The West will face dilemma after the death of Vladimir Putin – whether to intervene in Russia or not. However, the US and its allies should resist this temptation for at least three reasons. This is written by Sam Green for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Putin has turned the war in Ukraine into a cornerstone of his political legitimacy. In this, alas, he does not differ from the countless despots and warmongers of the world. Putin's greater crime against the country he claims to serve lies in his attempt to make conquest a mission of the Russian state itself.
No one has done more to undermine Russia's territorial integrity than the man who clearly intends to rule it for the rest of his days.
In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and after the full-scale invasion, occupied more Ukrainian territories. Putin tied the very foundation of the Russian state to a lie and even wrote it into the constitution.
Putin knows that whoever succeeds him will be faced with a difficult choice: either accept the lie, and with it the inevitability of autocracy and war, or destroy it – and with it the Russian constitution and probably Russia itself. And all this raises the question – what will happen to Russia after Putin's death?
There are many ethnicities in the federation, but breaking up the country along ethnic lines is not so simple. Western governments may be tempted, and certainly will be, to take sides. Washington and its allies should resist this temptation for at least three reasons.
First, in the absence of direct military involvement, the West's ability to influence the outcome of such a large and complex political process will be minimal, while the potential to deepen hostilities and deprive itself of leverage will be enormous.
Second, the West itself is likely to be divided over how and whether to intervene, precisely at a time when maintaining transatlantic solidarity in the face of uncertainty will be paramount.
And thirdly, the attempt to shape the future of Russia – probably in vain and probably at high cost – it will only distract the West from focusing on critical issues over which it has real leverage, such as securing Ukraine and expanding the European Union.
Some fear the collapse of Russia (and the uncertainty surrounding whose hands Russia's nuclear weapons will end up), while others would welcome Russia's demise. As if the war could be won more easily in Russia than in Ukraine. Both approaches will cost many lives.