Daniel Smilov's comment:
What is actually the position of Rumen Radev and "Progressive Bulgaria" (PB) on Ukraine? The last thing we heard from Defense Minister Stoyanov is that Bulgaria is stopping military aid to the victim of aggression, but will continue to sell it weapons. Before that, Foreign Minister Petrova stated that European military aid to Ukraine is necessary and should be continued. The Ukrainian side replied to Stoyanov that Bulgaria does not provide it with gratuitous military aid anyway. In the discussions around the "new policy" It became clear to Radev that the EU and member states have given us over 200 million euros as compensation for military aid that we have provided over the years in the form of old weapons from the army's warehouses. And ultimately, Bulgaria is a member of the EU, which through its budget supports Ukraine financially and militarily, i.e. Bulgaria participates equally in the collective aid for the attacked country.
All this, taken together, raises the question of what Bulgaria actually wants and aims for with its policy towards Ukraine. In front of Bulgarian journalists abroad, Rumen Radev stated that Europe should rethink its policy towards Ukraine. But if Europe looks at Bulgaria as an example, it would be very puzzled. Several things are still clear.
The clear things
1. Rumen Radev and the PB do not look like moral pacifists: You cannot be a moral pacifist - i.e. to deny the war and military actions - and at the same time to be ready to sell weapons to the belligerents for a lot of money. It is clear that the Bulgarian industry is making a big profit from the war in Ukraine and Radev has nothing against it. From this point of view, his moral pacifism is similar to that of Kornelia Ninova - "not a single bullet for Ukraine" on paper.
2. Bulgaria does not morally support the aggressor and does not claim that Russia should win the war: Bulgaria - even through Radev's government - does not claim that the Russian cause is justified. Thank God, there is no such statement, although Radev is very careful and rarely calls Russia an aggressor. Bulgaria's refusal to support an international court for Putin introduces some ambiguity into the issue, but the explanation for this action is also contradictory: we do not support the tribunal because Putin has not been caught. That is, if he is caught, will we support him?
3. Bulgaria does not believe that Ukraine will necessarily lose the war: Bulgaria has not taken an official position that Ukraine's cause is doomed. If that were the case, there would really be no point in aiding the country militarily. At the beginning of the war, Radev and his inner circle seemed to assume that it would end quickly with a Russian victory. After that, Radev's spokesmen, who are now also MPs, repeatedly declared Russia's victory in the conflict. However, the Ukrainians refuted them and have been fighting for five years now. Recently, they have even had their successes and a certain advantage in the drone war. This is clearly reflected in the messages that Radev's government is sending - they have become far more nuanced.
4. Bulgaria claims that Ukraine cannot win the war by military means: This seems to be the backbone of Radev's position. The assumption here is that Ukraine cannot completely push Russian troops out of its territory. This is not an unrealistic understanding, although the forecasts of many of the "realists" (Mearsheimer and company) for the course of the war so far have generally been wrong and biased in the Russian direction.
5. Bulgaria does not say that the conflict should be frozen along the front line, nor does it claim that Ukraine should cede four of its regions to Russia: When we do not have a position on these issues, however, our demand for a diplomatic solution to the conflict is emptied of content. In order to start negotiations, Putin wants Ukraine to withdraw from Donbas. This is a firm condition from which the Russian side does not deviate. The cession of the four eastern regions (including Kherson and Zaporizhia) is the Russian condition for lasting peace, among many others, such as requirements regarding Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU, etc. That is, in order to sit at the negotiating table, Russia wants certain things with which Ukraine (quite rightly) does not agree. We have no position on these issues, but we insist on negotiations. At the very least, the addressee of our demands remains unknown, let alone their content.
6. Bulgaria does not want Ukraine to surrender: If they listen to interviews with politicians or spokespersons of the Bulgarian National Front, many might get the impression that they want Ukraine to surrender. The meeting between Radev and Zelensky in 2022 gave grounds for such an impression. Ultimately, if Europe stops military and financial assistance to the attacked country, if the US stops Starlink and intelligence information, surrender will be inevitable. However, at the official level, Bulgaria does not defend such ideas. The very fact that we want to continue selling weapons to Ukraine, purchased with European (i.e. partly our) funds, shows that Bulgaria is actually acting against Ukraine's surrender.
7. Bulgaria does not block sanctions against Russia and plans for Ukraine's EU membership: On these issues, with grumbling and remarks, the Bulgarian position does not differ much from that of other European countries.
The Problem
Taking all this into account, one can come to the assumption that Radev's position on Ukraine aims to create the impression that it is more turned towards Russia, without this impression being backed up by real policies. That is why there is more rhetoric and less action. Grant aid that was not given is being stopped. A "diplomatic solution" to the conflict is being sought, without outlining its direction and without taking a position on Russia's ultimatum demands. It is claimed that Ukraine "cannot win", but it is not claimed that it will lose or that it must therefore capitulate.
Why is all this being done then? The answer is that the PB came to power not only with the votes of a large part of Bulgarian Russophiles and Eurosceptics who want to hear anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. In order to keep his party, Radev makes such foreign policy gestures, even at the cost of internal contradiction (the Minister of Defense says one thing, and the Foreign Minister another, for example).
The problem with this cunning strategy is that it can only work for a while. At some point, that part of Radev's electorate that enjoys anti-Ukrainian rhetoric will demand not words but deeds. And these deeds will not be acceptable to the other part of his electorate, as well as to many other Bulgarians.
In addition to purely partisan motives in the motivation of foreign policy, there may be another factor of a historical nature. Bulgarian politicians have often followed the strategy of not speaking against Russia, even when they act against it. This is some kind of superstitious insurance like Boris III's formula "Always with Germany, never against Russia". This insurance is as strong as a red thread on the arm and spitting in the bosom. Russians have never been impressed by this type of insurance and have not pitied its holders in Bulgaria. But tradition is tradition and red threads never stop being worn.
In general, however, it is better to follow international law and morality, rather than partisanship and political superstition.