When I visited Beirut years ago , I was able to speak with a Lebanese army officer whose unit was stationed in southern Lebanon. We passed another checkpoint of the security forces, where the procedure was repeated - checking names, checking the car, identifying documents. The presence of an officer helped to make the transition easier, and in some places only his service card was needed to pass on. The roads of Lebanon, and especially those leading south to the border with Israel and east to Syria, were under surveillance.
This commented on "Facebook" Ruslan Trad.
There was one little secret that many of the correspondents learned sooner or later in the field - most Lebanese soldiers are out of ammunition. This was maintained until very recently - sometimes because of policies, sometimes because of lack of funds. The third reason was the most obvious. "The only army in this country that has weapons is Hezbollah," the officer told me. He could hardly be more right. I knew about it in Syria, I saw shared sketches of military structures when I spoke to contacts on some of my visits to Turkey - southern and eastern Lebanon was littered with Hezbollah bunkers and positions, largely built after the 2006 war th. Today I recall these details when there is more and more talk of a new war.
Information that sources confirm is that Israeli forces have completed their plans to invade southern Lebanon and presented them to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. All the plans need is the signature of his war cabinet.
As far as I know, as of September 20th, this signature had not yet been placed on the documents, but it is possible that this moment is not far off. Blowing up thousands of Hezbollah operatives, including commanders, with exploding pagers and walkie-talkies might make for a good first salvo.
Israel wants to push Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon, which Tel Aviv occupied between 1982 and 2000, to reduce the threat to residents of northern Israel. About 80,000 people have been forced to flee their homes, both under Hezbollah rocket fire since October 7 and in the event of an October 7-style attack on their own villages. Tens of thousands of displaced people are also on the Lebanese side of the border. The situation creates conditions for chaos and escalation. "The center of gravity is moving to the north," Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant said on September 18.
The invasion of southern Lebanon is seen by some analysts as a less painful task than trying to destroy Hamas. Hezbollah also has its tunnels, but the landscape is less populated and much of the civilian population has already left for safer areas in northern Lebanon.
In the event of a full-scale war, Israel will undoubtedly begin bombing Lebanese infrastructure and even residential areas of Beirut, but its operations will not require what we have witnessed in Gaza and the ensuing worldwide condemnation. However, Israel is aware of the difficulties of such a plan, which is almost certainly the reason why an invasion has not yet been undertaken.
History provides examples. Israel's 1982 invasion, in the context of the Lebanese Civil War, remains an encyclopedic example of the adage that you should be careful what you wish for. The Israeli army has achieved its goal of driving the Palestine Liberation Organization out of Lebanon, but its actions have alienated allies, including Margaret Thatcher's government, turning into eternal enemies even those factions within the Lebanese civil war that might one day make peace with Israel still fails to address the broader threat. The PLO has been replaced by Hezbollah and a number of more radical factions that have opened the door to Iranian influence. The second, more limited operation to deal with Hezbollah in 2006 was in some ways worse, with even commanding officers at the time describing it as poorly planned.
That is why it is debatable what will happen in the coming days, weeks or months. Netanyahu is believed to be reluctant to open a new front; in the past he avoided risk at all costs. Gallant is believed to be more enthusiastic, but disagreements over Israel's broader strategy are wide in both political and military circles.
All of this is worth bearing in mind as we admire or loathe on Facebook about exploding pagers. The most likely and accepted explanation in intelligence circles for the timing of this operation is that it was expected to be an alternative to the invasion, not its predecessor. Some in Israel, given the circumstances and extent of Hezbollah's entrenchment - as well as its external structures located throughout the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Europe and South America - are talking about a deal on the border areas.
Recently, Israeli intelligence has achieved success by taking out Hezbollah military commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, and before that Iran's nuclear program chief Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020. Since these people are replaceable, obviously other solutions will be sought.
Meanwhile, Israel is embroiled in a conflict in Gaza that it cannot end yet. It does not have the means to reconcile with its neighbors, especially Lebanon and Syria, while others such as Jordan, once partners, are angry and on the verge of halting some of the agreements signed in recent decades - which would aggravate the situation in the occupied West Bank. Let's not forget that Iran's nuclear program continues, and the Russian Federation is helping with experience, even amid its losses on the Ukrainian front. The Russian army conducts regular exercises with the Syrian army in the border areas with Israel. The Mossad's box of tricks cannot provide all the answers that Israeli society has yet to face.