Let's start with the topic of the upcoming NATO summit in Washington, which will be held next week - in the period from July 9 to 11. Prof. Tagarev, what decisions can we expect to be made by the allies and why will they be so important for the future of the war in Ukraine, the security of Europe and the world?
At the NATO summits, there are always many issues and different issues discussed, but from this meeting I expect, the focus of the meeting in Washington is first - to note that this is an operationally successful political-military alliance that has already 75 for years has been protecting the security of its members and ensuring that they are not subject to aggression, and it has been doing so very successfully over this long period. For this alliance to continue to be successful, it must now be extremely well prepared against the biggest security threats and risks. The biggest threat at the moment is definitely the Kremlin's aggressive policy.
The war that he (Editor's note - Putin) launched with his large-scale aggression since 2014, with the large-scale aggression since February 2022, this war has been going on for the third year now – it is apparent that President Putin's appetites are not diminishing. And from this point of view, NATO must show that, having already adopted the plans for the deterrence and defense of potential aggressors with a focus on the east at a summit in Vilnius last July, these plans must now be fulfilled with substance.< /p>
I.e. to be clear that what is defined as a requirement and outlined in general parameters can now be fulfilled by creating all the necessary command and control structure, decision-making mechanisms and transfer of responsibilities from the political to the military authorities to undertake of the determined actions, with the deployment of troops of the Union, the multinational battle groups already known to the Bulgarian citizens, which in Bulgaria we already have such a multinational battle group for two years, and with the creation of all the necessary conditions for their successful actions - including repositioning of equipment, of ammunition, their creation with fuels and creation of conditions for their reinforcement when necessary.
This is perhaps the most important question for all allies. It is, of course, very directly related to the development of military actions on the territory of Ukraine, because if Ukraine, as we hope and help, manages to resist Russian aggression, it sharply reduces the probability of Russian aggression against a NATO member country. And vice versa, if Putin manages to achieve his goals in Ukraine, to subjugate this large country both in terms of population and territory - perhaps I should remind you that Ukraine is the largest country in terms of territory entirely located on the European continent and in terms of material resources , Human Resources. Then the probability of aggression and of achieving Putin's imperial goals increases very seriously.
And that is why I personally expect decisions to be made on how to continue to provide assistance to Ukraine from all its parameters: political, diplomatic, financial, economic and military assistance, so that it can guarantee its security and, over time, succeed in liberating occupied territories. Only in this way will conditions be created for a more lasting and certainly for a just peace. There is no other peaceful solution. Any other peaceful solution, which we hear our politicians talking about on a regular basis, will not be sustainable and will not be fair, and will not return us to the international framework for guaranteeing global security based on the UN Charter .
And since you say that we have politicians who say that the conflict should be resolved by peace and by peaceful negotiations, I want to ask you because in recent weeks the saga of who should represent the country us - the president or the prime minister, it ended in such a way that initially it was decided that the president and the prime minister would go together to the meeting, and then the president said that he did not like the position of our country, saying "I do not accept some provisions of the framework positions adopted by the Council of Ministers regarding commitments that our country undertakes regarding the war in Ukraine”. But since our position is common, shouldn't individual political differences be put aside here and the country appear united? Doesn't this destabilize our position?
First, I must point out that according to our Constitution, the leadership and conduct of internal and external policy, security and defense policy is the function of the Council of Ministers. When the Council of Ministers performs these functions, it must follow, because we are a parliamentary republic, all legal and other politically oriented decisions of the National Assembly. In this regard, the President has quite limited functions under the Constitution.
Yes.
The fact that he is the Supreme Commander does not change the position clearly spelled out in our Constitution, that this is a function of the Council of Ministers. The very decision to include the president in the delegation was strange to me. And then, when he is included, he cannot help but be the head of a delegation. That the Prime Minister will also go does not change the fact that there is one leader and that leader would be the President. But when he goes, he must express the national position, not his personal position. And in this regard, the Council of Ministers approached correctly by asking the parliament what decision to make, and then when it approved what Bulgaria's position should be, presented at the summit in Washington.
