At a press conference in Prague on May 31, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken promised that the upcoming NATO summit in Washington would provide the Ukraine "a bridge to NATO membership". It's already been a long way to get here. The alliance first announced in 2008 that Ukraine would become a NATO member. Sixteen years later, the failure to fulfill that promise has frustrated Ukraine and fueled Russian President Vladimir Putin's confidence that he can subdue the country. Another empty promise of membership or a bridge to nowhere would be counterproductive. To be credible, the bridge to NATO membership must be built in a way that institutionalizes Ukraine's integration into the Alliance's structures, starting now, writes the Atlantic Council.
The sad reality is that NATO today lacks the consensus needed to grant membership to Ukraine. At the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, that consensus was narrowly missed when the United States and Germany blocked efforts led by a broad coalition of allies to extend a membership invitation to Kiev. Nevertheless, the summit was notable for unprecedented support among NATO allies for Ukraine's membership aspirations. Moreover, in the communique from the Vilnius summit, the members of the Alliance confirmed "the commitment we made at the 2008 summit in Bucharest that Ukraine will become a member of NATO.
There is already speculation among NATO watchers about what might be included in Blinken's proposed bridge to NATO for Ukraine. One possibility is a stronger emphasis on joining the NATO-Ukraine Council. Another is for the Alliance to take responsibility for generating and coordinating security assistance to Ukraine. Third, there may even be an expanded role for NATO in training Ukrainian soldiers.
While any of these elements would be constructive — especially those focused on helping Ukraine beat off a Russian invasion — none inspires much confidence in the alliance's promise to one day grant Kiev NATO membership. This is because all of these potential elements are commitments in which Ukraine and NATO member states remain on different sides of the table. Although they would help Ukraine, they do not alleviate the feeling that Ukraine, after more than a decade and a half, remains outside the NATO community.
The bridge to membership will be reliable only if it includes elements that tangibly and institutionally contribute to the integration of Ukraine into the structures of the Alliance. Repeated or restated promises are no longer enough. Institutional integration, not just additional commitment, is the key to making the bridge reliable.
At the upcoming summit in Washington, NATO can take three decisions that will make Blinken's bridge to membership tangible and convincing:
First, the Alliance must officially recognize that Ukraine meets the requirements for NATO membership. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly and simply states the requirements for membership: "The Parties may, by unanimous consent, invite any other European country which is able to uphold the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic Area to join to this contract. Ukraine, of course, is located in Europe. It is an established democracy with a vibrant civil society that has repeatedly held free and fair elections. Its democratic resilience was highlighted when some of those elections had to withstand active Russian interference. No country contributes more today - and sacrifices more blood - to protect the security of the North Atlantic region than Ukraine.
When NATO allies deny these realities and claim that Ukraine is not ready for membership, it is extremely disappointing for Ukraine and undermines the credibility of the Alliance's promises of membership. For Russia, this can only appear as a weakness in the Alliance's commitment to support Ukraine.
Some might argue that acknowledging Ukraine's readiness would reveal the real reason for the West's failure to grant membership to Ukraine - the fear of being drawn directly into the war. But this hesitation is hardly masked by NATO's refusal to recognize Ukraine's qualifications. Rightly or wrongly, avoiding combat is an openly stated goal for NATO leaders. Refusal to recognize and welcome Ukraine's qualifications only fuels mistrust and frustration in Ukraine in favor of Putin.
Second, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to appoint military and civilian personnel to fill positions in NATO's headquarters, agencies and military command structure. This would allow Ukraine to gain experience in NATO's institutional culture and procedures and to deepen its relations with NATO and its member states. Ukrainian officials would bring to NATO invaluable - indeed unparalleled - experience, expertise and insight into how to most effectively counter Russian military forces. As for the security risk of bringing non-NATO countries into secret NATO discussions and information, Ukraine is not a problem. No country is more determined than Ukraine when it comes to preventing intelligence from leaking to its adversaries. In fact, Ukraine is probably more reliable in this regard than a number of allies.
Third, NATO should grant Ukraine what has been granted to other candidate countries invited to cross the bridge to NATO membership - an observer seat on the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Alliance's decision-making body. In this capacity, Ukraine will not have a vote or veto at the table, but will be able to observe and contribute to NAC deliberations. It is clear that Ukrainian officials have perspectives and experience that would be invaluable to these top-level NATO discussions about how to deter and defend against Russian aggression.
In the post-Cold War decades, Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, and most recently Finland and Sweden participated as observers in the NAC after being invited to join NATO. A Ukrainian seat in the NAC would be a highly symbolic demonstration of the Alliance's determination to grant Ukraine membership. This would reverberate throughout Ukraine and undermine Putin's confidence in his ability to block Ukraine from joining the alliance.
Since 2008, the mantra that "it's not a question of if, but when Ukraine will join NATO" has become increasingly hollow, if not counterproductive. If an invitation to join NATO is not possible at the Washington summit, then the Alliance has options to add the necessary credibility to its membership pledge to Ukraine. He should use them.