The Telegraph: Vladimir Putin has his finger on the nuclear trigger

Putin has his finger on the nuclear trigger. The risk of an incident is enormous, writes Rebecca Koffler, a strategic military intelligence analyst and former US military intelligence officer, in a commentary for The Telegraph.

On Friday, three Russian MiG-31 “Foxhound“ aircraft, the Kremlin's main combat platform for the “Dagger“ hypersonic missiles (capable of carrying nuclear warheads), violated Estonian airspace. It was the latest Russian incursion into a NATO member state, following a series of drone violations over Poland and Romania earlier this month.

This is clearly a dangerous escalation by the Kremlin. Vladimir Putin is probably trying to get a clearer picture of how NATO responds to provocations, as well as to desensitize Europeans to violations of their sovereignty. But there is another important element to the story. On Tuesday last week, to mark the culmination of a strategic war game by the command staff codenamed "Zapad 2025", Russia simulated the launch of a tactical nuclear strike. It was watched by Russian President Vladimir Putin, dressed in military uniform.

Many believe that nuclear war is impossible today. As a former officer in the Military Intelligence Agency who led "red teams" in war games simulating conflict between Russia and NATO, I am here to tell you why that is wrong. The threat of nuclear war is greater than ever. "The unimaginable" is more conceivable than most are willing to admit.

Neither Russia nor NATO wants a direct “kinetic” conflict. But as the war in Ukraine, a proxy confrontation between Moscow and Washington, continues to rage, the risk of unintended escalation through misunderstanding is growing rapidly.

For five days, Russian forces conducted the “Zapad” exercise jointly with their Belarusian counterparts at 41 training bases in western Russia and Belarus. The aim was to learn lessons from the current conflict in Ukraine, with an emphasis on hybrid strikes, mobile artillery tactics and countering drones. Russia has previously conducted the “Zapad” in the fall of 2021, using them as cover to amass around 190,000 troops on its western border before invading Ukraine, aiming to achieve tactical surprise against Kiev and NATO. Forces from Belarus, which now has Russian tactical nuclear weapons, also participated in “Zapad-2021“.

The Russians regularly conduct nuclear strike authorization exercises as part of military maneuvers, in which Putin “presses the button“, because they believe their leader must be psychologically prepared for this action. This is the result of an important lesson learned during the Soviet era.

In 1972, then-General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was reported to have “trembled” when asked to press a button during an exercise simulating war with the United States. He went on to ask Defense Minister Andrei Grechko if "this is definitely an exercise".

This does not mean that Putin is prone to violence. He does not want nuclear war. But the Russian leader and his general staff view nuclear weapons as a combat capability, not simply a psychological weapon.

Moscow has developed and implemented a sophisticated nuclear doctrine called "escalation for de-escalation", developed low-yield tactical nuclear warheads, and trained its forces to wage "limited" nuclear war. On February 27, 2022, days after the invasion of Ukraine began, Putin placed Russia's nuclear forces on "special combat readiness" and there has been no official announcement of a change in their status.

While Western analysts have dismissed Putin’s actions as exaggerated, arguing that there has been no real change in Russia’s core nuclear posture, US intelligence assessments based on so-called I&W (indications and warnings) may be only partially useful in understanding the current threat. The US threat detection framework is structured to detect an immediate threat, not to provide strategic warning of a threat that develops over time.

Crucially, there is currently no trust between NATO and Russia. Moscow’s long-standing concerns that the US is seeking regime change in Russia are reinforced by frequent comments by Western officials who have openly stated or implied their intention to defeat the Russian military, destroy its economy, and remove Putin from power. Ukrainian strikes on Russia's nuclear triad, particularly strategic bombers that are the backbone of Russia's deterrence and defense strategy, have likely further heightened these concerns.

For its part, NATO fears a Russian attack on one of its members, which would trigger the collective defense clause of Article 5, especially if Ukraine collapses. Recent violations of NATO airspace by the Kremlin have prompted the alliance to launch a new military operation, codenamed "Eastern Guard" on September 12, 2025.

The usual risk of mutual activation of mechanisms increases during periods of high tension and during simultaneous military activities, such as "West-2025", "Eastern Guard" and the "Iron Gate" exercises in Poland. Today, the region is crowded with surveillance assets, live ammunition of all types, warships and support vessels operating in close proximity. The risk of an incident is therefore very high.

There is a strong historical example of how quickly and easily things can go wrong during periods of high tension.

In November 1983, NATO was preparing to hold a nuclear test, called "Able Archer 83". Tensions were already high after the Soviet Union shot down a South Korean passenger plane that had strayed from its course en route from Anchorage to Seoul. But the Kremlin panicked over Able Archer, assuming that this was a real situation, not an exercise.

Russian intelligence agencies had been on high alert for two years after KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov and Brezhnev tasked them in 1981 with looking for signs of US intentions to launch a nuclear strike on the USSR. The KGB published a computer-generated intelligence assessment stating that the "balance of power in the world" was drastically in favor of the United States. The result was a massive secret intelligence-gathering program, codenamed RYAN (Rocket-Nuclear Attack), to look for signs that the United States was preparing for war with the USSR. This encouraged Soviet leaders to see in the US position exactly what they were looking for. A full-scale simulation of a nuclear weapons launch by NATO forces could have meant only one thing to paranoid Soviet leaders: the beginning of nuclear war.

A massive Soviet nuclear attack was just waiting for an order from Andropov. During the crisis, there was no communication between Moscow and Washington to clarify the situation. Fortunately, no such order was given, and by the end of the NATO exercise on November 11, 1983, tensions had eased.

But it could have ended very differently. The world faces a similar situation today, given the breakdown of trust between Russia and the West, as well as the disruption of key communication channels.

Neither NATO nor Russia wants to go to war, let alone nuclear war. But neither side wants to allow the other to be perceived as the victor in Ukraine. Both sides, anticipating an attack from the other, are using their massive intelligence-gathering systems to look for any signs of an impending attack, allowing them to make quick decisions.

Interpreting the intentions of leaders is inherently difficult. Not every order can be intercepted, and not every intelligence indicator is observable. Confusion and errors, resulting from the notorious "fog of war", are standard features of armed conflict. The possibility of a tragic error of judgment in this tense situation is very real.

With social media awash with President Trump’s ultimatums and threats from Putin’s representatives, unless more cool-headed leaders prevail in Moscow, Washington, and Europe, nuclear war could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.