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The Power of Delyan Peevski: DPS and Political Repression

Things should be called by their true names: what happened these days is a manifestation of political repression. The first source of Peevski's power is Borisov and GERB. The second is completely illegitimate

ФАКТИ публикува мнения с широк спектър от гледни точки, за да насърчава конструктивни дебати.

Daniel Smilov's comment:

The meeting between Delyan Peevski and Dzhevdet Chakarov this week, Chakarov's resignation as co-chair of DPS and his withdrawal of the lawsuit against Peevski are the empirical manifestations of political repression in Bulgaria. Things should be called by their true names.

Is there political logic

Political repression is the use of the investigative and punitive instruments of the state to put pressure on political opponents. There is no other reason for Dzhevdet Chakarov's actions, which in themselves represent a blatant betrayal of his party members and causes, other than the criminal actions initiated against him (through his son): investigations and seizures of businesses. Chakarov has not provided any political arguments for what he is doing. In fact, he has not made any statement and is clearly ashamed to explain his actions publicly. What we have as an explanation of what happened is from Delyan Peevski and his MRF. Dzhevdet Chakarov had obviously not consulted his parliamentary group about his decision, so it had to urgently meet after him and explain that in fact it was not about unifying the MRF, but about betraying the leader of one of the factions. All this suggests that Chakarov is not proud of his actions and, if not forced, would hardly have committed them.

There is no political logic behind these actions. After all, Chakarov himself defended the thesis for more than a year that Delyan Peevski was trying to take over the MRF, using the instruments of the state. This actually happened in the most absurd and ostentatious way - the leader of the MRF-Dogan himself repented and sprinkled ashes on his head, leaving the name of the Movement to his enemy and opponent.

There are some observers who are looking for in this biblical in nature betrayal the "normal" logic of the political race. Peevski simply turned out to be stronger than Chakarov, who decided to throw in the towel in the name of… who knows what. The unity of the party, "working for the people" and other similar things are cited as possible motives for Chakarov to admit his political weakness. However, this is more of a PR manipulation on the part of Peevski's people than a real explanation of what is happening. First, if he had aimed to unite the two factions, Chakarov would still have warned his own and spoken on their behalf. Second, Peevski's "power" itself is the problem that DPS-Dogan has been struggling with for the past year, claiming that it is the result of his influence in services and other institutions. What problem do you solve if you simply recognize it as existing and unsolvable?

The Power of Delyan Peevski

In the clash between the two DPS, the sources of Delyan Peevski's "power" became extremely clear. Moreover, power should not be confused with legitimate power - power is simply supremacy, supported by state instruments in an opaque and inexplicable manner.

The first source of Peevski's power is Boyko Borisov and GERB. Without this source, the "Peevski" phenomenon could not exist either now or in the last decade. After the last parliamentary elections, for example, the municipalities that switched to the DPS-New Beginning received generous, extraordinary subsidies from the budget. This cannot be done without GERB and Borisov. In order to secure Peevski's place in government, Borisov and GERB firmly declared themselves against the cordon sanitaire against Peevski in the current National Assembly, and also failed the rotation with the PP-DB during the previous regular government of the country. And when they nominally included Ahmed Dogan's people in the government, GERB insisted that they not be given any posts and that their demands generally not be met. In practice, Dogan's APS was expelled from the ruling majority with the continuation of the criminal and administrative repression against its representatives.

In short: Peevski's "power" comes from his ability to "distribute portions", and for this, a GERB party is needed to guarantee him participation in power. The appointment of Rosen Karadimov to the CPC is another example that demonstrates how people who are quite acceptable to Peevski end up in the regulators. Whether they are through "quotas" of GERB, BSP or some other party - this is not so important. Kalin Stoyanov entered the government of academician Denkov with the approval of PP-DB. This did not prevent him from remaining in his post even after losing the trust of Denkov and PP-DB. And for this, GERB was needed to protect Peevski's man.

The first source of the power of the New Beginning is semi-legitimate. It consists in the politically inexplicable cooperation between Borisov and Peevski, which has outlived all conflicts. The only thing is that from covert, this cooperation is becoming more and more obvious, and the current majority directly depends on Peevski.

The second source of Peevski's power is completely illegitimate. This is his influence in services and judicial bodies according to the "Eight Dwarfs" model. We have seen in recent years how, on political command, supposedly independent bodies defend or remove Ivan Geshev, appoint and re-appoint Borislav Sarafov, give the name MRF to Delyan Peevski, and deny registration to Dogan's people. Moreover: Peevski's political opponents are being checked, investigated, and imposed arrests, not to mention the abundant smearing of them in a certain part of the media that belongs to Peevski, without officially being his.

Here, the New Beginning's defensive theories are two. First, that all this is just coincidence and chance. The institutions are doing their job, and the fact that they are doing it only with respect to certain political subjects is just a coincidence. All this is nothing new - in Bulgaria, the opposition is usually investigated.

The second defensive theory is that Dzhevdet Chakarov and his people deserve to be investigated because they have accumulated many sins during the years of transition and their wealth is the result of vicious schemes.

Both defensive explanations are misleading, of course. First, there are no coincidences in the political repression - it is quite targeted towards Peevski's political opponents. Second, even if Dzhevdet Chakarov or his son committed crimes and irregularities, this does not change the situation. It simply means that for a long time they have been using the umbrella of the institutions, and when they became politically inconvenient, the umbrella is folded and they are chased away. Political repression goes hand in hand with political protection against punitive repression: these are two sides of the same coin.

Borisov in the "Peevski" photo studio?

Many have raised the question of whether there are no parallels between Chakarov's situation and that of Borisov towards Peevski. It is true that there is still no Peevski-Borisov photo, but Borisov behaves as if there is one. He supposedly doesn't watch the "Turkish series", and yet all the governments and majorities act in favor of one of the characters in it (the "cordon" is a good example). And always in favor of a specific person. And in general, Borisov doesn't like to explain himself about Peevski - just like for Chakarov, this is a visibly unpleasant and shameful activity.

At the moment, there are no cracks between Borisov and Peevski, so "scare" Borisov with a possible unfortunate outcome of his partnership is wishful thinking. Both protagonists act in sync and clearly benefit from their interaction. The problem is that this interaction has a heavy price. And it is the legitimization of political repression.

And when violence becomes the norm, the question of the next victim remains open.