Debates about Russia's domestic authoritarian politics have long revolved around the relative weight of the military and security elites relative to their civilian counterparts. Some define Russia as a militocracy, while others argue that the balance of power subordinates the military to bureaucrats.
The sectors of other so-called "security ministries" - such as the FSB or the Interior Ministry - are usually seen as extremely influential, but not all-powerful, since at the heart of the Kremlin stands a unique model of autocratic legitimacy. This is what the political scientist from "George Washington University" writes and researcher at the Center for Naval Analyses Julian Waller in his analysis for the Moscow Times.
Since the start of the war in 2022, however, observers have increasingly noted the growing weight of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the FSB.
Due to the constant need for resources and the rebuilding of the army, the MOD now controls a large part of the Russian economy. Moreover, according to Vladimir Putin himself, war veterans are seen as a key personnel reserve for the future of the regime and for the inevitable intergenerational transfer of power in elite circles.
In parallel, the FSB - together with the Investigative Committee - has been given unusually wide freedom to conduct anti-corruption investigations and is gradually strengthening its role as an instrument of supervision not only over society but also over the army itself.
It was premature to talk about "the imminent transformation of Russia into a police state run by the services" in the first decade of Vladimir Putin's rule, but today's trends may point in this direction.
All of this reinforces the thesis of the militarization of the regime, combined with its transformation into a sustainable personalist dictatorship.
But the real picture is more complex, and the balance between repressive and technocratic elites in Russia remains fluid and unresolved.
The latest evidence of this dynamic came on October 31, when Vasily Osmarkov was appointed as the new Deputy Minister of Defense, replacing Colonel General Alexander Fomin, who had held the post since 2017.
The appointment continues the trend of rejuvenating the leadership of the Ministry of Defense with civilians - replacing military personnel with technocrats from the civilian sector instead of people from the security services. So, instead of strengthening the militarist, we see the rise of civilian administrators tasked with running Russia’s vast military-fiscal machine.
Osmarkov has no background in the service – he graduated from Moscow State University and the State University of Management, and until recently was first deputy minister of industry and trade. He is an expert on industrial policy, import substitution and the pharmaceutical industry.
His appointment follows the most significant personnel reshuffle in the Kremlin since the start of the war – the removal of long-serving Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in May last year.
Shoigu was reassigned to the Security Council, and in his place was appointed Andrei Belousov, an economist, technocrat and statesman. Along with him, other civilian figures have entered the ministry, including Anna Tsivilova, a relative of Putin.
These appointments have several explanations.
First, with the current volume of resources that the Ministry of Defense controls, the need for efficiency and clear management is obvious. The ministry is known for its opacity, internal feudal structures, and corruption, and disappointing results on the battlefield have created a convenient occasion to bring in "new people".
Second, the anti-corruption campaign is hitting both senior military and regional leaders who have fallen from grace. The installation of civilian technocrats without their own clientelistic networks is a way to keep both the army and its supervisors under control. This is a classic form of "coup insurance" - depriving the security forces of real autonomy.
Thirdly, the transfer of personnel from more competent ministries shows that the Kremlin is aware of the danger of bureaucratic paralysis, even in times of war. Authoritarian regimes often rely on cumbersome and unreformed administrations for control, but Russia continues to seek ways to modernize, albeit half-heartedly - from the Medvedev era to the appointment of Mikhail Mishustin as prime minister in 2020.
There are increasing signs that the presidential administration in the Kremlin is growing concerned about the state of the state machine.
Under the leadership of Sergei Kiriyenko, for example, programs for the "methodical" development of technocrats and managers are being implemented, and economists and trade specialists are being brought into the Ministry of Defense.
In conclusion, the Russian bureaucratic elite is on the move. The military has enormous influence, the security services are expanding their powers, and anti-corruption purges are becoming an instrument of control. But civilian technocrats still hold strong positions in the power structure.
Whether the removal of "Shoigu's guard" and its replacement with experts will lead to real tensions between the military and civilians remains to be seen.
For now, this is just further evidence that the tradition of the military's subordination to civilian power remains alive in Russia, and that no single definition can fully capture the complex evolution of its wartime authoritarian regime.