Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has posed growing challenges to Russia at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Ukrainian drone units are increasingly carrying out successful strikes against Russian artillery, drone operators and logistical targets in the near rear in order to achieve tactical effects.
This is what the "Institute for the Study of War" writes (ISW).
A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces had shifted the focus of their drone strikes to prioritize targeting Russian artillery, drone operators, ground lines of communication, and training areas rather than Russian infantry, reducing the number of Russian attacks and allowing Ukrainian forces to achieve local successes.
The commander added that frequent drone strikes by Ukraine against Russian communications antennas were demoralizing Russian forces, as well as disrupting Russian communications on the front line.
A Ukrainian drone unit reported on March 19 that Ukrainian drone operators had destroyed an entire battery of six Russian "Grad" multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the direction of Pokrovsk, and geolocated footage released on March 19 confirmed the destruction of two Grad systems at Zhuravka (about 16 kilometers from the front line southeast of Pokrovsk).
Ukraine's campaign of short-range strikes against the Russian tactical close rear is therefore increasingly degrading both Russian offensive and defensive capabilities, allowing Ukrainian forces to make tactical gains and hindering Russia's ability to conduct artillery preparation for the expected spring-summer offensive in 2026.
Ukrainian forces are also conducting systematic efforts to degrade Russian air defenses and expose other valuable assets in the Russian rear as part of their medium- and long-range battlefield air interception (BAI) campaign. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported on March 18 that reported monthly Ukrainian strikes with a medium range between 50 and 250 kilometers behind the front line had quadrupled from an average of about 11 between March and October 2025 to an average of 45 since November 2025.
The analyst noted that Ukrainian forces had conducted a total of 365 medium-range strikes between March 19, 2025, and March 9, 2026, of which a third had occurred in the previous three months alone (since approximately January 9, 2026). The figures include some long-range Ukrainian strikes, which have a similar impact, as medium-range strikes are typically at operational depth (about 20 to 120 kilometers from the front line).
The OSINT analyst noted that Ukrainian forces have targeted radar stations, missile launchers, and other elements of the Russian air defense system in almost half of the strikes since March 19, 2025. The OSINT analyst added that Ukrainian forces have used Ukrainian-made medium-range drones with ranges of up to 250 kilometers to partially replace the role that High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) systems were performing, and have significantly increased their use of long-range FP-2 drones over the past five months (approximately since October 9, 2025). The BBC Ukrainian Service reported on March 19 that data from the Ukrainian General Staff showed that Ukrainian forces had struck 55 Russian air defense systems in the winter of 2025-2026.
The commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Major Robert "Magyar" Brodsky reported on March 16 that Ukrainian forces had struck 23 more air defense systems between March 1 and 16, bringing the total to 80 systems in the winter of 2025-2026 and early spring of 2026.
The Dutch open-source project Oryx visually confirmed on January 1, 2026, that Ukrainian forces had destroyed 77 Russian surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) and 23 radar stations in 2025.
According to reports, tankers carrying Russian oil are sailing to Cuba in violation of the US embargo. Samir Madani, co-founder of maritime intelligence company TankerTrackers.com, told the Financial Times (FT) that the Hong Kong-flagged tanker Sea Horse was carrying 27,000 tonnes of gas and would arrive in Cuba on Monday, March 23.
Maritime intelligence company Kpler identified the gas as Russian in origin. Madani added that the Russian-flagged tanker Anatoly Kolodkin, which is carrying an estimated 100,000 metric tonnes of crude oil, is likely to arrive in Cuba on April 4. The FT reported that the ships would be the first to arrive in Cuba in three months.
Kremlin officials are reportedly considering military means to escort Russian ships. Russian presidential aide and former Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev told the Russian business publication Kommersant on March 18 that Russia is considering installing "special protective equipment" on ships, including mobile firefighting groups to protect ships (possibly from drone strikes) and Russian naval vessels to escort convoys of merchant ships.
Patrushev's statements come amid increased U.S. and European seizures of tankers from the shadowy fleet off the European coast, in the North Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Caribbean Sea.
The Russian federal censor, Roskomnadzor, is reportedly struggling to block all blacklisted resources on the Russian internet as Russian authorities slowly try to restrict access to Telegram. A source from a Russian fixed-line telecommunications operator told Forbes Russia on March 18 that Roskomnadzor had "completely lost control" over its blocking efforts, allowing users to periodically access some previously blocked websites and applications.
A source from a Russian internet service provider confirmed to Forbes Russia that Roskomnadzor "does not have enough bandwidth" to process all the traffic on "RuNet" to completely block all banned resources. "RuNet" is Russia's sovereign internet system, which uses state-controlled domain name servers (DNS) to map IP addresses to domain addresses and connect users to websites.
Roskomnadzor has denied claims that it lacks the bandwidth to carry out the necessary blocking.
Russian authorities have failed to prepare adequate technical means to block Telegram, as well as other banned apps and websites. Russian authorities have also failed to adequately prepare the information space to accommodate the increasingly restrictive measures, and the Kremlin has faced backlash for its attempts to control information from pro-war figures in the information space, which it cannot fully subordinate to state control.
Russian business newspaper "Kommersant" announced on March 18 that the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) has expelled State Duma deputy Andrei Svintsov for actions that "discredit" the LDPR, likely referring to his controversial statements made recently regarding the blocking of Telegram, virtual private networks (VPNs), and the internet in Russia.
The Russian rhetorical response to the backlash against the upcoming internet crackdown appears uncoordinated, and the Kremlin is likely unprepared to deal with such a backlash.
The US decision to lift sanctions against Belarus is likely to directly benefit the Russian economy and therefore Russia's military efforts. US Special Envoy for Belarus John Cole met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on March 19, after which Lukashenko announced that he had released 250 political prisoners.
The ISW has long assessed that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that the countries share a common defense industrial base.
The lifting of US sanctions against Belarus therefore directly benefits Russia's military efforts.
A Russian Su-30 fighter jet briefly violated Estonian airspace on March 18. The Estonian Defence Forces reported on March 19 that a Russian Su-30 fighter jet violated Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland near Vaindu Island (about 81 kilometers southeast of Helsinki) for about one minute on March 18.
The Estonian Defence Forces reported that the Russian aircraft had no published flight plans and did not have two-way radio contact with Estonian air traffic control.