The daily devastating bombing of Ukraine and the Kremlin leader's intransigence often cause the world community to lose sight of the obvious truth: sooner or later the world will be without Putin. Even he himself, obsessed with immortality, finds it difficult to accept this idea. Organ transplantation could allow people to achieve immortality, he explained during his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in September. The Russian autocrat has also conducted research into "anti-aging technologies" a national scientific priority.
Although the Russian leader, who celebrated his 73rd birthday in October, amended the Constitution to theoretically allow him to remain in power until 2036, naming a successor is inevitable. And Western countries should be prepared for it now.
This is what John Kennedy, director of research at the European division of the Rand Corporation, warns in an analysis recently published on the American think tank's website. Premature approach? He doesn't think so: "Europe's future strategic stability depends on it." Especially since this transition could be "unpredictable, lengthy and violent due to the structure of the Russian government and political culture".
In an interview with the French newspaper L'Express, Kennedy, who is also an adviser to the British government on Russia, explains how NATO allies can specifically prepare for the question of the Russian president's successor, which remains taboo in Moscow.
L'EXPRESS: At 73, Vladimir Putin has already exceeded the average life expectancy of men in Russia by about five years, according to the latest WHO data from 2021. But isn't it premature to think about his successor, given that the war in Ukraine continues and he shows no signs of wanting to relinquish power?
JOHN KENNEDY: I don't think so. I think it is desirable and useful to think not only about the current crisis, but also about where we would like to be after Putin’s death. I think it is a sensible exercise. We need to gather evidence, analyze it, and propose a framework for reflection that will allow decision-makers to plan for his disappearance – or the situation in which we assume him dead – in order to develop different scenarios and be ready to react.
It is crucial to think about this now, in order to anticipate this event when it happens. We need to give ourselves the necessary space to systematically consider the figures who could represent a potential successor today – while accepting a certain degree of uncertainty – and to plan accordingly, because there are methods for doing so. And it is useful to remember that the Russian status quo that we face now will change over time. It is important to be prepared for this, especially in the circles responsible for strategic planning and foreign policy.
Vladimir Putin is not exempt from the laws of nature; he is aging. Moreover, he is fully aware of it. Perhaps the most telling moment was his conversation with Xi Jinping in Beijing in September. He raised the idea that some people could in the future live indefinitely. Xi replied - rather surprisingly - that some scientists believe that reaching the age of 150 is possible. This conversation, which was clearly intended to remain confidential (ed. note: the microphones were left on), reveals a lot about the mindset of the two autocrats.
Moreover, several anecdotal signs in recent years suggest that Putin has become increasingly concerned about his own survival. For example, he has maintained a very visible distance between himself and others during the pandemic and even after it. He often requires his interlocutors to wear masks in his presence. He now prefers video conferencing to face-to-face meetings. There are even reports of his interest in traditional remedies and medicinal plants, not to mention his regular retreats in Siberia.
L'EXPRESS: Should we expect Vladimir Putin to run for president again in 2030, if his health permits?
JOHN KENNEDY: Everything points to that. He changed the Constitution so that he can stay in power indefinitely. He is determined to suppress all forms of opposition, as well as independent media. He seeks to ensure that he and he alone can stay in power for as long as possible. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, and this was noticeable even before 2022, we have seen an increasing concentration of power in his hands.
His main opponent, Alexei Navalny, died in prison after being the subject of numerous attacks over several years. So yes, it is entirely plausible, even likely, that Vladimir Putin is seeking to remain in power beyond the end of his current term. And Russian history teaches us that leaders often die in office.
Many historical elements can be cited that characterize Russian political culture, but one of the most striking is undoubtedly the autocracy that Putin embodies to the fullest. Historically, all Russian autocrats of the 20th century have died while in power, with the exception of Boris Yeltsin, who, knowing he was ill, ceded power to Putin. This is an interesting development. Of course, we can also think of Stalin.
