North Korea will send a new military contingent to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attacks against Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region.
This is stated in the daily analysis of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and are likely to face the same high levels of casualties and complications when working together with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided that the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces in the same way as it has so far as cannon fodder.
Western intelligence estimates that Pyongyang has sent about 12,000 troops. A third of them have been killed, wounded or missing in action by mid-January.
Russia continues to make long-term efforts to build up its reserve of manpower with the organizations of the All-Russian Cossack Society and to create a ready and well-trained priority reserve designed to protect the Kremlin from a potential retaliatory strike in the event of a possible future partial mobilization of Russian reservists.
On January 22, the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service for Northwestern Russia, Sever, reported that Russian organizations had allocated a total of 11.4 million rubles (approximately $114,880) for territorial defense training for 100 officers within the framework of the All-Russian Cossack Society's "Great Don Army" branch, including 5.6 million rubles (approximately $56,400) from the Grant Fund of the President of Russia and 5.7 million rubles (approximately $57,400) from the organization "Great Don Army".
The training will include drone piloting training and tactical, medical and fire-fighting training. A separate part of the training will be devoted to organizing defense and interacting with political authorities in "war conditions".
The Kremlin's efforts to expand the All-Russian Cossack Societies, following the law of March 2024 to include members of the All-Russian Cossack Society in the Russian army's mobilization reserve are likely an attempt to expand the number of well-trained soldiers in Russia's active reserve that the Kremlin could call up to fight in Ukraine or elsewhere during a possible future partial mobilization of Russian reservists.
Russian military bloggers have complained and expressed concern about recent allegations that the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-led interim government in Syria has suspended Russian investment and financial participation in the port of Tartus, as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
Ukrainian forces have recently regained lost positions near Toretsk.
Russian forces have recently advanced near Chasov Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo, and Velika Novosilka.
The Kremlin has launched an information operation aimed at creating the false impression that the Russian economy is doing well, despite numerous persistent indicators of macroeconomic difficulties.
ISW continues to monitor macroeconomic data that directly contradicts the Kremlin’s claims that the Russian economy is doing well.
The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader demographic problems, declining savings, and a growing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, rising wages, and deteriorating production capacity.
These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin’s efforts to demonstrate economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and demonstrating Russian power abroad, while concealing the real challenges facing the Russian economy, particularly exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.
Russian state media reported that Russia may resume direct gas supplies to Transnistria despite recent discussions for the supply of non-Russian gas to the region.