Daniel Smilov's comment:
The governance of "Progressive Bulgaria" is both something new and something familiar. What is new is the unprecedented majority in parliament that it has in recent decades. What is familiar is the personalist nature of the formation, which almost entirely relies on the popularity of its leader Rumen Radev. The mandate of the government is also familiar: to deal with the conquered state and the practices of the "Borisov-Peevski" transitional model. What is new is the support received by Radev from pro-Russian or partly Eurosceptic voters who see the PB as an expression of their views.
When enthusiasm gave way to real problems
Over the past week, the new rulers have been confronted with the specifics in various sectors and the enthusiasm from the great electoral victory has slowly begun to fade. Despite this victory (quite naturally), serious accidents continue to occur in the country due to street racing, entire illegal cities are being discovered, people wanted for possible serious crimes appear in Belgrade, etc. The two modes of initial action of the new government so far were:
- The opposition is to blame for the problems;
- We need time to solve them.
Both modes work and will continue to work, but with each passing day and week their coefficient of useful action decreases. It is true that in the case near Varna a large knot of authorities was revealed who either overslept or outright legalized illegal construction with certificates of tolerance, notarial deeds and other instruments. The National Security Agency intervened again, which either chased the investor as a potential threat to security, or used him in the traditional way - to put pressure on the mayor of Varna Kotsev, who, on top of everything, unjustifiably spent half a year in custody right at the time the whole story unfolded. Adding the Ukrainian connection (which some argue is more likely Russian), the scandal has the potential to capture the public's attention and distract from the overall picture of the country's governance. Whatever comes out of Baba Alino, however, it will not be the end of corruption and mismanagement in Bulgaria, nor even the beginning of that end.
The challenges facing the PB from this perspective are systemic and they cannot be solved by covering up each old case with a new, fresher one, following the "every miracle in three days" model and a new Baba Alino the following week. We have seen enough of this kind of fight against corruption: a noisy start, lots of talk on television and the case gradually being forgotten. Or at most, as with Petyo Euroto, his brokerage in the judiciary was punished with a fine of 2,556 euros.
We will measure the success of "Progressive Bulgaria" by these indicators.
Since the media noise is very large, in order for people to orient themselves whether there is really a positive change in the government, they should monitor structurally determining indicators, such as the following:
1) Budget: will the government manage to propose a budget for 2026 and 2027 that is within the 3% deficit, without raising basic taxes and social security burdens and without freezing or reducing income in the public sector. This task is not the easiest, but the situation is far from "catastrophic", as some representatives of the government are trying to claim. Simply, fiscal consolidation must happen smoothly, so as not to lead to a sudden cooling of the economy - which is still growing at a pace ahead of the EU;
2) Prosecutor's Office: Sarafov's resignation from his post as acting prosecutor general and from other leading positions in the magistracy is a good signal for a new direction in governance. This signal can also be read as an invitation for the current status quo to agree on a "rearrangement" with the new government. People should not be touched, while at the expense of this, the punitive instruments will serve the new political powers. If this happens, we will have a failure of the new government in the most serious part of its political mandate;
3) SANS and the services: The change of SANS management is a good step, but here too it remains to be seen whether the vicious practices will not be continued. And they mainly consist in using the services as a truncheon against some and an umbrella against others;
4) New SJC, Inspectorate: The new administration is working on the draft laws for the election of new higher bodies in the judiciary. But here too, the result will be important, not just the conduct of the election procedure. Will a SJC be formed that is not just convenient for the new government, but actually fights for the rule of law? It is very important that the people who will be nominated are not anonymous lawyers and magistrates without a clear position on judicial issues. If the candidates do not have their own gravity, they would easily be included in some of the existing lobbies;
5) Old corruption scandals: A key indicator of success will be progress on the serious cases that have accumulated so far. The "Dwarves" and "Notaries" are nowhere to be found. The same can be said about the Corporate Banking case, the "Bozhkov" affair, the drawers and the house in Barcelona, the murder of Alexei Petrov, the "assassination" against Geshev, etc. If all this remains swept under the carpet, and at the same time more and more new cases are added to it, which are making a lot of noise, this will mean a failure for the new government. It is true that many of these cases are in the prosecutor's office and court, but it is also true that the executive and legislative branches can ask for and insist on results in these cases. And the disciplinary bodies in the judiciary can examine the reasons for the lack of progress in them (or for their deliberate waste). If there is a will, there will be progress;
6) Relations with the EU: If Bulgaria falls into isolation in the EU, this will be a serious setback. The first signals from Radev and his government are rather positive: he wants Bulgaria to be well integrated and with clear priorities in the EU. The indicators for this will be whether we manage to take advantage of the new common initiatives in defense and whether there are enough funds in the new budget framework to catch up with the others through cohesion and other funds. Budget disputes are always and everywhere difficult, so the more allies we have in them, the stronger position we will be in. And in general, it is not a winning approach to claim that we will not participate in common initiatives (for example, defense), but will demand solidarity financing from other Europeans. Such behavior is both in bad taste and counterproductive in most cases;
7) Ukraine: For the vast majority of European countries, support for Ukraine is an element of their own defense. The clearest case is the case with the Baltic states and Poland, but in practice, with the exception of one or two countries, everyone shares this position. Bulgaria under Radev's rule will probably be among the one or two countries mentioned as rhetoric. If this rhetoric does not violate the achieved European unity regarding aid (military and financial) for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, it can receive both European and national certificates of tolerance. But if rhetoric is replaced by blocking common initiatives, Bulgarian foreign policy will be seriously changed in the wrong direction. Because what is a danger to everyone is most likely a danger to us as well.
These guidelines can filter out the media noise from real change. The clock is ticking and the time for the first substantive reports is approaching. The presidential elections in the fall will also provide the first assessment by citizens.