On Sunday, the Kremlin announced that amendments to Russia's nuclear doctrine have been prepared and are yet to be formally adopted, meaning that relevant documents defining the circumstances under which Moscow can use nuclear weapons will be updated , reported Reuters.
Last week, President Vladimir Putin warned the West that under proposed changes to the doctrine, Russia would now be able to use nuclear weapons if attacked with conventional missiles and would consider any attack against it by a non-nuclear country but backed by a nuclear force , for a joint attack.
Many Western observers see the changes in nuclear doctrine as an attempt by Putin to create a "red line" for the US and its allies, signaling that Moscow would consider responding with nuclear weapons if they allow Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory with long-range Western missiles, Reuters commented.
The official Russian nuclear doctrine - the last public version of which dates back to 2020 - currently only states that Russia can use its own arsenal in the event of a nuclear or conventional attack "when the very existence of the state is endangered", states in. "Mond". Putin proposed that the updated doctrine also state that "aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear power", would be considered "their joint attack against Russia". The reference to Ukraine and its current offensive in Russia's Kursk region is extremely obvious, the newspaper commented.
The doctrine also stipulates that in the future Russia will be able to use nuclear weapons "if it receives reliable information about the beginning of a massive cross-border air attack using strategic and tactical aviation aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles aircraft and hypersonic weapons", Putin also said. This wording is probably directly related to the current negotiations between Ukraine and the West on the supply of long-range weapons, notes the French edition.
The last proposed change is to make clear in the doctrine for the first time the fact that Belarus is already under the umbrella of Russia's nuclear arsenal. "We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia and Belarus," Putin said. The move is not surprising given the June 2023 deployment of nuclear warheads on the territory of Belarus, which was Moscow's first deployment of nuclear weapons outside of Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mond said.
Despite the serious rhetoric, however, it should be kept in mind that there is a big difference between Putin's statements and the actual nuclear doctrine, which stipulates when, how and why exactly Russia can use nuclear weapons, notes "France 24".< /p>
"This does not necessarily mean that there is any strategic change," said Sarah Tsinieris, a specialist in international security and nuclear non-proliferation at King's College London. "It's largely rhetoric," she adds.
David Blagdon, a senior lecturer in international security at Britain's University of Exeter, shared this view and noted that despite the serious language, Putin is probably no closer to pushing the nuclear button than before.
However, this makes it even more difficult to assess what kind of threat Putin's declaration actually poses, according to Ulrich Kuhn, head of the program on arms control and emerging technologies at the Institute for Peace and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.< /p>
"Basically, the question here is: Does Russia have red lines? Where are those red lines? And if those red lines are crossed, does that mean that this will almost automatically trigger the use of nuclear weapons? And the answer to all three questions is: We don't know," he points out.
Kuhn explains that the Russian nuclear doctrine, which was created in 2014 and updated in 2020, contains two parts: One is "declarative" and is often made public, and the second, top-secret part, consisting of about 100 pages, contains the specifics of when Russia might use its nuclear arsenal.
"So I wouldn't pay too much attention to the first part of this document, the declarative, public part of it, in terms of whether it tells us anything about whether or not Russia is going to use nuclear weapons, [because] it probably won't tell us much," he points out.
The American "Washington Post" quoted a Russian academic close to senior Russian diplomats as saying the changes would increase the flexibility of the doctrine and "in a sense expand it".
"It seems to me that the element of uncertainty will be preserved to increase the level of flexibility. But ... since the use of nuclear weapons in the event of attacks similar to the one in Kursk would be accompanied by significant negative side effects, it can hardly be justified from a military point of view,", says the academician.
According to him, the moment in which Putin's statement was made is not accidental and is a clear signal to the West that "there is still a large range of possibilities for escalation". "The nuclear option is not preferred," said the academician.
Pavel Podvig, a Geneva-based analyst who directs the Russian Nuclear Forces project, says the changes in Russian nuclear doctrine are intended to create "uncertainty and ambiguity about the ability to respond." and pointed out that the current version of the doctrine is perceived as "quite restrictive" by many experts in Russia.
"Overall, this is a message intended to warn the West ... that the aid currently being discussed could be ... problematic," he said.
Podwig added that Putin's comments would cause more uncertainty about what action could be designated as an attack on Russia and would "keep people guessing and cautious about anything that might look like it." .
Therefore, the announced change in Russian nuclear doctrine is not so much related to a fundamental change in Russian nuclear policy as it is to sending a signal to the Western audience, commented the British "Spectator". Moscow wants to make it clear to London, Berlin, Washington and other Western capitals that the nuclear option is explicitly on the table and that by continuing to increase their aid to Ukraine, these countries are increasing the risk of using nuclear weapons, the publication said.
Ultimately, however, the possibility of Russia using a nuclear weapon remains unlikely - at least for now, writes "Spectator" and points out that if the Russian side begins to seriously consider using nuclear weapons in Ukraine or against NATO countries, there will be warning signs. For example, family members of Russian oligarchs who continue to enjoy the lavish life in European capitals would begin to leave Europe en masse. It is hard to imagine that Putin would start a nuclear war with NATO if it would endanger the relatives of his main supporters in Russia, the newspaper concluded.