Europe was restless after World War I. To strengthen its defenses against Germany, the French built the Maginot Line in the 1930s - an extensive system of fortifications, obstacles and weapons installations along the French-German border. In 1940, Germany bypassed the Maginot Line by invading through Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to the north, ultimately defeating France within six weeks.
This is written in an article for the American magazine "TIME" the famous political scientist and specialist on Eastern Europe Ivan Krastev.
The almost mystical belief of the French elite in the invulnerability of the Maginot Line was one of the reasons for the country's strange defeat in 1940, claims historian William L. Shire in his famous book "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich". "The French pinned all their hopes on a line of fortifications that ultimately became more of a psychological crutch than a strategic asset," he writes.
Today we are witnessing the disintegration of the post-Cold War European order and the real risk of the collapse of the transatlantic alliance as a result of President Donald Trump's attacks on Europe and his determination to buy or annex Greenland. This state of affairs raises the question of whether future historians will argue that European trust in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the Maginot Line for the European mind—a psychological crutch that created a false sense of security and prevented Europe from preparing to meet its existential challenges.
How NATO Shaped Europe
Is it possible that Europe’s current sense of vulnerability is primarily a failure of the European imagination? In private, most European politicians admit that the Americans can no longer be trusted to protect their allies. Yet, in public, they insist that NATO remains vital to Europe’s defense. The European public is less diplomatic. A recent survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations found that only 16% of Europeans view the United States as an ally. Perhaps more strikingly, a fifth of those surveyed described them as an adversary or rival.
After the end of the Cold War, NATO was Europe’s last religion. It was more than just a defensive alliance; it was the Holy Spirit ruling the world at the end of history. Europeans were mesmerized by American military might and found little reason to doubt Washington’s commitment to the Old Continent’s security.
NATO’s existence enabled most Europeans to fantasize that a major war in Europe was unthinkable in the 21st century. European loyalty to NATO prevented them from realizing that in the post-Soviet era, especially in Eastern Europe, the demilitarization of Europe, rather than the building of its defense capabilities, had become the alliance’s central task.
Contrary to popular belief, NATO’s expansion into Central Europe in 1999 did not come as a response to some eternal Russian threat, but rather out of fear of the return of nationalism and wars inspired by nationalism. NATO expanded into Eastern Europe after the Yugoslav wars and saw itself as defending Europe from the demons of its past. "Today, European peace is not simply the absence of war, but the marginalization of war from national life—a profound cultural and institutional change," writes James J. Sheehan in his 2008 history of post-war Europe, "Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?".
The treatment of national minorities, rather than defense capabilities, became a key reason for joining the Atlantic alliance. For decades, European forces were not trained for autonomous defense, but to fight alongside Americans and invariably under American command.
NATO’s paradoxical role as an instrument for disarmament rather than for building combat-ready armies is most clearly illustrated in an unusual pairing: Sweden and Finland, which resisted membership for decades, joined NATO only after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and are now the alliance’s most combat-ready members.
About 15 years ago, Robert Gates, the Obama administration’s defense secretary, expressed America’s impatience with Europe’s complacency on international security issues and its defense funding shortfalls for NATO.
"If the current trends toward reducing European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not as formative an experience as it was for me—may not see the return on America's investment in NATO as justified," Gates warned.
The Europeans were not ready to believe him.
And then Donald Trump appeared on the political scene. After accepting the Republican nomination for president in July 2016, he spoke of tying America's defense of NATO allies in the event of an attack to their contributions to the alliance. After his election, Trump secretly threatened to withdraw from the alliance during a summit in Brussels. The Europeans saw it as an empty threat and waited for him to leave office. In January 2025, Trump returned to the White House. And it was too late for the Europeans to come up with alternatives.
Trump and the Future of NATO
What is the future of NATO in a Trumpist world in which Europe has lost its central role to the United States? And what about the growing, whispered, but increasingly widespread belief that being an American ally is becoming more dangerous than being an American enemy?
