Author: Georgi Lozanov
Unlike the assumption that there may have been Kremlin interference in the determination of Rumen Radev's candidacy for president, which is unlikely to ever receive a definitive answer, events in the near future will show whether and to what extent the hypotheses that Putin may be behind his party project or a deal between him and Trump on the Balkans are justified. But even so, they can hardly impose it by force, and will have to rely on the national vote, which itself is quite possible to put him in first place. Even without technological manipulation of opinions, as was attempted in Romania, because in Bulgaria they are already manipulated by propaganda to a considerable extent.
The first electoral group that will readily vote for Radev's party (PR) is that of the socialist nostalgics, whose share should not be underestimated - the further we move away from the "dictatorship of the proletariat", the more their number paradoxically increases. At first because of elementary life nostalgia for youth, and later by attracting those who proved unable to appreciate the historical chance to live in a democracy instead of a dictatorship. In the 1990s, Konstantin Pavlov wrote: "The mechanism of dictatorship is something more comprehensive and more understandable than democracy. Democracy is complex and contradictory - at every single moment: its goal is higher than itself. This explains the phenomenon that the dictatorship has supporters even among its victims. And so they started saying that under "Bai Tosho" it was better: when you don't have the qualities to live in freedom, you want there to be no freedom at all. And let everyone collectively return to the panelkas, to reheat their sauerkraut, to lie under their Muscovites, to drink their homemade brandy, to listen to "Serbian", to curse the authorities in the evening, and to flatter them in the morning. Such is the ideal of the socialist-nostalgics, which a possible party of Radev has the potential to fulfill in its current version of moderate Euroscepticism. Skepticism towards our integration with Western Europe precisely because it is equal to democracy, but moderate, so as not to lose its benefits.
Radev vs. Kostadinov
Here is the essential nuance between "Vazrazhdane" and a possible party of Radev, which was clearly manifested in their war against the euro. Kostadinov led it and continues to lead it with "soul and heart" (until Bulexit), while Radev played it hesitant and both claimed that he was for the common currency, and did everything possible to postpone its introduction. He hardly realized that the risk of this never happening was close to 100 percent in the increasingly acute international context. The result sought by both coincided, the difference was in their communicative strategies. And Radev's is far more profitable than the socialist-nostalgics, which will significantly reduce their vote for Kostadinov - and he has no other electorate, outside of his small hard core.
The Russian proxies went crazy with this euro not only because it institutionally completes our integration with Western European countries, but mainly because it is a widely accessible symbol of our belonging to them, which everyone holds in their hands. And it directly affects national self-esteem, regardless of what is said on television or in podcasts.
Radev vs. BSP
Radev's maneuvers to postpone the euro were supposed to attract another electoral group, no longer along political lines, but along social lines - the group of the financially worried and unprotected, for whom he would appear as a savior from the price increases caused by the currency change. The increase itself, presented in this way, was a purposefully inflated media bubble, because it started without any change - since Covid. And it seemed to be deliberately stimulated by the threat of strict sanctions against speculation after the entry of the euro, so that it could run wild before then. The coalition support for the government that introduced the euro, by the BSP, redirected this main electoral group for it to Radev. Although the oldest party seems to have reached the point where it is ready to accede to him - an entire party of one man, if he decides to accept it at all.
The only one who really did something to prepare Bulgarians with limited incomes for the eurozone was Assen Vassilev in his capacity as Finance Minister, by preemptively raising all pensions and state salaries to an unknown scale. But lest anyone acknowledge his gesture against inequalities, he was subjected, together with the PP-DB, to powerful attacks, including for raising pensions.
So: Radev's battles for the Eurosceptic and social electorates already seem to have been won. But for the other two, it is not so certain.
Radev vs. Borisov
At first glance, the opportunistic electorate is also "tied up": those who vote for whom they predict will win anyway - and this contributes to his victory in a "self-fulfilling prophecy" mode. And in this case, Radev was specially "assisted" with an interview in a format and with a duration as if he had already won the elections.
The opportunistic vote for Radev partially coincides with that of the socialist-nostalgics, but expanded with the reoriented clientele of other parties and geopolitically strengthened by the USA and Russia, which have regained their role as "great powers" in the Euro-Atlantic space. It is in their common interest for Radev to be elected in order to bring a kind of Bulgarian Orban onto the scene (according to the formula - in the EU against the EU), especially if Orban himself loses the next elections in Hungary. But here Radev's powerful competitor is Boyko Borisov in a battle between the generals, who prepared for it by suddenly inserting Bulgaria into Trump's Peace Council, side by side with Hungary from the EU. In other words: Putin may be for Radev, but Trump will be for Borisov.
Radev vs. PP-DB
The most dramatic will be Radev's battle for the fourth type of vote - the punitive vote, the wave of which brought citizens to the streets of Bulgaria. A wave that was raised by Borisov and Peevski with Peevski's "exaggeration", according to Borisov. With speeches against the oligarchy, Radev has set out to take away the punitive vote from PP-DB, directing it against them themselves because of their alliance with Borisov and Peevski, even though it was in defense of the Bulgarians from Radev's pro-Russian aspirations. He confirmed them with his new answer to the old question - whose Crimea is it: "According to international law, Crimea is part of Ukraine, and reality says that Crimea is part of Russia". That is, what is important is what Russia can appropriate, not what the law prohibits it from doing. Which is not just absurd, but also encourages complete impunity in politics.
Radev's appetite for the punitive vote is probably fueled by the fact that this happened last time - after the protests in 2020, when the PP and DB supported him in search of allies to fight corruption. But what he distinguished himself with in his second presidential term, apart from the unprofitable contract with "Botas", was mainly his resistance to aid for Ukraine. So the PP had to stand up to their "political father", who, angry that they no longer wanted to listen to him, called them "charlatans".
This background should be the "earring in the ear" of the democratic community, to which the genzits have already joined and which should not allow Radev to "steal" its vote. Moreover, he is as punitive as he is strongly pro-European, to which Radev does not meet expectations.
However, what would happen if a possible party of Radev won and truly dismantled the inherited model of governance, ensured the independence of the judiciary and the media, opposed Putin's expansionist policy, condemned his war crimes, confidently entered the coalition of the willing and bet on "value-based realism" (as defined by Mark Carney)? Then Radev will become a national hero like the Revival heroes and children will study him from a young age. But unfortunately, at least according to the applications so far, this does not seem possible.
It seems far more possible to begin a managed transfer of autocracy from Moscow. Essentially the same one that began to solidify from within and the citizens filled the squares...