Author: Ivaylo Noyzi Tsvetkov
I have a favorite and moderately worrying thesis about the end of happy Europe, related to the 80s without war (if we don't count the Yugoslav years). How does it sound to you?
Dimitar Bechev: Unfortunately, it sounds completely convincing to me. A full-scale war is being waged in Europe, which - let's be honest - began back in the spring of 2014. The very existence of Ukraine as an independent state is at stake, and from there, it seems to me, the principles on which the political order in Europe is structured. For example, that the forcible annexation of territories of a foreign state is not permissible. But if we return to the past, it seems to me that we have rather headed back to the Cold War, and not to the early 1940s. I hope I do not come off as too optimistic!
What would be the smart, and perhaps forced, move of the EU in this hostile environment, in which we seem to be "abandoned" in terms of military and all kinds of resources?
Dimitar Bechev: We may be abandoned by the US, but I do not agree that we lack our own military, let alone economic resources. The European countries in NATO spend over half a billion euros on defense annually. This is over three times more than Russia in nominal terms. Russia's GDP is smaller than that of Italy (again in nominal terms). The problem is that these expenditures do not automatically lead to increased combat capabilities. And here the dog is buried, so to speak. We need a much higher degree of cohesion and coordination - that is the short answer to this question. But we are unlikely to achieve it easily. Even with increasing defense budgets, Europe is divided and this is one of the main reasons why it needs a leader like the United States.
The other problem is the quality of military capabilities. Europe may produce a huge amount of shells, but it does not have air defense, intelligence and surveillance systems, etc. That is why we are dependent on America, in addition to the fact that the military-industrial sector relies on components and technologies from the other side of the Atlantic. And most importantly: societies in key countries like Germany are pacifist. Despite the turn in political thinking - Russia is now seen as a threat in Berlin, not as an economic partner, attitudes in society are changing with difficulty and slowly. Resistance is real - the growing vote for parties like "Alternative for Germany" shows it clearly.
Is there an additional disenchantment with everything Western in Bulgaria because of the euro?
Dimitar Bechev: This is a long conversation. The disenchantment has been going on for a long time and is related to a variety of factors. Most of all, the fact that the West - if we conditionally identify it with principles such as the rule of law, human rights, personal freedom and dignity as a value - has not yet sprouted so deeply in Bulgarian society. And to date, the crisis in the core of the West, which erupted in the late 2000s, has further weakened the attractive power of liberal ideas. And since we joined NATO and the EU, the Bulgarian elites - or at least a significant share of them - do not have to pretend to share the beliefs of their former mentors in Brussels, Berlin, Paris or New York. On the contrary, there is a direct benefit to playing out nationalist messages. This is exactly how political entrepreneurs like Kostadin Kostadinov gain influence and power. On the third hand, the deep-rooted distrust of all public institutions has also spread to foreign ones. In addition to the Bulgarian state, many citizens no longer trust its corrections abroad. Simply because we are now part of the same political system. The campaign against the euro is another example. I am sure there will be new ones.
"The majority in Bulgaria is for membership in the EU and NATO"
However, one caveat: despite the vocal supporters of "Vazrazhdane", "Velicie" and similar formations, public opinion polls clearly show that the majority is for membership in the EU and even NATO. Whether there is a spell or not, I don't know, but let's not underestimate the rational assessment of where exactly it is most advantageous to be positioned. Especially considering how unpredictable the world has become.
How influential are the pro-Russian/anti-Western forces in Bulgaria? What would happen in the event of a possible – obviously fabricated – political project of President Radev?
Dimitar Bechev: In the hard version - complete withdrawal from the EU and NATO and attachment to Russia - about 20-25% of Bulgarians share such understandings. This is neither a little nor a lot. It is not a little, because it gives lifeblood to anti-Western players in politics and public affairs. It is not a lot, because it cannot form a majority. The strategy of "Vazrazhdane" is to fence off a political plot and then come to an agreement piece by piece with Peevski and Borisov, collecting material benefits. Radev seems to be aiming for the soft version of Russophilia - "to stay in Europe, but not to spoil our relations with the brothers and not to provoke them, because we will suffer". This version is potentially more influential. It is no coincidence that Borisov also played on similar strings until February 2022. However, in my opinion, Radev will not bet on foreign policy messages. They usually do not win votes. More likely, he will insist that he is the only real opponent of Peevski and Borisov. Russophiles will recognize him without reminding them of what he said about Crimea, how Kiev will fall in three days, etc. And then, after accumulating votes in future elections, he will sit down at the table to bargain with Peevski about how to share power. This is the good scenario for him. The bad scenario is Parvanov's ABC - for those who even remember this party from the recent past.
How should we interpret the parade of Xi, Putin, Kim, the Iranians and everyone lined up there as an anti-Western wedding?
Dimitar Bechev: This is a type of "more of the same". The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not new. It was created with the aim of China and Russia not competing in Central Asia. But then Moscow and China were equal. To date, the parade emphasizes the increased economic, and hence strategic, dependence of the Russians on China. I would highlight two interesting moments. The first: Narendra Modi, although he did not go. India is literally furious with Trump because of high customs duties. That is why it is building bridges to China, its otherwise greatest geopolitical rival. The second: how China emphasizes its role in World War II. The message is this: as victors in the war, we are the founders of global institutions such as the UN after 1945, on an equal footing with the United States. Today, the United States is abdicating from these multilateral organizations, which are the cornerstone of the world order. But we still hold on to the commitments we have made and the responsibilities we bear as a great power.
You teach at Oxford "Authoritarian Regimes". What do you think of Donald Trump's many actions and threats in his second term?
