"For Europe, China is always important, but never urgent. The European Union summit last week proved it once again. First there were endless discussions about Russia: who should talk to Vladimir Putin on behalf of Europe, is there any point in such a conversation at all, when should it take place and what message should it convey? Then there was the familiar battle over the budget. The camp of the "frugal" countries insisted that the European budget should above all remain limited. The countries of southern and eastern Europe, on the other hand, want to maintain spending on agriculture and cohesion policy.
As one might expect, the leaders once again returned to their well-known positions, without giving a clear idea of how Europe intends to finance its new priorities. The debate was largely procedural and only exposed divisions - at a time when Europe needs to demonstrate strength and unity.
This is what Stephen Everts, director of the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), wrote in his analysis.
"It was only late in the evening - after 11 p.m. - that the leaders got to the topic that was actually supposed to be the main focus of the meeting: China. It was listed on the agenda under the heading "Competitiveness and the Economy" because Europe is still struggling to openly name the true essence of the debate. And that, of course, is China. Everyone was already tired, the discussion had already been postponed twice and once again led to almost nothing. This is a missed opportunity.
Europe urgently needs a serious debate on China. Not a technical discussion about tariffs, subsidies or market access, but a strategic conversation. Because China influences everything at once - industrial policy, defense, technology, critical raw materials and trade. This is geopolitics and therefore must be among the highest priorities.
The challenge is becoming more and more urgent. The pressure is increasing in more and more sectors. Electric cars, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, the pharmaceutical industry, the chemical industry - European companies are feeling the growing competition from China everywhere. Behind this is an economic model in which state subsidies, cheap financing, export promotion and strategic market access are closely intertwined. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly difficult for European companies to operate on fair terms in the Chinese market itself.
A strategic problem
The consequences are already visible. The European Union's trade deficit with China is approaching 1 billion euros a day. In Germany - the long-standing symbol of European industrial power - thousands of manufacturing jobs are disappearing every month. And the French national planning agency warns that in the long term, 55% of the EU's industrial base is at risk. This poses a huge structural threat to the European economic model and, consequently, to our welfare states.
Moreover, the problem has long been no longer just economic - it has become strategic. China is reducing its own dependencies, while increasingly using Europe's dependencies as a tool of influence. Critical raw materials, chips, magnets - it becomes clear again and again how vulnerable Europe is when Beijing decides to slow down exports, restrict permits or politicize access to these resources.
This is already affecting our security. In recent years, Europe has rightly stated that it must expand its defense industry. But tanks, drones, missiles and communication systems require critical raw materials, magnets, chips and industrial capacity. The discussion about European defense often revolves around dependence on American weapons. This is important. But the dependence on Chinese raw materials and components is just as essential.
That is why it is strange that the debate on China is constantly postponed, watered down or hidden behind technocratic language. As if words are more dangerous than reality itself. Of course, the situation is complicated, especially now that Europe must simultaneously deal with the aggression of Vladimir Putin and the unpredictability of Donald Trump. And of course, Europe has an interest in maintaining trade with China, cooperating with it on climate issues and on a number of other topics. But this should not be an excuse to avoid the main question: how will Europe defend its strategic interests against a country that increasingly uses trade, technology and interdependence for political purposes?
The second danger
There is another risk. Europe should not simply follow Washington - and even less Donald Trump. US policy towards China is tougher, more unpredictable and often aimed primarily at preserving American supremacy. Europe has its own interests. We do not want a world divided into blocs, in which every decision becomes a test of loyalty. We must also be alert to a possible US-China deal that could be struck at the expense of European interests.
Following its own course does not mean Europe is soft. Quite the opposite. Europe must be less naive about market access, take stricter measures against Chinese state subsidies and reduce its dependence on critical raw materials and technologies more quickly. Europe must also be more honest about the cost of these decisions. This is where the problem lies. There is talk everywhere that Europe must act geopolitically. But as soon as this geopolitics starts to cost money and affect national interests, the conversation returns to the old arguments. We want strategic autonomy, but without common financing. We want less dependence on China, but without industrial policy and without trade tensions.
This is not going to happen. Those who want to be less vulnerable must invest. Those who want to act strategically must set priorities and accept the risks. And those who take China seriously must have this conversation where it belongs - at the highest political level, between leaders.
Europe is not powerless. It has a huge market, strong companies and serious technological potential. The European Union has a wide range of tools with which to counter unfair Chinese practices. But these advantages are under pressure and only matter if they are used strategically. And that is precisely what Europe is failing to do.
All of this requires political decisions and clarity. Concrete actions are also needed - introducing tariffs in vulnerable sectors, giving European companies an advantage in public procurement and stronger protection for strategic industries and enterprises. Only then will Europe show that it is ready to pursue a tough policy. Just as China is doing.
Some argue, especially in southern Europe or among supporters of green policies, that Europe needs China. Many fear a Chinese "escalation". This is understandable, but ultimately wrong. If Europe wants to confront China, the choice is simple: either it will bear the price now or pay a much higher price later.