And the president has already decided that he should not be restricted in such a way and refused to go, which is ultimately his right and his decision. But you said the saga was over – maybe it is not yet finished, since we hear that these days the vote of the draft cabinet from the GERB-SDS political party will be submitted, the cabinet vote will be submitted. If we have a new cabinet, a new prime minister, foreign minister and defense minister, they are supposed to go to Washington.
Because if this cabinet succeeds, if it is voted in the National Assembly, surely the Prime Minister will be different according to the request of GERB, and he cannot be replaced, although we hear ministers that they are still being discussed, but for sure there will be another foreign minister. So it remains to be seen who will represent us at the summit in Washington. In any case, it must be a current prime minister, not a former one, even if one or two days old.
Do you worry that there may be a retreat from the current Euro-Atlantic position, which has been firmly held for the last year and a half?
No, they don't bother me, since GERB-SDS, PP-DB, and DPS have a very consistent policy in this regard. The Euro-Atlantic majority in the National Assembly has always been solid in recent years and I do not expect any divergence from this point of view. Both the caretaker cabinet and a possible regular cabinet, if voted on this week, I'm sure will follow this policy line.
We move on to the war in Ukraine. You started the thread. Exactly 858 days have passed since February 24, 2022, when Putin launched the illegal aggression against a sovereign country. However, the situation on the battlefield looks more like a war of attrition. It is as if the Russian Federation is waiting to see how the presidential elections in the USA will develop, whether governments will change in Europe. Do you think that Russia is also waiting for a possible appearance of Trump on the field or rather at the moment there is a delay, a strategic retreat from some positions? Since it is obvious that both sides are not on the offensive.
This period now – early summer, summer in general, early fall, late spring is more suitable for offensive action than late fall and winter, when these US elections will happen and possible changes that we cannot predict with sufficient confidence. In my view, it's just that neither side has the resources to make serious progress offensively, nor does the other side.
The question really is, as you said, in this war of attrition, who will last longer: whether the Russian economy, which is subject to quite severe sanctions, but at the same time Russia manages to find alternative sources of supply from its new allies such as North Korea, Iran and to some extent receiving support from China, or from another side - the help of the democratic world for Ukraine will prevail and Ukraine will finally get these 100 or so F-16 fighters, there is also talk of other fighters , with the air defense systems, long-range systems and high-precision weapons, to be able to guarantee its security and liberate the occupied territories. This will not happen with an infantry attack.
This will be done with the destruction of supply lines, storage bases, critical elements such as ammunition, armaments, equipment, fuels, with the interruption of certain logistical links to Crimea, and to other parts of the front line, and subsequently already under better conditions, a more serious introduction of ground troops. All this takes time. It is very important when Ukraine will be able to prepare new people, because, unfortunately, Ukraine is also suffering losses on the front, it is not only Russia, and when it will get these additional systems, armaments and the whole package of capabilities that go with them: prepared people, infrastructure for their use, control systems, precision munitions for the aircraft and those we are talking about long-range artillery, cruise missiles and the like to be able to successfully deal with Russia.
And of these two trends, which one will prevail: on the one hand, the Russian economy and the aid that Russia receives, on the other hand, the Ukrainian economy and technology, innovation, the aid that it receives from the democratic world. And in my opinion, if there are no serious upheavals, and even if there is a certain change in US policy, Europe already very well understands that this is primarily a European problem, this war in Europe, and it must be able to compensate, which is not easy , but should be able to compensate for a possible reduction in US aid. But I hope, let's be a little optimistic, that it won't come to that point, to a reduction in US aid.
And do you think the Western allies have slowed down, and here I mean mainly the strange members of the European Union, with the help, because we know that the ambitious plan to send ammunition to Ukraine, we are talking about ammunition, about the most basic fighting stuff, actually failed to follow through on the plan they set out last year when President Biden was in Poland visiting and promises like that were being made? Also, the delay in sending the first F-16s, I think this morning the Dutch Minister of Defense said that the first planes are expected to arrive in Ukraine very soon, but two years now there is no action.
