"With the arrival of a new convoy of Russian armored vehicles from the port of Lomé, designed to support the deployment of the Russian African Union Mission in Mali, the mission has entered its fifth year. The Russian outlay of human lives and vast financial resources urgently demands a return, but what could it be? What is Russia’s ultimate goal in Mali?", writes Raphael Parens for War on the Rocks.
"When the "Wagner" — the predecessor of the African Union Mission in Somalia — entered Mali in December 2021, pursuing a “resources-for-security” deal similar to the one it had achieved in the Central African Republic. Among the lessons Wagner learned was the mistaken hope that future operations would proceed with the same ease with which the group had taken over the Central African Republic. There, the organization built a reputation as a guarantor of national security, and in return received full access to the state bureaucracy and the economy throughout the country — from gold and diamond mining to the sale of beer and alcohol. As I pointed out in 2022, Mali proved to be a much tougher nut to crack for Russia. Wagner’s failure to secure access to Mali’s mineral resources marked the beginning of the end for the organization, but so did the African Union — an organization directly subordinate to the Russian state — failed to gain access to Mali's gold after taking over from "Wagner".
"Wagner" has failed to gain a foothold in Mali's gold mining industry itself, although it has done so in the gold and diamond mines of the Central African Republic and in Syria's oil industry. "Wagner" has failed to wrest Mali's gold mines from the regime's control, and the African Corps has yet to show the business acumen of its predecessor. The Russian failure comes at a time when the Malian government is seeking to secure its own control over the country's gold mining — although this will still require the involvement of existing Western partners. This process began with a new mining code in 2023 that increased state profits and the state's share of ownership of mines, and then continued with the arrest of four Barrick Gold employees and the issuance of an arrest warrant for Barrick CEO Mark Bristow in late 2024.
Barrick and the Malian government then agreed to a settlement, under which Barrick was to pay the state approximately $430 million in exchange for the release of its employees, the dropping of charges, and the resumption of operations. Malian President Assimi Goita then began to centralize state control over gold mining through Sopamim — a state-owned enterprise created to control all Malian interests in the country's mines. These events helped to push Russia and its military contractors out of Mali's gold business, while simultaneously strengthening the Malian state and preserving the role of Western mining companies in the country.
While Wagner failed to secure access to the gold mines on its own, the Malian government appears to have paid them in gold revenues. Several sources cite U.S. intelligence reports that the Malian junta paid Wagner an estimated $10.8 million per month. The Malian government is believed to have funded Wagner primarily through taxes on international gold mining companies such as Barrick, or directly through gold when the funds for payments ran out. These claims are largely based on conjecture and anecdotal evidence, and without a clear documentary trail, they are very difficult to verify — which highlights the precarious nature of the financial arrangements between Mali and "Wagner".
However, the Royal Institute for Defence and Security Studies claims that "the operations in Mali were not profitable for "Wagner". Furthermore, "even if the annual profits had flowed to the Russian state rather than to [former "Wagner" leader Yevgeny] Prigozhin (which seems highly unlikely), they would almost certainly not have been enough to cover the costs of even a single day of Russian combat operations in Ukraine." Instead, the payment structure left economic power in the hands of Bamako.
The African Union and the Kremlin are trying to keep up the pressure on Bamako. The Russian conglomerate Yadran Group is partnering with the Malian state to build a gold processing plant, construction of which began in June 2025. However, Polish experts Filip Bryzka and Jędrzej Čerep point out that this plant will have to compete with the Malian-owned refinery Marena Gold, as well as with makeshift smelters in the central market of Bamako. Moreover, the timeline for the implementation of this project is unclear, and West Africa is full of planned foreign business projects that have failed or were never completed. Elsewhere, the African Union is continuing the "Wagner" attempts to secure control of the Intahaha artisanal gold mine, but has failed to establish control of the site. The Sentry’s executive director, Justyna Gudzowska, said that local miners say the African Corps controls some of the roads leading out of the mine, but these isolated attempts to collect fees are limited and reflect an overall failed strategy.
So what, if anything, is Russia getting in return for its presence in Mali? The political capital is significant, but competition with external partners, including Turkey, China, and the United Arab Emirates, continues and could threaten Russia’s unique access. Since 2022, Russia has certainly reaped diplomatic benefits in the Sahel, distancing Mali and its neighbors — Niger and Burkina Faso — from the West and bringing them under Russian influence. This has also served Russia’s geopolitical calculations at the United Nations, where its new partners vote alongside Moscow on issues related to the war in Ukraine.
