Last news in Fakti

After the DPS rift: big changes ahead

In short, the DPS rift has some pretty important implications: it explains not only why we're heading for a seventh election in a row, but also what we can expect after it

Sep 14, 2024 06:00 127

After the DPS rift: big changes ahead  - 1
ФАКТИ публикува мнения с широк спектър от гледни точки, за да насърчава конструктивни дебати.

Earning the name DPS, Delyan Peevski has lost a large part of his pretense that he is a normal politician who has a place in the management of Bulgaria. The crackdown in DPS is unprecedented and will lead to significant changes.

Comment from Daniel Smilov:

As expected, Delyan Peevski managed to grab the DPS tag and thus gained an advantage in the race with Ahmed Dogan's formation. Now the name and abbreviation DPS will be an asset of Delyan Peevski, and his opponents will have to rely mostly on their recognizable faces in their campaign, which will not be easy.

Peevski gained an advantage, but the price is high

But the price of this advantage is high for Mr. Peevski: he achieved it by confirming the most serious criticisms of his opponents. Namely, that he has informal and illegitimate control over supposedly independent institutions such as the CEC and the Supreme Court, which ultimately served his interests.

The CEC is less responsible/guilty in this case, because it at least tried to make a principled and legally sound decision. This decision should have been for the DPS not to appear as a party or coalition in these elections, because the Movement is currently blocked. It has two co-chairmen who argue with each other. And the other bodies that could resolve these disputes cannot gather the necessary majorities for this. Thus, in practice, the DPS cannot express a unified and uncontradictory will on the question of its participation in the elections: the chairmen make opposing proposals and withdraw the proposals of the other faction. In such a situation, the CEC was right not to allow DPS to participate in coalitions.

The SAC ignored this central problem and, on the grounds that Peevski submitted an application by e-mail before Chakarov, gave the name and registration of the DPS to the user of modern technologies. Leaving aside the fact that Peevski's electronic application was "bare" - without the relevant supporting documents required by law. Leaving aside the other fact that it was submitted before the official filing hour. (If Dogan's people had opted for high technology and electronically overtaken Peevski, it is likely that the VAS would have used the mentioned defects to decide against them.) The whole problem is different - the VAS simply turned a blind eye to the lack of clear will from DPS as a party for its participation in the parliamentary elections. "The first in time" he can't take the whole party by registering it - that's just raiding, even if it's litigious.

The weaknesses of the Supreme Court's decision immediately became clear when Chakarov - this time first in time - filed a request to withdraw the registration of the DPS. There is such a procedure under the law and it is separate from registration - the parties have more time to think and change their decision. If you follow YOUR logic, the "first in time" should still win and the Peev coalition should lose the DPS. We have yet to see what procedural tricks the CEC and the Supreme Court will come up with, but it can be predicted that in the case of the withdrawal "the second in time will be the first in law".

Seven reasons for the inevitable changes

This story would be comical (well, it is comical) if it didn't have rather tragic consequences for Bulgarian politics. The DPS crackdown is unprecedented and will lead to significant policy changes for the following reasons:

- The reputation of the DPS has been irretrievably damaged and its claim to participate in power openly becomes more and more indefensible: The scandals actually confirmed the most serious accusations against the leaders of the DPS - Peevski and Dogan. The scandal with the BGN 150 million loan for Valka is quite real and should be investigated. Ahmed Dogan once passed a meter with his million fee: then, however, because Peevski was on his side, the "independent bodies" decided in favor of the philosopher hydroengineer. The argument was that there was no conflict of interest because the dam construction royalty was under contract before the conflict of interest law came into force, even though it was received after it came into force. One-of-a-kind, first-in, first-out - or something like that. The 150 million for the Wolf, with part of which Dogan most likely bought a port and a power plant, as well as other goodies, make the hydro-engineering story look like child's play. However, Peevski also strengthened his negative reputation as a person who disposes of state institutions, which, with fantastically ridiculous arguments, decide everything in his favor. In fact, by earning the name DPS, Peevski lost much of his pretense of being a normal politician who has a place in running the country;

- The electoral weight of both DPS will decrease: This scandal in the DPS cannot but shake part of their electorate. Moreover, neither side in the conflict is politically or morally blameless. In fact, DPS voters will hear from their own what they have so far only heard from their biggest opponents. "And maybe all the criticisms were true" it will not be a very difficult conclusion to reach;

- The idea that Borisov and Peevski are close to an independent majority in the parliament fails: Bulgaria went to the sixth parliamentary elections so that Borisov and Peevski could be close to a majority. And they really were, as Peevski had even secured this majority with six or seven people from "Greatness". But Ahmed Dogan pulled the brakes on this management project by splitting the DPS. Both Dogan and Borisov, in fact, correctly assessed that such governance would be detrimental to their parties. But Boyko Borisov could not refuse Peevski and offered the minority government, and Dogan gathered courage and spoiled the finished work. He was further motivated by the prosecutorial and police pressure that Peevski took against his people to support the GERB-DPS-"Velichie";

- Borisov and Peevski continue to be a tandem, but the idea of governing openly together is increasingly impossible. Until now, the interests of Peevski and DPS have been well protected by GERB, regardless of the Movement's indirect involvement in power. But now, when DPS-Peevski will have at most half of the electoral weight of the Movement, Peevski himself is beginning to become an even greater burden for Borisov - a serious reputational cost against a small electoral positive. Peevski clearly understands that he is becoming vulnerable and evasive. To counter this trend, it will seek to strengthen its influence in GERB. As paradoxical as it sounds, GERB may be on the verge of a split over the Peevski issue, just like DPS. Borisov's silence and his inability to take a clear position are an expression of the accumulating tension. Not only is he not talking, but the main figures of the party have gone silent. This is probably the calm before the storm;

- The negatives of the Borisov-Peevski management model were again recalled: The use of institutions for party and corporate interests is the weakness of this model. Peevski did not bother to harness the institutions to solve an internal party conflict. Imagine how it will be acted if the question is about the billions for highways and government contracts in general. As long as state institutions are conquered, the business environment in Bulgaria cannot be good - it is a heavy millstone that the country carries;

- The possibility of ideological management "Borisov-4" disappears: GERB, DPS, ITN and small players could form an ideological majority in this parliament that would be both Euro-Atlantic and anti-corruption. In the next parliament, in order to participate in a majority, Borisov will have to sacrifice either Euro-Atlanticism (with "Vazrazhdane", BSP or new players in this niche), or anti-anti-corruption (with PP-DB). And it may turn out that the parliament is so fragmented that no coherent construction is possible;

- Technocratic formula: Party governments or minority governments become even more unattainable. The only formula that can have any chance of legitimacy in a fragmented environment becomes technocratic rule based on an expert figure and an agreed program. In any case, however, a bright political figure from GERB is unlikely to be prime minister, and Borisov is not an option anyway.

The picture is not desperate

In short, the rift in the DPS has quite important implications: it explains not only why we are heading for the seventh election in a row, but also what we can expect after it. The picture is not desperate - in fact, people who really want Bulgaria to be a European, legal state and free democracy now have a huge chance. A big crack has appeared in the status quo and it cannot be patched. This crack can be used for serious, positive repair - or for the collapse of the system. The road to collapse is sometimes paved with the perfectionism of free-thinking people who decide to stay home because they can't find the perfect match. Perfect is often the enemy of good.

*****

This comment expresses the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the positions of the Bulgarian editorial team and of DV as a whole.