Trump has not just changed Europe’s position on the American map of the world, he has brought a new map through which Washington sees the world. He does not see the American system of alliances as an asset; he sees it as a liability. While some envy Washington for its alliances, Trump envies China for not being constrained by allies.
His aversion to alliances explains, at least in part, the fact that he sees the war in Ukraine as analogous to 1914, when the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist prompted Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia and set off a chain reaction that led to World War I.
When Trump looks at the crisis in Europe, he seems to ignore the folly of Britain, which believed it had bought peace after signing the Munich Peace Treaty with Adolf Hitler in 1938. Trump understands that the risk of the United States entering a disastrous and unnecessary war with Putin’s Russia is far greater than the risk of appeasing a revisionist power trying to reclaim parts of Europe. For Trump, Russia’s war in Ukraine is Sarajevo, not Munich.
The question of NATO’s future should be understood as answering two separate questions. For the Trump administration, the question is what role NATO will play when America no longer sees the European Union as an American project but still wants to keep the Old Continent in its sphere of influence.
It is a vision in which America seeks to replace the Cold War-era West, which was described as the "free world" and defined by shared liberal values, with a cultural West rooted in Christianity and whiteness.
For Europeans, the stakes are different but no less important. They see NATO as a necessity to counter Trump’s attacks and to build their own defense capabilities in an increasingly anarchic world in which American security guarantees can no longer be taken for granted.
Trump might be tempted to believe that without NATO, there is no reason why Russian President Vladimir Putin could not become Washington’s best friend. Europeans might be tempted to believe that increased defense budgets would be enough to protect Europe in the absence of the United States.
The Theater of American Empire
The audacious U.S. special operation in Venezuela was a spectacle of imperial power. It was a harbinger of what we might call theatrical imperialism, an emerging phenomenon in which great powers demonstrate their power as a way of governing without actually governing.
It is also a sign that Washington’s latest national security strategy should be taken at face value. Understood in this way, the Trump administration’s position becomes clear: Trump is not interested in destroying NATO, but in using European anxiety about American abandonment as a crutch to reshape Europe.
The Europeans will probably be able to defend themselves, but Europe has both a "time problem" and a "political problem." They must reduce their dependence on American technology and weapons, while simultaneously pleasing Trump and maintaining the illusion that Europe can rely on American military might.
For Trump, Russia’s war in Ukraine seems to represent an opportunity. Just as a private security company exploits rising risks to increase the price of its services, Washington exploits Europe’s vulnerability and rejoices in the accompanying escalation of tensions between Russia and its European allies.
The Russians, for their part, see Europe as an enemy and Trump as a natural ally. Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, the British general and diplomat who served as NATO’s first secretary general, famously remarked that the alliance’s purpose was to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”
Russia’s current strategy can be described as “keeping the Americans in, the Europeans out, and the Ukrainians down.” Europeans should brace themselves for Trump’s continued threats to annex Greenland, an act that would violate the territorial integrity of a NATO member state. There is a strong possibility that such an annexation - akin to Trump's Crimea - could happen this year.
European leaders have spent a year trying to flatter Trump and promising to buy American weapons, but his ultimatum to Europe - to give up Greenland or face higher tariffs - has backed them into a corner.
Describing Trump's behavior as crossing multiple "red lines", Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever noted that Europe faces a choice and that "being a happy vassal is one thing, being an unhappy slave is quite another". Europe will be forced to make that choice.
Europe still desperately needs NATO. And Europe’s relevance in the world will depend on its willingness to live in a world without the Atlantic alliance.
Any hope that Europeans will mobilize against the twin threats of Trump and Putin is inspiring but unrealistic. According to a recent survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 20% of respondents who view America as an adversary are the least enthusiastic about increasing defense budgets.
European leaders need to convince their publics that they understand the difference between playing dumb and being one. To be a fool is to believe that, despite evidence to the contrary, America will side with Europe in the event of a Russian invasion, or to believe that once Trump leaves office, the US will come to its senses.
The main strategic challenge for Europe is to remember the slogan: NATO is dead, long live NATO!