Iliana Yotova’s convincing victory in the presidential election strengthens Rumen Radev’s position, while at the same time revealing the serious shortcomings of Bulgaria’s political parties. Why did Yotova win, what actually lies behind the support for Radev, and has he become the focus of political expectations that go beyond the framework of a single party formation? Prof. Rosen Stoyanov, a lecturer at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski", spoke to FAKTI.
- Professor Stoyanov, Iliana Yotova convincingly won the presidential runoff against Andrey Gyurov. What does this result actually show – personal support for Yotova, trust in Rumen Radev’s political project, or rejection of her opponents?
- Above all, the result shows the void left by the parties. When political entities fail to produce recognisable candidates of their own, with a clear line and responsibility, voters turn to what remains – an institutional figure with accumulated capital of trust, even when that trust is more a matter of habit. Yotova won not because she presented a new Bulgarian doctrine, but because she faced a candidate whose campaign failed to move beyond the framework of „Anti-Radev“ and „…as long as it isn’t her…“. This is less a personal triumph and more a rejection of an alternative. For his part, Radev received indirect confirmation not so much of his project as of the fact that, through his manner of speaking – with a clear personal dominance, he has managed to fill the vacuum that serious parties themselves created by failing to nominate their own candidates.
- Following Yotova’s victory, can we speak of a strengthening of Rumen Radev’s political position and of a concentration of power around a single political centre?
- Yes, but this strengthening is of a particular kind. Radev has never been a politician in the classical sense – he is an institutional representative who turned the appetite for power into an extension of his mandate beyond the mandate itself. Now, what is gathering around Radev is not a party but a „space of heightened expectations and hopes“. These are people who have already learned to distinguish between „the state“ and „those in power“ and prefer the former, even when it is personalised.
The concentration of power is real, but it is not party-institutional in the traditional sense.
It is communicative and symbolic. In fact, the danger is not that one centre holds more power, but that this centre continues to speak in the language of „us versus them“, in a military manner, without offering deliberation within its own perimeter.
- Does Andrey Gyurov have the potential to become the new leader of the democratic community, or has his candidacy already exhausted its political resources?
- His candidacy showed the limits of the resources that the „democratic“ community can mobilise when it comes „from outside“ the party system, but without creating a new one. Gyurov has a reputation as a competent person, but his campaign failed to turn that reputation into a political platform with clear messages for voters who are not part of the capital’s or academic circles. The potential for leadership exists only if the coming months are used to build something that is not „anti“, but „for“ – and in the sphere of the national interest, formulated as treaties, alliances and an economic outlook. If this does not happen, the candidacy will remain evidence of yet another attempt to fill a vacuum with a personality rather than an organisation. The so-called „democratic community“ has still not realised that it does not need a new messiah, but people with political qualities, vision and party potential.
- Did these elections prove that Bulgarian parties are no longer capable of producing recognisable political leaders and taking responsibility for their own candidates?
- Yes. That is the clearest conclusion. When GERB did not nominate its own candidate, while DB supported someone who was not their leader but, on the contrary, a PP activist, the parties admitted that they had abandoned their main function: producing leadership, representing and defending interests existing in society, promoting values and ideologies, and being political entities. Voters sensed this.
Voters do not vote for parties that hide behind other people’s names, because this is a form of irresponsibility.
On the other hand, coalition culture in this country is already poor, but it is now being compounded by an even lower culture of putting forward one’s own candidates, which speaks to a deficit of political culture. Major parties betrayed their voters by failing to nominate their own candidates – and this is not a moral reproach, but a structural diagnosis. When a party does not „risk“ putting forward its own candidate, it is saying that it is not ready to take responsibility for its choices.
- What needs to happen within PP-DB following Andrey Gyurov’s result? Is an internal party realignment or a broader unification on the right possible?