Putin has not yet surpassed Stalin in terms of the length of his rule, but there is currently no sign that he is considering stepping down. Of course, some factors could influence his decision. One possible scenario involves an unfavorable development of the situation in Ukraine. If Putin feels vulnerable politically or militarily, then his calculations could change. Another determining factor would be a serious health problem.
If his physical condition deteriorates or his mental state changes, he may feel the need to ensure continuity, ensure the transition of power, and protect himself and his family. These are, among other things, plausible reasons that could lead to a change in his views. But we must be prepared for him to remain in power until his death, since no change in his position suggests an imminent transition.
L'EXPRESS: You write that in order to best anticipate the post-Putin era, "Western governments must improve their intelligence on the Russian elite. The succession of power will not happen publicly, but within opaque networks of patronage." How can Western countries do this specifically? Does Vladimir Putin himself have preferences for a potential successor?
JOHN KENNEDY: Western intelligence services should start by mapping the various networks of influence, tracking the assets of the elite, and understanding internal rivalries. They should rely as much as possible on Russian diplomats, academics, and dissidents to analyze the dynamics in Putin's inner circle. To answer your second question, Putin has not, to our knowledge, publicly named a successor.
However, a fairly broad list of potential candidates can be drawn up from those close to power, using the old method of "Kremlinology", which consists of observing signs of proximity to the president, manifestations of favoritism, in order to assess their respective chances. This has fueled speculation about Alexei Demin, Putin’s former bodyguard who was recently promoted to Secretary of the State Council. There have also been rumors that a successor could come from within the security services, Putin’s inner circle, where he feels most comfortable. However, naming a successor too explicitly would put him at risk, as other powerful figures could also claim the position. It would also send a signal: that Putin is tired, that he is considering leaving, or that he no longer feels capable of fulfilling his role. In other words, by openly discussing or planning a successor, Putin would actually weaken his own position.
L'EXPRESS: "Russian history teaches us that transitions can hold surprises", you write, recalling that "few observers predicted that Putin would be elected by Yeltsin in 1999 or that Medvedev would succeed him in 2008." Does this unpredictability also apply to today's Russia?
JOHN KENNEDY: No one knows how the transition will unfold in Putin's case. But we are currently seeing a deterioration in socio-economic conditions in Russia. The trajectory is negative. And this has been exacerbated by the intensification of Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Of course, the socio-economic trajectory is not as negative as it was at the end of the Soviet period. But we are seeing increasing vulnerability and greater dependence within Russia itself. Demographic trends are extremely negative. The economy is concentrated in certain sectors. Innovation is not encouraged. So there are a number of problems that will worsen if Putin stays in power and continues his current political course.
He will leave his successor a Russia that is more dependent on China, burdened by the domestic and international consequences of the war, and facing a worsening health and demographic situation. So, whatever happens, the transition could be surprising. It could be long and potentially violent. Some socio-economic factors accompanying this transition will influence further developments.
L'EXPRESS: What do you mean by "violent" and "unexpected"?
JOHN KENNEDY: Putin has allocated certain sectors of the political economy to influential individuals, in exchange for their loyalty, among other things. And these men - because they are mostly men - control large parts of the state or the economy. They have privileged access to the profits generated by these vertical structures. Historically, they could be compared to the "boyars" - a kind of Russian feudal lords.
These men control and profit from the rents generated by the various vertical structures of power. They enrich themselves personally in exchange for stability in economic sectors and in society - which is why the opposition leader Alexei Navalny's fight was based on denouncing the corruption of these elites, not on a political ideology, whether left or right - but once we recognize that their loyalty is tied to a single person, their position depends entirely on him.
His physical absence would put them in a very vulnerable position. And the truth is that we know very little about how they would react during a transition. There is no guarantee that they could agree on a successor. And we do not know to what extent these elites actually agree among themselves. That is why, as I said, it is important to start investigating this now and analyze their profiles and potential chances.
