ISW: Vladimir Putin is ready to fight for years

Over the past year, Russian troops lost more than five tank divisions and thousands of soldiers in their attempts to capture Pokrovsk. Currently, Russian forces continue their attempts to capture the city from the east and west, which indicates Vladimir Putin's intention to conquer all of Ukraine by military force at any cost, if he cannot do it through negotiations. These conclusions are drawn by analysts from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in their current review of the situation in the Pokrovsk direction, Radio NV reports.

Currently, Russian troops are pursuing three different tactical goals in the Pokrovsk direction, say ISW analysts. They were recently expressed by Viktor Tregubov, spokesman for the Operational-Strategic Group of Forces "Khortitsa". In this section of the front line, Russian troops are trying to:

-cut the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostantinovka road northeast of Pokrovsk,

-surround Pokrovsk from the west,

-develop an offensive in the direction of Novopavlovka (southwest of Pokrovsk)

However, Ukrainian drones and local counterattacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to hinder Russian advances in the area. Currently, Russian forces are making limited advances northeast of Pokrovsk towards the T-0504 road and southwest of Pokrovsk towards Novopavlivka. However, the Russians appear to be having difficulty advancing in the areas south and southwest of Pokrovsk, where Ukrainian forces focused most of their counterattacks in February, March, and early April 2025.

The current Russian offensive northeast of Pokrovsk supports both Russia’s efforts to encircle Pokrovsk from the east and west, and its efforts to put pressure on Kostantinovka from the south, advancing along the T-0504 highway and eliminating the Ukrainian stronghold southwest of Toretsk. ISW experts recall that in early 2025, the Russian military command deployed additional units to reinforce Russian offensive operations east and northeast of Pokrovsk. However, in recent months, Russian forces have made only minor progress towards Kostantinovka (northeast of Pokrovsk). Russian troops have advanced only 5-7 km north of Vozdvizhenka.

Recently, the Russians have also advanced beyond the western outskirts of Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk in the area of Panteleimonovka and Oleksandropol. Therefore, Russian troops may now allocate additional forces and change the priorities of offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk if they begin to advance significantly from Toretsk towards Kostantinovka, ISW predicts.

The situation south and southwest of Pokrovsk remains extremely dynamic against the backdrop of intensified Russian offensive operations and local Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area.

In mid-March 2025, Russian troops intensified offensive operations in the direction of Pokrovsk in order to reach and capture Pokrovsk, as well as Mirnograd (a city east of Pokrovsk). However, since late autumn 2024, they have not been successful due to resistance from the Ukrainian defense forces. Geolocation footage from 8 April shows that Ukrainian forces have recently advanced in the area west of Kotlyno (southwest of Pokrovsk), while Russian forces have recently made minor advances northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk). In late January and February 2025, Ukrainian forces launched some counterattacks and made some progress in the area of Shevchenko, Pishtane, Kotlyno and Nadeyevka.

However, ISW believes that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have not been able to establish a strong foothold in the area, and in recent weeks the Russians have slowly repelled most of these Ukrainian advances to the south and southwest of Pokrovsk. At the same time, Ukrainian defense forces continue to conduct sporadic local counterattacks in the area.

ISW analysts point out several more conclusions about the situation near Pokrovsk:

Russian troops continue to exhaust their manpower and equipment as a result of unsuccessful mechanized and infantry attacks supported by armored vehicles southwest of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian units report that the Russians are using tanks, armored personnel carriers, all-terrain vehicles, motorcycles and infantry in the attacks. There is also geolocation data on repelling a number of Russian mechanized attacks. On April 2, a spokesman for one of the Ukrainian brigades operating in the Pokrovsk sector said that the losses of Russian equipment southwest of Pokrovsk have tripled since the beginning of US negotiations with Russia (probably since mid-February 2025, ISW adds).

In recent weeks, Russian forces have moved slightly closer to the administrative border of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions as a result of mechanized attacks, especially west of Preobrazhenka (southwest of Pokrovsk). However, at the time of publication of the ISW report, Russian forces had not yet advanced the remaining 3 km to the border with Dnipropetrovsk region in this area.

The Russians have managed to make only minor progress in the Pokrovsk direction due to Ukrainian counterattacks and better integration of Ukrainian ground and unmanned forces. The experience of Russia's war against Ukraine has shown that it is difficult for the Russian military command to organize multi-directional offensive operations. The actions of Ukrainian unmanned aircraft further complicate these efforts.

Russian "military commanders" have repeatedly acknowledged that Ukrainian drones have air superiority at low altitudes and force Russian troops to move on foot for distances of more than 10 km, which makes it difficult for Russian troops to be supplied with ammunition, water and fuel.

Over the past 13 months, Russian troops have lost more than five tank divisions and thousands of soldiers in attacks on Pokrovsk in an attempt to capture the city, ISW points out. Analysts believe that the current Russian offensive operations aimed at capturing Pokrovsk and the offensive on Kostantinovka emphasize Vladimir Putin's intention "to conquer all of Ukraine by military means at all costs, if he cannot do it through negotiations".

In February 2025 Viktor Tregubov, a spokesman for the Khortytsia Regional Military District, estimates that Russian troops are losing between 14,000 and 15,000 people per month in the Pokrovsk direction, including up to 7,000 killed. In other words, in the first three months of 2025, Russian troops could lose up to 45,000 people in the Pokrovsk area, analysts believe. A spokesman for one of the Ukrainian brigades operating in the Torets direction said that as of mid-July 2024, Russian forces have lost more than 15,000 people in this area in killed, bringing the total losses of Russian forces in this area to over 50,000 people.

ISW has already assessed that the Russian defense industry is unable to produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at a rate that could compensate for the current level of losses in Russia in the medium and long term. The current increased use of armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk sector, as well as future Russian attacks on Pokrovsk and Kostantinovka, will only lead to even greater losses of manpower and equipment - if the Russian army is even capable of conducting such operations after the heavy losses of armored vehicles and personnel over the past three years of fighting, notes ISW.

Nevertheless, Putin and the Russian military command seem intent on capturing Pokrovsk and continuing on to Kostantinovka, regardless of the losses. Russia’s attempts to advance towards Kostantynivka from several directions underscore Russia’s ongoing efforts to capture a number of “fortress” towns in the Donbas, although such an operation could take several years for the Russian military if the West continues to provide aid to Ukraine.

ISW has previously assessed that Russian commanders are likely prepared to launch such long-term operations because they assume (or know directly) that Putin has no intention of ending the war in Ukraine anytime soon.

ISW also reminds us that, according to Putin’s “theory of victory,” Russian forces can continue their gradual, creeping advance into Ukraine indefinitely. The Russian president has also made it clear on more than one occasion that he is not interested in ending the war on terms other than those he dictates. In his recent threat assessment for 2025, The Russian Internal Intelligence Service noted that Putin continues to try to secure Ukraine's surrender through both diplomatic and military means. The ISW continues to assess that Putin is not interested in ending the war and intends to continue it until he achieves his goals in Ukraine - i.e., overthrowing the current Ukrainian government and destroying the Ukrainian army.