Comment by Daniel Smilov:
At the end of the election campaign, it becomes clear that there are two specific ideas for governance after the elections, which can be conditionally called the "PP-DB plan" and the "Peevski plan". Otherwise, everyone else also swears that they will form a government, but without specifying how this will happen. As in the last six elections, Boyko Borisov is the first among those swearing, but so far it has only become clear that he does not like the "PP-DB plan". Logicians would say that if he rejects one plan, then he accepts the other. But Borisov is unlikely to agree and will insist that the excluded third is possible in his political universe.
However, the choice before Bulgaria is truly logical, because it boils down to a simple dilemma: governance without Peevski or governance with Peevski. There is no third option. The dilemma is simple, but each of the choices is quite complex and difficult for political players. There is also one peculiarity: if no regular government is implemented, the country will continue to be governed by a caretaker cabinet. That is, it will be governed with Peevski and by Peevski, because in the current caretaker government, key ministers - such as the one for internal affairs - are from his "quota". And surely in the next elections they will lead the lists of some "new beginning". With other sums: the scales are tilted in favor of "governance with Peevski" and GERB and Borisov do not seem to be bothered by this fact. On the contrary, they are destroying the alternative scenario, which, however, relies precisely on them for its implementation. And if that's not irony, tell him hello.
PP-DB's plan
PP-DB's idea for governance after the elections is relatively clear. A technocratic cabinet with a prime minister who is not closely linked to one of the main political parties and is relatively neutral between them. This government is based on a program with clear priorities and a majority in parliament, which excludes Delyan Peevski formally and informally (as well as "Vazrazhdane", for clear (geo)political reasons). From a formal point of view, the majority should be sufficient to make decisions without Peevski. From an informal point of view, GERB should give up defending Peevski's interests and being his spokesmen, especially regarding appointments to the judiciary, regulators and anti-corruption reforms.
Borisov has focused his criticism so far on the "equidistant prime minister", but this is actually no obstacle to the plan. Everyone knows that if there is a prime minister, he will not be Boyko Borisov or Tomislav Donchev, but some technocrat who is acceptable to the PP-DB. The real drama is with Peevski's real influence on GERB and the proposals for regulators, magistrates and anti-corruption officers. These issues turned the car on its head and are hanging again with the same force.
In fact, the main obstacle to the "PP-DB plan" is that Borisov and GERB have not given the slightest sign that they really want to govern together with the PP-DB. On the contrary, everything in their actions speaks to the opposite: GERB's entire campaign is against PP-DB, and Borisov's calls for moderation and tolerance sound like empty phrases. And since 2013, Borisov has never stood up to Peevski. In fact, he has never uttered a bad word against him, which is remarkable, because in principle he is not stingy with bad words. From this point of view, to expect that Borisov is actually considering an option "without Peevski" contradicts his overall behavior so far. Whether this is behavior dictated by addictions or by a coincidence of interests is not so important. The fact is that this behavior is sustainable over time. But who knows, after the elections we may have a political infant who has undergone electoral baptism.
The "Peevski" plan
The alternative plan "regular government with Peevski" is also quite logical and also suffers from serious defects. This plan suggests the following. First, it would be easier to implement with a worse election result for PP-DB. Second, GERB should come out first in the elections and together with "New Beginning" and other parties such as ITN and "Majesty" plus breakaway parties be close to a majority. Third, pressure should be exerted on PP-DB to join the "Euro-Atlantic majority" in order to prevent Bulgaria from being diverted from the right path and supposedly limit "Vazrazhdane".
In such a situation, GERB proposes a "minority government" or a political cabinet with its ministers, and the rest support it so that it has regular power. If PP-DB agrees to participate, they will simply legitimize "rule with Peevski". If they do not agree, the majority will depend entirely on Peevski, and Borisov will be in an even weaker position, but he will have the excuse that the PP-DB refused him.
It is not excluded that after the US elections and a possible success of Trump, there will be a move towards "patriotization" of the Euro-Atlanticism of GERB and Peevski, which will lead to a broad coalition in parliament against PP-DB. Whether "Vazrazhdane" will be officially included in the majority in one way or another - this is not so interesting. But their agenda may be partially incorporated in one form or another. For example, regarding Ukraine, as well as some of the fascist laws against sexual minorities and "foreign agents".
In fact, the "Peevski" plan was also tested in the current parliament and failed due to the split in the DPS. More generally, however, this plan would bring very serious reputational damage to GERB and Borisov. Borisov's problem is that he cannot refuse it and will look for excuses in other partners for its eventual collapse.
Maybe the people are already so fed up that they would "swallow" any government, even one with Peevski? Such logic can hardly be relied on, however. Once formed, such a government will be weak and will quickly drag the main parties in it into the political abyss. This effect will hardly be compensated for by media dominance and other tricks. And the international reaction will be seriously negative or rather negative, depending on the outcome of the elections in the US. In other words, a risk that Borisov would hardly dare to take.
From this point of view, the real "Borisov plan" may actually be new elections, as it has been so far. It is no coincidence that GERB cannot form a government, even though they are supposedly "winners" in a series of parliamentary elections. Their Pyrrhic victories are related to the fact that they have no real idea of regular governance. What they managed to do was to exercise control over the caretaker government together with Delyan Peevski, and for now this seems to be the preferred option of the GERB-"New Beginning" tandem.
What is it all about?
Of course, people are gradually realizing what is happening and are beginning to understand the real reasons for the lack of a regular government. Behind the smoke of words and mutual attacks, the main issue is still the dismantling or preservation of the conquered state: this is actually the meaning of the plans "without Peevski" and "with Peevski". The increasingly brazen use of institutions for political purposes in this campaign has certainly not gone unnoticed by people: the buying of votes, selectively tolerated by the Ministry of Interior; the strange decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Central Election Commission on the registration of the DPS in favor of Peevski; the arrests of Dogan's people, etc.
Many will say that these are not the things that really excite people. They are not excited about the change in the state's fiscal model, which led to more growth in both the economy and people's incomes. And what is it that "really" excites society then?
It is true that the mobilization to vote is based on emotion. And emotions come from a narrative, a story that is either frightening or captivating and captivating in a positive sense. Borisov and Peevski have not been captivating for a long time, but what they manage to do by remaining on the political scene is to take away the positive emotion generated by their opponents. And in an environment of weak public interest, petty calculations, clientelistic schemes, bought votes, and the small psychological joys of rubbing one's opponent's nose begin to play a decisive role.
There is a big picture, however, and it boils down to the plans described above. With emotion or not, citizens have a choice that they cannot really escape - even if they don't go to the polls.