No, it's not two years. What the countries helping Ukraine approached too cautiously in my opinion. Listeners may recall that they first started with: "Yes, we give defensive weapons”, they gave "Javelin” and British similar missiles to stop the Russian attack with the large tank columns. They succeeded, but several months later they said: "But we shouldn't give weapons that are offensive”. They understood, and experts have always known that the weapon itself is neither offensive nor defensive – the question is how it is used and what is needed. But this type of thinking has delayed decision-making to give armored vehicles.
Yes, they gave it, but quite late and not in sufficient quantities, and that is why the offensive of Ukraine at the end of last summer failed. But he gave such a technique. Then they said: "We should not give long-range weapons”. They gave. Then they said: "We do not allow these long-range weapons to be used against targets on Russian territory”. Over time, however, what does a border mean – a line on the map is okay, but if on the other side of the border they are shelling you, why can't you shoot at them? They gradually lifted, but only partially, these restrictions. This western policy is changing. And also for aviation – for a long time there was no discussion about aviation.
Only a year ago there was talk of giving aviation. And as I said, the issue is not just to hand over some planes - there they have a whole system for training the flight crew, engineering and technical staff, infrastructure, spare parts, ammunition and management of all these processes. This is complicated. There is no way to retrain one pilot from one aircraft to another within 2-3 months. But I really hope that we will soon see Western fighter aircraft used by Ukraine in action. There are already some indications that perhaps the F-16s have already appeared on the front, if not, I hope it will happen soon.
Do you think Bulgaria is doing enough, since in the first days of the war it became clear last year with the articles that appeared in "Politico“, in "Die Welt" that Bulgaria in the first days of the war has helped Ukraine tremendously? And in this sense, can our country still contribute either with old Soviet equipment, with ammunition that our military factories produce? Does Bulgaria have anything to give?
Our defense industry, as far as I am informed, is running at very high speeds. I did not answer your question about these ammunitions that Europe had promised – yes, it didn't deliver on its promise to deliver 1 million rounds of ammunition by march this year, but the industry is picking up steam. It is believed that by the end of this year, the production capacity in Europe of 1.5 million 155 mm shells will certainly be achieved. And most of them to be handed over to Ukraine. The Bulgarian industry is also switching to the production of this caliber, but the Ukrainians still use the Soviet standard 122 and 152 mm shells and many other weapons that are produced in Bulgarian companies.
We do not restrict them in any way, although this was in the government of Kiril Petkov then with Kornelia Ninova as deputy prime minister, and now there are no such restrictions. We also have some capability of expiring ammo in its final years, but with a mechanism to replace it with new ones, so we can continue to pull those out of stock while compensating with new ammo that is newly manufactured. We have capabilities with certain old equipment. As far as I am informed, the service cabinet continues the line of our government.
I hope that a new regular cabinet will continue in the same direction to provide assistance in the possible volumes and types of armaments of Ukraine. Because the understanding is there. I don't know how it is among all Bulgarian citizens, the propaganda there is quite successful, but in the expert community there is definitely an understanding that helping Ukraine is not only a moral obligation - it is in our strategic interest. And we talked about this at the beginning of the conversation with you.
Since we are talking about the Bulgarian army, about its capabilities, let's look at it. What can we expect as an upgrade? We know that in the coming years the first F-16s should arrive, as well as the patrol ships. During your ministry as Defense Minister, the defense budget exceeded 2%. This is the so-called "NATO standard”. In the reports that came out as strategic priorities, our country is expected to buy a new air defense system, and the Bulgarian military is expected to be equipped with new equipment. What can we expect as a modernization of the Bulgarian Army in the coming years, since this cannot be done during the mandate of one government, even if it is stable?
You have listed the priority projects. Yes, the F-16 planes should start in 9 months before the first planes arrive in Bulgaria. The first of the new patrol vessels will be launched next year, the second – 2026 year. The "Stryker" machines, for which our office prepared the contract, some of them will also start arriving in the second half of next year. We are very advanced with the project with modern radars. There, as I understand it, is some kind of legal process that is expected to be completed in order to move toward a contract.