Dimitar Bechev: Unfortunately, the USA, an old and established democracy, is not immune from the erosion of democratic institutions and rules. Trump is not a democrat. I do not mean a member of the Democratic Party, whose supporter he was in the past, by the way. And if it were up to him, a hybrid regime would be established in America - something like a semi-democracy/semi-authoritarianism, similar to our neighbor Turkey, or a number of Latin American countries. At the moment, he has a lot of wind in his sails: polarization in society, unreserved loyalty on the part of the Republicans, a conservative majority in the Supreme Court, disorientation and discord in the ranks of the Democratic Party. But time will tell how well the social, political and, above all, constitutional mechanisms work, whose task is precisely to contain the executive power and the personal ambitions of this or that leader - and hence to achieve a balance necessary for the functioning of democracy. It is entirely possible that they will not work.
Is there a correlation between the rise of new authoritarian regimes and the third industrial revolution, i.e. the digital one? Regimes like Bolsonaro's, through neo-Sukartism in Indonesia, all the way to Orban and the like, in which authoritarianism formally poses as democracy?
Dimitar Bechev: There definitely is. Over time, authoritarian rulers have learned how to harness the Internet and social networks in the exercise of power and, above all, in the manipulation of societies, as well as control over them. And in democracies, such platforms have undermined the established media and trust in traditional political parties and leaders, giving space to populists. Separately, the concentration of power in tech giants like Meta and Google raises questions about accountability and transparency in public and political life. Let's not forget Elon Musk's techno-authoritarianism. But it is also true that digital technologies can have the opposite effect - helping civil society to self-organize against autocrats. Bulgaria in 2013 is an example. We can only guess how the next technological revolution related to artificial intelligence will affect us.
Is liberal Western democracy, which generations swore to protect and seemingly fail to protect, declining? "Freedom House" warned about this back in 2022, immediately after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Dimitar Bechev: It is currently in retreat. The trials in the US are a sufficiently worrying illustration, but the situation elsewhere is also not good. For example, in a few years, Great Britain may find itself under the rule of "Reform UK", and Nigel Farage may be prime minister. Democracy, understood as a competition of parties in free and fair elections, will not disappear. However, the liberal component - the rule of law, constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms - will, so to speak, have declining functions. This is also important for us. Instead of Bulgaria approaching Western democracies, Western democracies may resemble - if we allow ourselves a slight exaggeration - the Bulgaria of Peevski and Borisov.
How do you think the horror in Ukraine could end? Possible partition?
Dimitar Bechev: Freezing the conflict and de facto annexation of the lands occupied by Russia so far. Integration of the remaining Ukraine (about 75-80% of the country's territory) into the West, albeit without formal membership in the EU and NATO. The problem is that Putin is not interested in Donbass, Zaporizhia or Kherson. His goal remains the same as before the full-scale invasion - the subjugation of Ukraine as a whole and its transformation into a vassal on the model of Belarus. This is the other scenario, which, however, is not easy to realize - because of the heroic resistance of the Ukrainians themselves.
And what about Putin? And then the next one, probably from military circles, who will again dream of the Third Rome and will be a victim of both the siege thinking and the expansionist doctrine of Russia?
Dimitar Bechev: Putin is the new Brezhnev. He will rule until clinical death, and probably beyond. He may even agree to a truce at some point (certainly people around him will be happy with a de-escalation of the conflict with the West), but this will only be, as Stalin said, a "peredyshka" (a pause to catch your breath - b.a.). I do not think the goal is the Third Rome. Rather, it is the consolidation of Russian control over most of the former USSR, which is a prerequisite for Russia to be in the hotbed of globally significant countries in the multipolar world. This goal will remain on the agenda of Putin's successors, even if they switch from confrontation with the West to a mode of détente. Except that the balance, as far as the imperial agenda is concerned, is negative. In addition to the loss of Ukraine and Moldova, at the moment even Russia's allies such as Armenia are backing down and seeking warmer ties with the West. Azerbaijan has come into direct conflict with the Russians. Central Asia, on the other hand, uses China and the West to reduce Moscow's influence. In short, a new USSR will not exist. Meanwhile - despite the powerful growth and thanks to military spending - Russia's economy will yet begin to stagnate, similar to the Brezhnev stagnation, and society will yet pay the price for the "special military operation". And today's Russia is not the Third Rome, because unlike the USSR, it is not the bearer of a universal ideology and, accordingly, does not have a mission to spread the true faith to all points of the globe.
How is Putin's Russia trying to take over a large part of the minds in Bulgaria? Beyond the obvious.
Dimitar Bechev: I don't know if it is trying (Bulgaria is small and not particularly significant in the eyes of the Kremlin) or if it is simply knocking on an open door. There have always been admirers of Russia in our country, even at the peak of Western influence from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s. Some motivated by nostalgia, others by self-interest, and still others by frustration with the West. Here is the strongest trump card of Putin's propaganda: nihilism, cynicism and denial. The message is not that Russia is very morally elevated and the bearer of some positive values, but rather that America and Europe are just as compromised and imbued with corruption. In a way, we may be villains, but they are not goods either. And yet, unlike us, they are hypocritical, claiming to uphold some values and principles.
Are you an optimist for this world?
Dimitar Bechev: Pessimistic intellectually and optimistic willfully, as Comrade Antonio Gramsci says. Here's something emotional in this regard: I remember, as if it were yesterday, how on November 18, 1989, the entire Sofia Classical High School gathered and went to the first big rally of the democratic opposition in front of "St. Alexander Nevsky". If I'm not mistaken, you were there too.
And not only there. The question is: why?
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Dimitar Bechev is a political scientist, lecturer at Oxford. He is also a senior researcher at Carnegie Europe, with a focus on EU enlargement, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.