Since 1997, the participation of presidents in parliamentary elections has invariably raised the question of what lessons history brings — and what makes the case of President Rumen Radev different.
What are the dividing lines in the upcoming campaign, how are the forces being rearranged in parliament and why the topics of “corruption“ and East-West will once again dominate the debate — political scientist Kaloyan Velchev analyzes the most important scenarios for bTV. He has a doctorate in political science, researching presidential activism in Bulgaria in conditions of political crisis.
According to him, it is inappropriate to draw a parallel with previous presidents and their political experiences, and with what is happening with President Radev. There are several reasons…
„The first is in the political environment itself at the moment we find ourselves in: it is a much more polarized, much more fragmented system, with much weaker parties, and it is much easier for any type of player to break through in such an environment. Especially those like Radev, who have accumulated institutional authority over the years. And I repeat: in my opinion, this authority is more institutional than personal“.
He specified that previous attempts by Bulgarian presidents to break through were more complicated, although their rating was not necessarily lower than Radev's.
„Another feature of Radev, which helps him in my opinion in an early campaign, is the fact that he was the only non-partisan president to date. Zhelev, Stoyanov, Parvanov, and Plevneliev — all of them were representatives of specific parties. Some of them were even leaders of these parties. In this sense, their party profile was much more clearly defined, and their path to a wider type of electorate was to a greater extent closed. With Radev, we don't have that“, the political scientist added to bTV.
Velchev commented that in the 2009 parliamentary elections, Boyko Borisov and GERB entered the right-wing space at a time when it was empty. The situation is similar at the moment with the left, which Rumen Radev will focus on.
„Until now, Rumen Radev has always been an anti-status quo president, who has consistently clashed with all majorities. He has always been against something until now“, added the political scientist.
„So for me, the problem facing Radev is not so much the historical parallels of failures of presidents until now, as the lack of content in his project. And this lack of content will prove to be a problem later. It may not even hinder him during the campaign, but when the president is expected to become prime minister and bear responsibility, from then on his idealized image will only devalue. And when he has to take specific positions, he will start to lose support, after having promised too many things to too many people. And there is no way to please everyone when real political responsibility is already being borne“, he emphasized.
In his interview, Radev talks about dialogue, not about sole power. Which of the two is easier?
I would also say which is more feasible. Dialogue is the more imperative in our political system and at this political moment. Separately, in my opinion, this is the more effective way to govern a society and keep it together. Which is easier - I suppose to govern with a firm hand. I suppose that is the expectation for Radev, including. Ultimately, his image is largely institutional. And he is not only the president, but also the military figure — these are the roles that he has held, which are somehow associated with a firm hand, with the ability to make difficult decisions.
So, in my opinion, the expectations for him are for a more personal power, which, however, it seems to me that it will be difficult to implement. And this is another problem that Radev will have to deal with. Which is perhaps why he responds in the way that you mentioned — that a dialogue will be necessary.
You commented that we still do not hear clear theses expressed by the president, and we still do not even know who the people around him are. What will be the main dividing lines in the election debate?
However, it is worth noting that Radev's appearance really puts the upcoming election campaign in a new light. Including in recent weeks, we have all been talking about the president and what we can expect from him, where he will be positioned. In this sense, the political picture is changing because of Radev and to a large extent the expectations for the next administration are related to him and what he can do.
But the political topics that divide the country and that mainly concern it are not changing. We have been talking about it for the last three or four years — these are mainly two topics.
One is related to the problems with corruption — the mass dissatisfaction with the way the country is governed, with the fact that we have many figures who are under international sanctions and accused of corruption, who are in parliament and in power. Dissatisfaction with them, on the one hand, is a main topic - to what extent an anti-corruption majority is possible.
And of course the second topic — has been going on since the war in Ukraine. Although this topic does not seem so crucial, it continues to be the East-West division. And it is this watershed that is a problem for Radev, and many of his opponents are trying to place him in one of the two geopolitical sides, while he is trying to place himself in the center — in the middle — and to portray himself as a strong foreign policy leader who can defend the national interest.
Who will maneuver between the two — right?
In my opinion, this is the attempt at a narrative. To what extent it is possible — I am not convinced. But this is also not a new narrative: we have seen this narrative from Borisov over the years. It is gaining support because it sounds more moderate, but this is not something new.
The change that Radev is talking about, precisely because of the lack of content, for me is currently limited to simply changing the faces in the government. That is, replacing Borisov and Peevski with Radev, which in itself can lead to calm in society. But I don't see how the way our country is governed will change in the long term, because I don't see any vision and I don't see any clearly taken institutional commitment to respecting the rules of the game, namely the laws and the Constitution.
What kind of parliament awaits us?
Maybe less fragmented, because many of the parties closer to the 4% barrier may fall out, because their electorate may flow to Radev. So maybe it will be a slightly less fragmented parliament.
Of course, it's too early to say, but with fewer parties there will be less fragmentation, which, however, will not exclude the need for coalitions. They may simply be with fewer parties.
Over the past few years, it has proven impossible to form coalitions with fewer than four parties, which has made governing the country complicated. In a future parliament, perhaps, three parties will be needed or even just two. That's how it seems to me that the next parliament will look.