- Something needs to happen that has not happened so far – a clear distinction between those who want to be an alternative to Radev and those who want to be an alternative to the very state of Bulgarian politics. Internal party realignment is possible, but it will make sense only if it is not simply a change of faces, but a change in the way politics is discussed, explained and implemented. A broader unification on the right makes sense, but not as a wedding before a runoff, rather as consolidation around a minimum set of rules, the most important of which are a parliamentary republic, Western alliances, and also a rejection of neo-modern street democracy as a substitute for institutions. If PP-DB remains in the mode of „we are against“, without formulating what „we are for“ beyond anti-corruption rhetoric, the idea of consolidation will remain just another tactical exercise.
- GERB did not nominate its own presidential candidate, and subsequently Boyko Borisov made political moves related to support for Andrey Gyurov. What does this show about his strategy?
- It shows a strategy of survival, not leadership.
Borisov is a master of situational positioning – he does not lead, he adapts to what has already happened.
The lack of an own candidate is an admission that the party has no face capable of standing comparison with Yotova on a national scale. The moves surrounding Gyurov were an attempt to preserve some relevance on the right without paying the full price of defeat. This is rational in the short term, but destructive in the long term – a party that systematically avoids producing its own candidates, as well as its own new leaders, gradually loses the ability to be recognised as an entity; it remains merely an instrument.
- Is a process of rethinking Boyko Borisov’s role in GERB beginning, and could we witness a change in the party’s leadership?
- The process began a long time ago, but it is slow and internal. Borisov is both an asset and a liability for the party. Without Borisov, GERB has no face; with him, it remains trapped in his style. A change in leadership is possible only if a figure emerges who can speak the language of institutions and of voters outside the hard core, without imitating Borisov. No such figure has emerged so far.
The rethinking will happen not through debate, but through elections – when the party loses yet another chance to be a factor.
Until then, Borisov will continue to be both the problem and the solution.
- What was the role of the DPS in these elections? The DPS activated its structures for the runoff, but this did not prove sufficient to change the final result. What does this show about the DPS’s actual political influence and its ability to mobilise voters?
- The DPS remains a mobilisation machine in certain regions and among certain communities. Its mobilisation for the runoff showed that its structures work, but it also revealed the limits of this machine – it cannot transfer support beyond its own perimeter on a national scale when the main debates are between two candidates, neither of whom is „its“. The DPS’s real influence lies in its ability to act as a balancer in parliamentary configurations, not in its ability to determine a presidential result. When the party mobilises but does not change the outcome, this is a signal that its strength is local and clientelist, rather than national-political.
- Low voter turnout was once again a serious problem. Why do so many Bulgarian citizens see no point in taking part in elections, and to what extent does this call into question trust in the political system?
- People see no point because they see no difference. When parties do not produce candidates, when campaigns are reduced to „against, anti and as long as it isn’t the other one“, while the state continues to function as something that happens despite politics, participation appears pointless.
Low turnout is not simply apathy – it is a rational refusal to take part in a game whose rules are unclear and whose reward is uncertain.
This calls into question not so much trust in specific institutions as trust in the very idea that political participation changes anything. When 60 percent do not vote, they are not „against the system“; they are outside it.
- Bulgarian citizens seem to have learned to live without the state and its institutions. Is this the most serious problem facing Bulgarian democracy today – the loss of trust in statehood?
- Yes. This is the most serious problem. Not corruption in itself, not populism, and not even the personalisation of power. The most serious problem is that a large part of the population has developed strategies for living that minimise dependence on the state – and this is not a triumph of freedom, but a sign of institutional weakness. Democracy requires a minimum level of trust that rules are applied and that participation has consequences. When people learn to live without this trust, they do not become freer; they become more vulnerable to anyone who promises to restore order from outside.
- What needs to change for people to return to active participation in political life?
- The way the state is discussed must change, as must the way the state itself speaks. Not as an enemy, not as a distribution machine, but as a space of common rules that have meaning. Parties must once again begin producing their own candidates and taking responsibility for them. A language must emerge that formulates the national interest not as a slogan, but as a set of treaties, alliances and economic priorities. And minimum political literacy among citizens must be restored – or perhaps, unfortunately, begin to be built – because a person who does not understand how institutions work cannot trust them. People will return not when they are promised something new, but when they see that participation has consequences that do not amount merely to replacing some faces with others. Until then, low turnout will remain the most accurate „comment“ on the state of Bulgarian politics.