Veselin Stoynev's comment:
The democratic opposition “Continuing the Change – Democratic Bulgaria“ is facing a severe dilemma – to radicalize or to be highly critical, but constructive. With Bulgaria's accession to the eurozone, it lost one of the grounds for constructiveness towards the ruling party. And after the attacks by the anti-corruption commission and the prosecutor's office against PP representatives in local government, and especially in Varna, the prospect of radicalization seems inevitable.
However, both prospects hide many unknowns. It is even unknown whether both wings of this opposition - PP and DB, can walk at least for some time on both paths simultaneously, without separating. The imperative for togetherness is now even more valid for each of them, being connected vessels with a common electorate and placed under a shared threat. But the exacerbation of the dilemma of “radical or constructive“ strengthens both the centrifugal and centripetal forces that have long strained the tension in the coalition to the extreme.
How PP and DB will together demand a vote of no confidence
Because of the eurozone, DB held back PP's pressure for a vote of no confidence, setting a deadline for it to be held in September. PP, however, supported “Velicie“'s vote and DB made a concession, with one co-chairman of “Yes, Bulgaria“ voting “for“ together with PP's deputies in the name of coalition unity. PP, however, hastened to announce three “left” topics on which they will ask for a vote in September - about the failure of healthcare, regional policies and impoverishment. The DB immediately responded with “right“ topics - personal and economic freedom, economic freedom and the rule of law. It is not clear, despite the requests for unity, how a common theme will be achieved and who will give in, or each for himself. Or both formations will resemble the Russophile opposition by initiating a series of votes and then the DB will support a vote for the PP, and the PP - for the DB.
The main problem is that even together, the PP-DB lack 12 deputies to submit an independent vote and must resort to the votes of the Russophile formations. The PP has already paved a path to them by supporting the vote for “Majesty“. However, the DB will have to explain how it will not get on the "Russian train", unless it relies solely on Dogan's APS, which (still) has 15 deputies and also supported the vote of "Majesty". But the theoretical maximum of the entire motley opposition in parliament is 105 votes, with 121 needed to fall the cabinet.
Sacrifice of European identity for the sake of anti-corruption?
The more important question is whether this minority can be an alternative governing majority, which is the ultimate purpose of the vote of no confidence - a coalition of anti-Europeans with pro-Europeans, to put it mildly. And with a main party “Vazrazhdane“, which PP-DB reproaches for being a mime of opposition, while GERB protects their immunities and the post of Deputy Speaker of Parliament Tsoncho Ganev. It is a small consolation that this will be PP-DB's own vote, and not support for someone else's, and that this is how an opposition identity is maintained, even if they offer mercilessly reasoned criticism of the ruling party.
Obviously, the parliamentary possibilities for radicalization of PP-DB are as insignificant as they are dangerous - sacrificing your pro-European identity in the name of anti-corruption. At the very least, this vote of no confidence will seem self-serving after the series of votes by the anti-European formations, and when the government has barely been in power for half a year, and there is at least another half until the actual entry into the eurozone in its first months.
Chances of protest pressure in the squares
The protest pressure in the squares provides more serious chances for radicalization of the PP-DB's political behavior. The two formations are together in the streets against the brutal and selective use of repressive bodies against representatives of the coalition's local government. If these protests gain momentum and sustainability, this will give greater strength to the parliamentary opposition in parliament. The unity can also be strengthened and strengthened by nominating a common candidacy of the democratic community for president. Then the overthrow of the government will not be a matter of shameful collaboration with Russophile parties, but will be a bid for an independent victory in parliamentary and presidential elections.
However, there are also potential limitations to this perspective. And the main thing is not the season - the protests against Boyko Borisov and Prosecutor General Ivan Geshev began in the middle of summer 5 years ago and lasted nearly 4 months. And the fact that, despite the obviously orchestrated use of institutions, a sufficiently wide part of society may already have been sown with doubt that the opposition is indeed tainted with corruption and abuses, albeit on an incomparably smaller scale than the ruling party. It can even be assumed that more convincing data or suggestions about corruption are yet to emerge, and that the current half-revelations were just bait so that the opposition could jump high and be overthrown more securely.
Can protest support be expanded
The second unknown is whether the PP-DB will be able to attract many more people from their current voters. The protests in 2020 were without a major party leader - despite the role of "Democratic Bulgaria" and especially "Yes, Bulgaria" with its actions in Rosenets, as well as the role of President Radev, who raised his fist in the square as a victim of prosecutorial arbitrariness. They were led by the "Poisonous Trio" and included a variety of small political and civil organizations with a colorful ideological color.
The protests 5 years ago failed to structure their own large political representation, and their legacy was capitalized on by the ITN, which won the elections the following summer. Today, there is a larger structured democratic opposition in the face of the PP-DB, which, however, can hardly attract more diverse support without making populist compromises. The DB would be particularly reluctant to make such compromises, especially since in 2020 they stood further away from the organizers of the protest, although many of their sympathizers were among the main forces of discontent. Now the DB would hardly swallow a square-based unity with "Velicie", which enjoys cooperation with the PP and is already leaning towards the protests in Varna.
Last but not least, the square-based manifestations also give birth to their own non-party heroes or recycle old ones. Who will claim a part of the political leadership of the democratic community, or at least for seats in parliament, and no party is inclined to make major concessions to “foreign“, even to “foreign ones“.
Inevitable radicalization, but to what extent
Political radicalization seems inevitable for the PP-DB, regardless of whether through it it will only build on its role as a constructive opposition or completely replace it. Radical opposition is a much more tempting, but not an easier dramaturgy than that of the constructive opposition. As a radical, you can grow quickly, but also burn out without shining. As a constructivist, you can survive or grow slowly, but also rot away imperceptibly. Success is a matter of skillful leadership, loyal supporters and irreparable mistakes of the opponent.