And Radev himself, around whom there is speculation that the government will be formed, has so far left all doors open. And we will see within the campaign what type of coalition will begin to look most possible.
At the moment when a relatively strong player enters the political arena, perhaps the correct logic would be consolidation and no internal party upheavals. In two of the parliamentary groups we see exactly the opposite - one is the BSP, the other is “We continue the change - Democratic Bulgaria“. Let's start with the socialists. What is happening in the BSP right now?
In recent years, the BSP has suffered constant declines - both electoral and internal. It is torn apart by struggles between cores. And now - with the internal life of this party — it is too complicated. In 2021, the left had perhaps — about 700 thousand votes. To date, they are much less. It lost over half of its electorate. Not to mention that in 2017, at the beginning of Ninova, there were nearly a million voters, and still…
Kornelia Ninova is largely to blame for the split that occurred in the party with the purges she undertook, with clashes with many of the party's leading figures.
So this decline of the BSP was determined over the years. The left has largely lost its identity. And again, Ninova is seriously at fault, as she stumbled into a nationalist, conservative narrative that does not necessarily go to a European left-wing party.
So it seems to me that the battle in the BSP will also be about its identity - whether it will offer authentically left-wing policies, or will continue on this path.
The problem with being conservative-nationalist in the BSP is that this terrain is overcrowded — there are much more authentic players on it. That is precisely why the party's downfall is so obvious.
There is an election of a leader there and it seems to me that this is the key. After all, the left has managed to reproduce itself over the years, to offer an alternative. It is the active internal political life that has managed to preserve it.
What we are about to see at the BSP congress will show whether this time the BSP will have the reflex to preserve itself. It seems to me that if a bright alternative is not chosen to the political elite in the BSP in recent years, it may not even pass the election threshold.
And PP-DB — we know, traditionally have complicated relations, as there are quite bright personalities there. Public disagreements between them are no secret — this is part of the life of this coalition. However, it seems quite unreasonable to me that it is falling apart at this moment, after it managed to largely consolidate support during the protests — including setting a large part of their agenda and including managing to re-legitimize its leaders like Assen Vassilev, and creating new ones like Ivaylo Mirchev.
In this sense, it seems to me that in order to be a factor in future governance, PP-DB should stay together. It would be good if the problems they have were not so public, because this creates concern among voters about how capable this complex coalition is of governing. In this sense, consolidation is needed and perhaps slightly clearer mechanisms are needed for the way in which positions are formed, leadership is formed, representation is formed — in general.
And since we have gone through almost all parliamentary forces, with the exception of GERB and “DPS – New Beginning“ - your forecast for the two parties?
It seems to me that both GERB and “DPS – New Beginning“ are in a difficult position. We saw in the latest sociological data, before Radev's project was announced, that GERB is in retreat anyway — perhaps a consequence of the protests, perhaps a consequence of the “Zhelyazkov“ cabinet, which to some extent was not recognized by all GERB voters.
But in my opinion, mainly due to the fact that the relationship between Peevski and Borisov became so public that even Borisov did not simply stop denying it, but began to tell it as necessary and the only possible one for him.
It seems to me that this type of story still disappointed GERB voters to a greater extent, who, in addition to being right-wing, are pro-European. They did not necessarily like this style of governance. And in this sense, a natural outflow begins.
Borisov himself — I grew up with him as a political factor, in this sense he is sufficiently worn out and has a sufficiently large number of people for whom it is increasingly difficult to mobilize a peripheral electorate through his charisma. So, tough elections await GERB.
Moreover, on the ground there seems to be competition with “New Beginning“ for voters and it may be difficult for them to achieve their good results.
With “New Beginning“ we will see what will happen. We will see — it seems important to me what the composition of the caretaker cabinet will be, and hence access to state resources. Peevski's access to state resources — because through them he has managed to exert influence in recent years — to take pictures with the coat of arms with various mayors and thus control groups of voters.
This control may prove to be weakened within the framework of this campaign and it may be more difficult for him to repeat his not bad election results from the last elections. So there is a possibility of voter hesitation.
Moreover, as a result of the protests, the current political situation in the country largely suggests a retreat of these parties. That is, even if they get good election results, the expectations are that they will be isolated in a subsequent administration.
To what extent do attempts at external legitimation influence Bulgarian voters? I am specifically referring to Donald Trump, the Davos forum.
Well, it depends on the format. In my opinion, this specific example that you give did not help legitimize anyone, because this forum — this “Peace Council“ — in general terms seemed like a retreat from the existing international order, whose defenders in Bulgaria over the years have been GERB. And this repositioning of theirs — I am not convinced that it did them a very good service.
Now, as far as I am aware, it is about to be voted on in the parliament, in the next parliament, perhaps, whether we will be part of this council. So this will also be an important topic during the campaign.
I say it as a symbol.
We have seen many times over the years how our politicians try to legitimize themselves through such external events, external players. This seems to me like a logical strategy. How much it works — I am not convinced. And in the end, it is expected to have some logic. Somehow this council — with the GERB party supporting it — rather did not do them a good service.
Otherwise, of course, Boyko Borisov has relied a lot on this card over the years — for example, Ursula von der Leyen coming from Brussels to pat him on the back and say that he is a European leader. These types of meetings have worked over the years. This one in particular — I am not convinced that it had a positive result for Borisov's party.