Steven BLATER
The headline quotes Medvedev's catchphrase to his compatriots when he was at the head of the Russian government, addressed specifically to the residents of Crimea in 2016 in response to complaints about meager pensions. Now it is becoming more universal in the context of growing financial problems for all Russians.
In September 2025, Russia faced a rather serious fuel crisis.
A steady rise in gasoline prices is observed in more than a dozen regions of the federation, and this trend began in the spring. Some regions continue to experience acute fuel shortages. For example - Transbaikalia and the Far East. Residents there have to wait in line for hours at gas stations. Meanwhile, in Crimea and Primorye, fuel sales are limited and available only with vouchers.
And this is an excellent example of the consequences of the crisis, as the stock exchange price of A-95 gasoline has increased almost fourfold since June (by 30%, exceeding 100,000 rubles per ton). At the same time, supplies from the Komsomolsk and Angarsk refineries, which are key to the region, have decreased (by 25% and 57%, respectively). As of September 9, 2025, the price of A-92 gasoline has also increased, reaching 71,800 rubles.
On July 28, 2025, the Russian government took a step to regulate the domestic market through a temporary ban on fuel exports, which was in effect until the end of August. However, this measure did not have the expected effect. Exports of petroleum products (gasoline and diesel) from Russia are relatively small, despite its status as a major exporter of crude oil. In the first half of 2025, only 2.5 million tons of gasoline were delivered to foreign markets, which is only 14-15% of total domestic consumption (17-18.5 million tons).
The root causes of the crisis are being ignored by both the Russian media and local authorities. Instead, fuel problems are attributed to “seasonal difficulties”, especially with regard to the harvest. They do not mention the successful attacks by Ukrainian drones on oil depots and refineries. These strikes force refineries to suspend their operations for significant periods (from several weeks to several months), depending on the damage caused. The authorities cynically call this "the aftermath of several pieces of debris from downed drones".
While the authorities deny there is a problem, drone strikes and internal miscalculations are wreaking havoc on the energy sector. Russian authorities insist that the fuel situation is under control, but they also accuse citizens of creating artificial shortages by panic-buying fuel in cans. The shortages have already led to a lack of gasoline and diesel for Russian troops, even for logistics to the front line.
Key facilities in Russia's oil infrastructure have been systematically attacked by Ukrainian drones. On the night of September 12, 2025, the terminal point of the Baltic Pipeline System, the oil port of Primorsk on the Baltic Sea, which is crucial for exports, was hit. At least 17% of oil refineries have been forced to close since the attacks began, with the main reason being damage caused by drones.
In September of this year, the price of gasoline (A-92, A-95) and diesel reached record levels due to a combination of strikes and other factors.
Although Russia has significant oil reserves, most of the easily accessible fields have already been exhausted. Western technologies are vital. They are vital for extracting oil from hard-to-reach depths. Without them, production will decline, as China and Iran do not have the corresponding innovations.
Factories built through cooperation with the West cannot currently be quickly restored after the attacks due to restrictions and a lack of Western parts. The government, business, and military have failed to effectively protect these refineries, and they have also failed to quickly replace Western equipment with similar ones.
The fuel crisis is being exacerbated by an ineffective system of state regulation, as well as drone strikes. The Ministry of Energy is trying to manage the situation manually. It has ordered refineries to postpone planned repairs in order to saturate the domestic market. However, this measure has not yet had a noticeable effect. The lack of significant fuel reserves complicates the situation. The Central Bank's decision to raise the key interest rate has led to a sharp increase in wholesale prices, which has made it less profitable for large players and private gas stations to hold stocks. According to experts, there are only two solutions to the problem: supply must increase or demand must decrease. A decline in demand is expected by the end of September due to seasonal factors.
There are two ways to increase supply. The first is to increase fuel imports. The second is to quickly repair refineries damaged by Ukrainian drones. The latter option, however, is complicated by a lack of technology and components.
Exporting oil to international markets is deliberately a priority for Moscow, where it is a key player, rather than using this raw material wealth to reduce fuel costs for its own citizens.
Despite having the capacity to provide its population with cheap fuel, Russia has taken advantage of its status as a major oil exporter, which has led to higher domestic prices. The pace at which fuel prices have been rising significantly has outpaced income growth. The rising cost of living, especially fuel, is exceeding the purchasing power of citizens.
This is a paradoxical situation: Russia is one of the world's leading oil producers, but the price of gasoline for the end user is higher than in the United States, where prices also vary.
What explains the fact that a country that is an oil giant sells fuel to its population at a higher price than an importing country, such as the United States?
For years, Russian leaders, including Putin and Shoigu, have praised the country's air defense system. They say it is “one of the best in the world“.
The truth is that the current number of air defense systems is not enough to provide reliable protection for all strategic sites, from the European part of the country all the way to Vladivostok.
Oil infrastructure facilities are no longer adequately protected by air defense. These facilities, which have long been considered the backbone of the Russian economy, include oil refineries and fuel depots. This creates vulnerability for infrastructure that was previously considered untouchable, which is a significant change.
Source: geopolitic.info