While these political victories may have been useful in the past, they do not explain Russia’s continued involvement to this day. This assessment is particularly problematic if the assumption is that the African Corps is not pursuing material wealth in the way that "Wagner" did. If so, the African Corps is continuing to deploy "Wagner" without clear objectives, given that France and the United States have already left the Sahel. The West may be gone, but Russia is still footing the bill.
Instead, fading diplomatic victories are turning into a costly, protracted military operation. "Wagner" is believed to be lost some 84 fighters in an ambush near Tinzaouaten in late July 2024, and the African Union continues to lose helicopters, suffer attacks on its troops, and besiege its bases. Worse, the African Union has failed to stop jihadists from carrying out attacks across the country with near impunity, including in Bamako and on major highways. Russian operations have failed where the West has failed, and Russia’s reputation in the country continues to deteriorate.
The Kremlin is also facing rivals in its diplomatic campaign in Bamako. The arrival of three new Akinci medium-range drones could signal a shift in direction toward Turkish military assistance, following the strategy of its Sahel Alliance ally, Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso has chosen a military strategy largely focused on drone strikes against jihadist groups, reflecting the weakness of the ruling junta outside the capital and its inability to confront jihadist groups on the ground.
Mali has suffered significant setbacks in the past two years, including a particularly severe campaign in 2025, when the Al Qaeda-linked Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen established a fuel blockade of the capital and key cities. A shift to a drone-first strategy, while logical in some ways, would signal a weakened state that is unable to sustain ground forces across the country. While Mali has had Akinci drones before, these changing circumstances—along with the death of the junta’s pro-Russian defense minister, Sadio Camara—have made it necessary to could signal a weakening of Russian influence in Mali and an expanding Turkish presence.
China and the United Arab Emirates are smaller players in Mali, at least in terms of military aid, but that could change in the future. Chinese military investment in Mali has been limited to sales of arms and equipment, notably Norinco VP11 armored vehicles with mine and ambush protection captured from Tuareg forces at Tinzaouaten. However, Mali lacks the port infrastructure that China prefers to develop in Africa, and the current level of instability in the country does not favor the Chinese model of long-term investment.
UAE investments in Mali have centered around a $50 million payment to Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen for the kidnapping of an Emirati prince and another citizen — a payment that a recent UN report linked to the group’s offensive and to payments to the wider Al Qaeda network. The Emirati investment — this time likely to be directed at the Malian government — will depend on the end of the civil war in Sudan, where the UAE is a major backer of the Rapid Support Force.
At this point, Russia may remain in Mali out of inertia and the logic of sunk costs. While the Kremlin appears unable, and perhaps uninterested, in pursuing gold mining rights in Mali, the only other compelling reason to stay would be to prevent the return of French or American forces. Mali’s strategic value as a landlocked country in the heart of the Sahel does not justify this type of military investment. The country’s geographical location has proven to be more of a curse than an asset for Russia.
Instead of providing a base for other operations, Moscow has had to build air bridges from Syria and Libya and establish port agreements in Togo to supply its deployed forces, and the equipment and weapons imported by Russia are then used by the African Corps rather than sold to the Malian army. If Russia’s primary goal is a comprehensive solution to the jihadist or separatist problem — which has never been its real priority — it is unlikely that the Kremlin will be able to change the balance of the conflict until it ends its war in Ukraine. Instead, Russia continues to pay lip service to counterterrorism while focusing on ensuring the survival of an illiberal regime, maintaining a status quo that benefits neither Moscow nor Bamako.
Politicians in Washington and Paris should take note of Russia’s weakness in Mali and prepare for the eventuality. Another major attack on Bamako, particularly on the airport or government buildings, could force Goyta to take action against Russia. Similarly, another heavy defeat, similar to the one at Tinzaouaten, could lead to the Afrika Korps’s own evacuation on terms he sets.
However, the US or Western approach must be cautious, lest it fall into the same “security versus resources” trap that Russia has found itself in. Furthermore, while Malian leaders appear open to a wide range of partners, that willingness will depend on a commitment to the uncompromising use of force — especially against civilians — which the United States and France have refused to offer in the past and which prompted Mali to seek relations with Russia in the first place.