There should be and is readiness to some extent and it is a matter of judgment when the resources will be available to launch, not only to launch a new contract, but also to be able to pay it off and create everything necessary around it, for to turn the new weaponry into a real capability. There are projects for new artillery, 155 mm, for anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems, for drones. Keep in mind that with this sharp increase in the budget, quite a serious investment resource was opened, and only the big projections are usually discussed in public, but in reality in the army there are also infrastructure repairs, and the acquisition of light weapons, uniforms, and so on. , on bulletproof vests, on unmanned aerial vehicles.
Many things can already be implemented within this budget. But I will still emphasize that the two percent is not a target, the two percent was a measure of who spends how much, who takes what part of the burden for the Union defense. In reality, some countries are already: Poland goes over 4%, the Baltic countries, Romania are close to 2.5 - 3%. It is considered that we must also move on. In any case, the two percent is not a goal, but a minimum that we need to get below so that these capabilities can be created, so that quality people can come into the army, and they will be confident, operating new equipment, new armament and to have a quality army.
Is this modernization too late? I am asking you because for many years the army was not as seriously discussed and as if budget deficits were being made, especially with the budget of the Ministry of Defense. Should the Bulgarian state have invested earlier?
Of course, of course. The army at the beginning of the century, in 1999-2000, I remember that defense spending was about 3%. After that, we had made a commitment to keep them at 2.8%, and gradually that rate fell. The financial crisis in 2008-2009 hit the budget of the Ministry of Defense in particular. There, the budget from 2009 to 2016 almost halved as a percentage of gross domestic product, and no serious projects could be launched.
The available funds were spent on repairing the MiG-29 engine and things like that, without which aviation would have been grounded, and this slowed things down a lot. But I think that with a reasonable management and maintenance of a budget like this year's, maybe a little bigger, the Bulgarian army can get a very modern look, completely different from the one we have seen in the previous 20 years.
And one question, it concerns rather the people in the army: such a hot topic lately about military training and the return of conscription. We know that the incompleteness of our army for 2023 reaches 21.8%, and the percentage varies in different formations. What must be done? Should conscription be reintroduced, or should there rather be some sort of compulsory military training? You have said many times that military training is more the approach.
Yes, we have not discussed, and are not currently discussing, a return to conscription as it was known in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, when soldiers trained for several months and then they served in order to have equipped and to some extent prepared formations, they served for two years. It's not about that at all. We will continue to rely on filling the peacetime composition on a voluntary, contract service basis. But what is needed – Russia's war against Ukraine showed it very clearly, is that there must be additional mobilization capacity, the peacetime army alone cannot cope.
And with us, this mobilization capacity mainly includes the people, the men, who did conscription until 2008 and for quite natural reasons, over time, these people gradually, not gradually, but rather quickly decrease, and we down to a few years we will find ourselves practically without a mobilization reserve. Therefore, it is necessary – such is the opinion shared in expert discussions at the Ministry of Defense, to introduce mandatory military service for certain categories of Bulgarian citizens. For example, I say that anyone who wants to work for the state should first go through military service, to know what it is all about. With few exceptions there, right, they have the rights of the disabled and opportunities like that, it's not about them, but everyone else should pass.
Or another option is that everyone who wants to carry a weapon and use a weapon must first go through military service and then have the right to carry a weapon. And as a more minimal option, anyone who wants to work in the security system must first have passed this military training and then, as a precondition - starting work in the intelligence services or in the Ministry of Internal Affairs system, he must there is such preparation. But this is a matter of very detailed analysis, because in order to solve one problem, we will divert some resource from solving the main problem of combat capability of the regular army, because some part of the army has to deal with training, with this mandatory military preparation.
The question is expert, the decision will be political when it is taken. In my opinion, we do not have much time to delay such a political decision, but it can only be taken by a regular cabinet in some more stable political environment. If we go to new and new elections, no one will make such a decision, and we will be left without the capacity for mobilization.
Yes, but the conflicts around us do not follow our political agenda, on the contrary, they are much more dynamic.
That's right, yes.