We also need to consider the possibility that a successor could emerge from outside the traditional circles of power. This could be a figure from the regions or even - more unexpectedly - a war hero from the Ukrainian conflict, or perhaps someone who came directly from the ranks of ordinary citizens.
What we are discussing here is inherently highly speculative. But it is important that it is plausible. The Russian system, both politically and economically, is organized along a set of observable "vertical lines". It is therefore necessary to examine each vertical of power, identify its leader, and analyze the relationships and rivalries between these figures under Putin's rule.
L'EXPRESS: What does a thorough study of these verticals of power tell us?
JOHN KENNEDY: These "boyars" tend to stay in their positions for a very long time, which means that in Putin's Russia loyalty trumps competence, even if there are occasional shake-ups. Examples of this are the appointment of Mikhail Mishustin as prime minister or the promotions of Viktor Zolotov and Alexei Demin, both former Putin bodyguards. All of these men rose through the ranks with his personal support.
Along with these promotions, some pillars of the system have been in their positions for decades, such as Igor Sechin, head of the oil company "Rosneft"; Alexei Miller, CEO of "Gazprom"; and Sergei Kiriyenko, who previously headed "Rosatom" and now works in the Kremlin on key foreign policy issues. Most of these men are in their 60s and 70s and rose with Putin.
Many of them are even his former colleagues and friends, such as Andrei Kostin, who heads VTB Bank, as well as Igor Sechin and Nikolai Tokarev, chairman of the board of "Transneft". Even Sergei Shoigu, who was defense minister and who clearly failed to do his job during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, was given a "soft exit" by being moved to the Security Council. In this way, Putin strongly protects his inner circle. And these figures retain high positions in the long term. Therefore, it is quite possible that these officials, equal in status to him, will stay with him until the end, as they are loyal to him.
At the same time, Putin also needs people with a certain level of expertise in key areas, especially the economy, but also, recently, in the development of the military-industrial complex. This is the case with Elvira Nabiullina, who heads the Central Bank, or Andrei Belousov, the new defense minister: they are technocrats who control the most important political decisions. And Putin cannot afford to let them go. It was even reported that Nabiullina wanted to resign after the invasion of Ukraine, but the president prevented her from doing so.
L'EXPRESS: Are there any known disagreements within Putin's inner circle, whether in the Kremlin or in business?
JOHN KENNEDY: Yes, there are. If we look, for example, at "Gazprom" and "Rosneft" - the two largest energy companies in Russia - we see a certain rivalry between Igor Sechin and Alexei Miller. This is documented. A certain degree of rivalry is actually important to Putin, as it allows him to position himself as an arbiter.
This demonstrates his supremacy. We can observe similar rivalries throughout history, in different sectors. But this is probably less noticeable in the system of government itself and even more noticeable in the economy as a whole.
L'EXPRESS: "Vladimir Putin's absence will not automatically make Russia less dangerous," you predict. What do you mean?
JOHN KENNEDY: Historians of Russia often point to certain enduring sociocultural traits, such as autocracy, nationalism, and orthodoxy, that continue to shape the country's political culture. Similarly, researchers of "strategic culture" - an analytical method developed by Jack Snyder at the RAND Corporation in the 1970s - draw our attention to the semi-permanent characteristics of foreign policy decision-making in the Kremlin. The most obvious example is Russia’s imperialist view of its region—a view embodied, in particular, in Putin’s scandalous and misguided 2021 speech on the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian people.
Another striking feature is the tendency of Russian leaders to view their country as a full-fledged civilizational and geopolitical power, on a par with the United States and—more recently, more cautiously—China, despite Russia’s relative weaknesses.
Of course, I am referring here to long-term trends. But I think Western observers and politicians—myself included—are overly optimistic about the possibility of Russia becoming a democracy or that relations with Moscow can be stabilized through economic integration. Politicians need to be more cautious in preparing for the post-Putin era.