The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) proposed on February 3 new rules for diseases for conscripts and those who sign military service contracts. Thus, syphilis, hypertension, atrophy of the central nervous system, skin diseases, schizophrenia, psychotic disorders are now milder diseases that do not disqualify from service and sending to the front.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) emphasizes this in its latest analysis.
Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision for a new mobilization, despite indications that the Russian army is struggling with its heavy losses at the front. The chairman of the Russian State Duma’s defense committee, Andrei Kartapolov, said on February 4 that Russia currently had an advantage on the battlefield.
Duma defense committee member Viktor Sobolev added that 740,000 people had signed contracts for Russian military service. The data is likely from the start of the war in 2022. He argued that mobilization “will only make things worse” because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the front lines.
The first deputy chairman of the Duma’s defense committee, Andrei Krasov, also said that mobilization was not necessary, as Russian military registrars were successfully recruiting new personnel.
ISW is monitoring reports in late 2024. and January 2025, the monthly rate of new Russian military personnel is likely to be at or below the amount needed to replace losses.
ISW has also observed reports that selected Russian federal subjects are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas because there are not enough volunteers.
Russian authorities continue to discuss the possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast by Russia, but claim that Ukraine's counteroffensive in September 2022 has thwarted plans to hold a referendum in the region at that time. The occupation governor of Kharkiv Oblast, Vitaly Ganchev, said in an interview with the Russian state news channel RIA Novosti published on February 4 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia.
Ganchev claims that he is "sure" that Russian forces will take over the entire Kharkiv region because Russia needs a "sanitary zone" to protect the Belgorod and Kursk regions and the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions from Ukrainian shelling. Ganchev called on Russian forces to drive Ukrainian forces "as far west as possible".
Ganchev claims that the occupation authorities in Kharkiv region had a plan in August 2022 to hold a "referendum" on the annexation of Kharkiv region by Russia, but the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv region in early September 2022 prevented the referendum. Ganchev claims that if it were not for the Ukrainian counter-offensive, Kharkiv Oblast would have become "the fifth region to join Russia on September 30".
Currently, Russian forces occupy parts of the northern and eastern parts of Kharkiv Oblast, but Russia has not illegally attempted to annex Kharkiv Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin did not include it in his June 2024 demands that Ukraine cede Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts - even territories that Russian forces do not occupy in those regions.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi visited the "Kievska" electrical substation in the Kyiv region on February 4 to assess the damage as Russian strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs).
Grossi warned that a direct strike on the substation or a power outage could cause a nuclear accident.
The Ukrainian publisher Suspilne noted that the Kyiv electrical substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies electricity to the city of Kyiv and central and northern Ukraine. On the night of November 16-17, 2024, Russian forces carried out a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
Grossi reported that the Russian strikes in November 2024 damaged several unspecified electrical substations connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and Yuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power plants, but not the plants themselves.
Arthur Lorkovsky, director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine's energy supplies), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing Ukraine's damaged energy infrastructure could take a significant amount of time to find and reinstall specialized equipment. Another Ukrainian energy expert said that Ukraine needs an expedited delivery of spare parts.
A significant number of Russian ships that have been in the port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia, as Russian-Syrian negotiations over Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria are reportedly ongoing. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities would continue contacts on "all issues", including Russia's continued access to the port of Tartus.
Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.
OSINT analyst MT Anderson published satellite images from the morning of February 4 showing the Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky-class landing ship Ropucha, the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Golovko, and the Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Grigorovich off the coast of Tunisia.
Satellite images and reports from the Main Directorate of Military Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR) indicate that all of these ships were in the port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.
The departure The significant number of ships from the port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the outcome of the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the ships off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not headed for Libya, despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as part of the Critical Threats Project Africa.
The Ukrainian Defense Ministry's Countermeasures Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite images collected on January 18 and 27 show that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II in Tartus. The Ukrainian Countermeasures Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in the "shadow fleet" of Russia.
The Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to drastically change the routes of Russian ships between Russia and Syria. The Ukrainian Resistance Center has released video evidence showing that it has gained access to the "Mosaik" system, an internal system that Russia reportedly uses to track Russian ship routes and cargo. Data from the "Mosaik" system show that the Sparta IV traveled between Tartus, Syria, and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai via the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in April 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) logistics company Oboronlogistika owns the Sparta, Sparta II, and Sparta IV cargo ships.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian ships stopped traveling between Russia and Syria via the Black Sea in the spring of 2024, possibly due to the threat of strikes by Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea.
Instead, Russian ships are reported to have begun traveling from ports in the Baltic Sea to Syria via the Atlantic Ocean, despite the fact that this route is several times longer than the Black Sea route. The appearance of Russian ships in the Mediterranean on February 4 is consistent with reports that Russian ships are now traveling between Syria and Russia via the Atlantic.
Russia has also reportedly used ships belonging to the Defense Ministry’s Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO ships in the Baltic Sea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that it had obtained access to correspondence between an unspecified branch of the Russian Seaports Administration and the captain of the Sparta, in which Russian authorities requested that the Sparta and Sparta II monitor Latvian patrol ships in April 2023.
NATO conducted its Aurora 23 exercises near Sweden in April and May 2024.