and counter growing local demands for self-rule. Despite Israeli airstrikes and some international expressions of concern, the Druze community today finds itself more vulnerable than before. Government forces are poised to partially withdraw from Sweida, which could be considered a victory for the Hijri clan.
However, more than ever before, all parties involved are at a crossroads. A negotiated, peaceful solution for reintegration with the Syrian state is urgently needed. Without such an agreement, the risk of renewed violence is high. Any new escalation could quickly go beyond the local level, spreading to other regions and threatening national cohesion and regional stability. The current fragile calm should be seen as an opportunity for dialogue before another, potentially more violent, crisis unfolds.
What is the Syrian government thinking right now?
From Sharaa’s perspective, the unrest in Sweida is both a threat and an opportunity. Damascus is seeking to reassert control over a region that has long resisted its rule, using historical tensions between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin tribes to justify intervention. But Israel’s direct and escalating involvement complicates these calculations.
The Israeli strikes have also extended beyond the south, targeting army headquarters in Damascus and even near the presidential palace. The message is clear: Israel supports the Druze and is prepared to escalate disproportionately, changing its stance in Syria. Damascus is now realizing that improved relations with Washington do not guarantee a détente with Israel. Syrian authorities also fear a wider regional conflict that could draw in other regional players such as Turkey.
However, the Shaaraa government believes that time and force are on its side. It expects local ceasefires, however short-lived, to emerge from negotiations with community leaders, gradually reducing resistance. But widespread violations and selective demands for disarmament, targeting only the Druze rather than the Bedouin tribes, fuel mistrust and reinforce perceptions that Damascus has chosen dominance over reconciliation.
Ultimately, the Sweida crisis reveals the risks of managing Syria’s transition through coercion rather than consensus. This is especially true given the many potential troublemakers in the region and Israel’s willingness to exploit instability to undermine Damascus’ efforts at national consolidation. Ahmed Sharaa knows he is entering uncharted territory and will have to update his calculations.
What is Israel thinking right now?
Recent events in Syria have underscored the fact that any excitement about the country’s impending participation in the Abraham Accords was wildly premature.
The outbreak of sectarian violence targeting the Druze population in Sweida, some fifty miles from the Israeli border, presents a multifaceted challenge for Israel at an already precarious time. Caught off guard by the crossing of hundreds of Israeli Druze into Syria, where they rushed to support their brethren, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expected the fighting to continue for several days.
Israel’s military involvement in Syria is motivated by both narrow and broader considerations. At the local level, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is vigorously engaging with the Druze community, whose Israeli members are known, if sometimes grudging, allies of the Jewish state. Mobilizing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in which many Druze have served valiantly, to confront the apparent brutalization of Syrian Druze allows Israel to claim moral superiority and demonstrate solidarity with Israeli Druze.
More generally, Israel is acting to limit the potential deterioration of the security situation in Syria. From Jerusalem’s perspective, there are two possible explanations for the attacks on the Druze in Sweida: either the perpetrators were linked to and/or sent by Sharaa (and the president is demonstrating his true jihadist leanings), or the central government in Damascus is unable to assert full authority over the country and cannot be trusted as a partner. Neither scenario allows Israel to remain passive.
Israel will be equally wary of attempts by other regional players—particularly Turkey—to intervene in the theater of hostilities. Despite the reported ceasefires, the situation on the ground promises to remain tense for the foreseeable future.
How should Washington approach this?
There is a great deal at stake for Washington in achieving a rapid de-escalation in southern Syria. Trump administration officials are working by phone to try to achieve that goal, but it will require a concerted effort.
The risks are significant. Just as the United States hopes to reach a ceasefire and the return of hostages to move toward ending the war in Gaza, a potential flare-up of tensions on another front that could widen regional instability is worrisome.
US President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria is an investment aimed at helping the Assad government stabilize the country. But it cannot coexist with images of Islamist militants linked to the government in Damascus killing and humiliating Syrian Druze. These scenes have also caught the attention of Israel, which has responded with destabilizing strikes in Damascus. Attempts by many Druze to cross from Israel and Lebanon into Syria to help protect their brethren have further complicated the situation. And any such division and chaos creates opportunities for Iran to try to take advantage of them to regain its lost influence in Syria.
Trump’s promise to ease sanctions and the follow-up action by U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barak have given the United States leverage over Shaaraa. It should use it immediately to pressure Damascus to rein in the militants who are escalating the situation and attacking the Druze.
Other U.S. partners with influence in Damascus, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, should be brought in to deliver similar messages to make it clear that the aid and investment Syria needs are necessary. Its reconstruction could be at stake.
At the same time, the United States should insist that Israel scale back its strikes. Limited action to protect the Druze population and keep threatening actors away from the Syrian-Israeli border is one thing, but strikes on government targets in Damascus could lead to cascading destabilization. This would destroy any real possibility of an agreement between Israel and Syria in the near future.
It is still unclear whether Syria can stabilize under the Shaaraa regime, but Washington should remind Jerusalem that the failure of this experiment increases the risk of a resumption of Israeli conflict with Iranian proxies in Syria, as well as the risk of more direct Israeli-Turkish confrontations.
How might this affect the prospect of normalizing Syrian-Israeli relations?
Israel’s strikes on the Syrian Defense Ministry headquarters in Damascus are both an obstacle to ongoing de-escalation talks between Syria and Israel and a confirmation of the importance of the Syrian-Israeli non-aggression agreement.
The Israeli government is facing intense pressure from Israel’s Druze community following an escalation between a Druze armed group in southern Syria and forces affiliated with the Syrian government. The government is also under pressure from Israeli officials who are deeply skeptical of the new Syrian government’s ability to stabilize the country.
Israel’s strikes at the heart of the Syrian government are a severe blow to the young Syrian government’s sovereignty that will be difficult to manage. If left unchecked, the situation could escalate into a larger conflict that further fragments Syria and emboldens armed groups and extremists. Ironically, this scenario would only exacerbate threats to Israel’s security.
While a Syrian-Israeli normalization agreement remains unlikely in the near future, a non-aggression pact that would address specific Israeli security concerns and limit Israeli military operations in Syria remains possible. The Syrian government was quick to announce a new ceasefire with the Druze following the Israeli strikes, demonstrating its interest in avoiding escalation with Israel. Realizing the potential for a non-aggression pact would require the Israeli government to significantly shift its approach to Syria toward supporting those who seek to unify the country rather than fragment it.