It happened not at the level of fact, but at the level of feeling - instantly and comprehensively: Vladimir Putin has led Russia into a dead end, and no one knows what will happen next.
The first sign was the change in the language used by high-ranking officials, regional governors and businessmen: they stopped using the first-person plural pronoun when talking about the actions of the authorities in the country.
Last spring, everyone was saying “we“ and “our“. Putin's war on Ukraine may have been reckless and failed, but at least it was common. “We“ were part of it, and for all “us“ It would have been better if it had ended sooner. But now they have begun to describe what is happening as “his“ story, not “our”. It is not our project, it is not our program, it is not our war.
They call his decisions “strange”. Even stranger is the fact that he is making any decisions at all. And this is not just about a drop in approval ratings. The future is no longer discussed in the context of what Putin will decide, but as something that will develop independently of him – and probably without his participation.
This change in rhetoric does not mean rebellion. An authoritarian system can only continue to exist for a long time on the basis of fear, inertia and repression. It still has a monopoly on violence, but it has lost its monopoly on shaping the future.
In the past, the regime, despite all its lies, had some kind of project of its own that it tried to impose: "restoring statehood", establishing itself as an "energy superpower". There was even talk of "modernization" - before the sharp turn towards ultra-conservatism and war.
The irony is that Putin started the war to preserve power - and the system he created. Now, for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, Russians are beginning to imagine a future without him.
This is the result of the coincidence of four factors.
First of all - the increasing cost of military operations. The war in Ukraine was conceived as a special military operation, conducted by a select group of people who would receive financial rewards for their efforts, while the rest of society continued to live as usual.
This model broke down as the war dragged on and expanded in scale. It led to rising inflation and taxes, a depletion of infrastructure, increased censorship, and endless bans. This is not a national war, but it is nationally funded — and society receives no benefit in return.
Second, the elites who have had to return to Russia with their capital need rules. Previously, their property rights were protected by the West. To resolve conflicts and seek protection, they used London courts, offshore structures, and international arbitration. Now, however, conflicts must be resolved within the country, in the absence of functioning institutions. The need for rules is becoming more urgent as the redistribution of assets accelerates.
In the past three years, assets worth about five trillion rubles ($60 billion) have been confiscated, nationalized, or transferred from private businesses to regime loyalists and supporters – the largest reallocation of property since the mass privatizations of the 1990s. And no, we are not suggesting that elites have suddenly become fond of the rule of law or democracy. But even those loyal to the regime crave rules and institutions capable of resolving conflicts fairly.
The third factor is the change in the geopolitical climate, to which Putin himself has contributed.
Russia believes it is reshaping the world order. In reality, however, it is only a catalyst: Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated the crisis of Western democracy, the rise of populism, and globalization fatigue. Suddenly, Russia finds itself in a world where rules have weakened and economic and technological might and brute force dominate.
In a rules-based world, Russia could exploit asymmetries: Europe’s dependence on its gas, its seat on the UN Security Council, the Soviet nuclear legacy. But Europe is now buying gas from other countries, Russia’s seat on the UN Security Council has lost its meaning, and nuclear blackmail has undermined the idea of nonproliferation, depriving Russia of its status as an arbiter. When order itself begins to crumble, the benefits of Putin’s revisionism quickly disappear.
At the same time, Russia is experiencing an identity crisis. For the first time in generations, it has no external model by which to define itself. Historically, it has always defined itself in relation to Europe - and the West as a whole. They existed only so that it could catch up with them, or lag behind them, and oppose them.
This ancient axis has suddenly disappeared. The West as a single cultural, military, and political entity is in crisis. There is no "there" against which we can define what is "here". And this is not an ideological problem; it is a structural problem. Because every development in Russia must have its own internal source of meaning - and the government is unable to provide it.
The fourth point is the strengthening of ideological control without any compensating consequences.
The previous social contract, according to which the state did not interfere in people's private lives, and citizens - in politics, has collapsed. In the past, the system bought people's loyalty through conveniences, services and consumption. Now all it can offer them is more repression, interference in private lives and censorship - the most striking manifestation of which are the current restrictions on access to the Internet.
The problem lies not so much in the repression itself, but in its aimlessness. Ideology by definition presupposes an image of the future; this ideology demands discipline without offering a future.
Citizens are required to be loyal, but they are not told what future this loyalty serves. The political reality seems unappealing even to the many technocrats who helped build it. Optimism has disappeared from within the system.
These four factors create a situation known in chess as a zugzwang: every possible move worsens the position.
As long as Putin is in power, the system could continue to exist. But every step he takes to preserve and expand this system only accelerates its decline.
His instinctive reaction may be to intensify repression. Or to start a new war. But these actions will only worsen the situation.
Putin will not be able to restore the connection between power and the future. He can only make the rupture more bloody and cruel."