On June 15, Russian writer Alexander Prokhanov published a pathos-filled article "We love you, FSB!". With this publication, the 87-year-old Prokhanov, called in Soviet times the "nightingale of the General Staff" because of his proximity to the top brass of the armed forces and his active participation in propaganda, reacted to the worsening situation in the Middle East by hastening to express solidarity with Iran.
In his article, he attacked Israel and raised the traditional question for the Russian "national-patriotic public" about the role of "Mossad agents" in the destruction of the USSR and the transformation of Russia in the 1990s, and also hints at the possible participation of the Israeli security services in the now legendary Ukrainian operation "Cobweb".
Modern Russian anti-Israeli propaganda
The article in which the conspirator Prokhanov, who does not hide his anti-Semitic sentiments, refers to the familiar Soviet anti-Israeli propaganda from the time of Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov, evokes a generally positive response from the Russian-Belarusian Z-community. In the 90s and early 2000s, the marginalized author Prokhanov, whose high-flown style, abuse of hyperbole and nostalgia for the "red empire" that had faded into history, caused only ridicule among the Russian liberal public, in the mid-2020s became a "living classic", preferred by the authorities. In early June 2025, Vladimir Putin awarded Prokhanov the title of "Hero of Labor of the Russian Federation", and later praised him as "a thinking, philosophically minded person".
Prokhanov's current texts not only reflect his personal views on the world, but also meet the current requirements and aspirations of the Kremlin. The article "We love you, FSB!" is the quintessence of modern Russian anti-Israel propaganda. And the Russian leadership relies on this propaganda to achieve its domestic and foreign policy goals, without being ready to completely break with Israel.
Why does Putin need anti-Israel propaganda?
Even before Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Russia, maintaining good relations with Israel's opponents, did not hide its dissatisfaction with Russian Jews who moved to Israel after February 24, 2022, as well as with the Israeli authorities - for their diplomatic and humanitarian support for Ukraine and their refusal to participate in the propaganda campaign against the "Ukrainian Nazis". In its attacks on the Ukrainian enemy and personally against Volodymyr Zelensky, the Russian leadership does not hesitate to make statements with anti-Semitic overtones. However, Moscow does not purposefully seek a sharp deterioration in bilateral relations with Israel.
After the start of the war in the Gaza Strip, the Kremlin, fueling the anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli sentiments prevalent in Russia and seeking support from Iran and Arab countries, joined the ranks of radical critics of Israel and strengthened its contacts with Hamas and Tehran. At the same time, the Russian leadership was well aware that this policy would test the already difficult Russian-Israeli relations and alienate some of the local Russians in Israel, who after February 24, 2022, sided with the Kremlin.
However, political calculations, seasoned with hidden insults and long-standing grievances, ultimately prevailed and the authorities gave the green light to an anti-Israel campaign based on the postulates of Soviet anti-Zionism and borrowed from Iranian propaganda. The emphasis was placed on the alleged excessive influence of Israel on US and German policy and, above all, on the ruthlessness of the Israeli army. The actions of the Israeli army were contrasted with the mythologized "humane" methods of waging war in Ukraine by Russia, and the anti-Semitic comparisons between the methods of the Israeli army and the Nazis, widespread in the Soviet Union in the 1960s, became common rhetoric in official publications.
These trends, combined with the growth of anti-Semitism in Russia and the strategic partnership with Tehran, which provided significant support to the Kremlin in the war against Ukraine, led to a noticeable cooling of Russian-Israeli relations even before the Israeli strike on Iran. At the same time, Russia's importance as a foreign policy factor for Israel has significantly decreased after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime - the main pillar of Moscow's influence in the Middle East.
What will the clash between Israel and Iran bring to Russia?
Now, Israel's attack on Iran has sparked a wave of anti-Israeli publications in the Russian media and social networks. The famous Russian apologist for the Iranian regime, publicist Maxim Shevchenko, even suggested breaking off diplomatic relations with the "Zionists". And this idea is not new: this is exactly what the USSR and its Eastern European satellites did during the Israeli-Arab Six-Day War in 1967. Shevchenko, in fact, knows very well that today such a proposal does not meet the interests of the Kremlin and will not be implemented.
And no, the reason is not Jewish figures in the Russian leadership or the mythical sympathy for Israel that Putin and his entourage supposedly feel. Their professional socialization took place in the 1970s, and the KGB of the USSR, in which the future Russian president served, was a breeding ground for anti-Israel campaigns and theories of "Jewish world domination", which probably influenced not only the worldview of Alexander Prokhanov, but also Putin himself. However, the USSR's unilateral support for Israel's opponents, the rupture of diplomatic relations, and the discrimination of Jews in the Soviet Union significantly narrowed the field for Moscow's foreign policy maneuvers and worsened the Kremlin's image.
The current Russian rulers have learned a lesson from the past and therefore, although they attack Israel, they act more cautiously. In the medium and long term, a military conflict between Israel and Iran could lead to the weakening and eventual collapse of the fundamentalist regime in Tehran - and, accordingly, to the loss of an important partner for Russia. In the short term, it raises oil prices, distracts the US and Western countries from the war in Ukraine, limits their military resources to support Kiev, and gives Russia a chance - albeit an almost elusive one - to return to the international stage as a mediator between Iran and Israel.
These are the dividends the Kremlin is counting on. The current anti-Israel campaign is a balm for the souls of retrogrades like Alexander Prokhanov and is close to the Russian leadership in both form and content. Yet for the Kremlin, this campaign is primarily pragmatic and serves as a propaganda framework for Russian domestic and foreign policy.
Author: Alexander Fridman