We recently learned that Alexei Navalny was most likely killed with poison from an endangered species of South American frog. I will ask you as a former intelligence officer: Why did the Kremlin have to kill Navalny in prison?
Gennady Gudkov: They were afraid that Navalny would come out and give impetus to the protests, using all his creative power against them. We clearly underestimated the information about a meeting that took place in the Kremlin nearly six months before Alexei's death. In it, Alexander Bastrykin (head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation - ed. note) and Igor Krasnov (Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation from 2020 to 2025, and since September 2025, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation - ed. note) declare to Vladimir Putin that Navalny will never be released from prison.
At the time, we thought they were talking about an indefinite extension of his sentence, but apparently they had something else in mind.
In the context of the pressure for Navalny's exchange, Krasnov and Bastrykin seem to have done Putin a favor: judging by their words that Navalny will not be released from prison, the murder was clearly already planned. Putin wanted the exchange to take place to show Russian agents captured abroad that he "does not abandon his own" so that they would not be afraid to commit new murders. That's why they decided: kill Navalny, and exchange the rest. They simply didn't want Navalny to "mud the water" for them from abroad. And the fact that five independent laboratories proved this deliberate poisoning makes Putin an outright criminal.
The West expressed its indignation.
Why aren't the names of the war criminals missing?
G. Gudkov: Yes, they were indignant, but was there anything else? Why was the process of recognizing Russia as a sponsor of terrorism stopped? Where are the lists of war criminals? They only include two people - Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova (the Russian president's plenipotentiary for children's rights - ed. note). And where are the rest? This also plays an important role in the split of the elites. Putin is waging war, his entourage is involved in crimes, but no other representative of the elites has been officially declared a war criminal. And this is the key point: if the elite finds out that they are personally recognized as criminals, many of them will quickly betray Putin.
But won't such lists make the representatives of the elite stand even more firmly on Putin's side?
G. Gudkov: They will have to think a lot about this issue, because this will affect their family members, their capital, their interests, their travels. They will not be able to travel around the world, because they will understand that if there is an order from the International Criminal Court, they can be handcuffed. This is still a restriction. And those of them who have not yet become war criminals will strive not to get on this list. I believe that in any case, any disunity of Putin's elites is useful - it weakens the regime, creates contradictions and tension. Because how else to change power - by sending Arkady Babchenko with an "Abrams" tank to Moscow? This is from the realm of unscientific fiction.
Why is there no disunity of the elites so far?
G. Gudkov: According to my recollections, the most serious disunity among the elites was at the end of 2022 and the beginning of 2023. Then people from Putin's closest circle tried to secure guarantees for their own security, some indulgence, but they were rejected by everyone on whom this decision depended. This was mainly influenced by the behavior of Ukraine, which set conditions - these people to publicly admit guilt and give it half of their fortune. This is like signing a death warrant! These were people from very influential circles who could influence the situation in Russia. But they did not receive any guarantees for their own security. The West said: Ukraine is an ally, without its consent there can be no guarantees.
Discontent with the Kremlin?
The next wave of dissatisfaction with the Kremlin was in 2024 - then some of the older Russians began to emit signals of dissatisfaction with the fact that the war was at a dead end, and they did not want to spend the rest of their lives in international isolation. But then Trump appeared, who said: “Vladimir Putin is a great person. I want to work with strong leaders like him“. And the entire disgruntled part of the elite took cover and took a wait-and-see position.
They say that Putin has already prepared the new “change“ - the children of the elite. And that the transition will go smoothly. Is that so?
G. Gudkov: No, there will be none. Because children born into wealth that suddenly fell on their families have not gone through the path of political struggle to forge character, will, etc. They are a spoiled generation that cannot do anything. They have become an elite not because of their own qualities, but because their parents held certain positions. Therefore, they are incapable of taking leadership positions in conditions of serious changes and battles.
What can the elite do if it realizes that things are not getting better?
The economic crisis is also a factor
G. Gudkov: They can do anything. An internal palace coup is quite possible. Most likely, it will be initiated by the second or third echelon of the elite, who will feel the greatest need to change the leader, who is becoming a problem for them and a threat to their future. These will be ministers, deputy directors of various agencies and big businessmen who are still beneficiaries of the Kremlin. By the way, their incomes have fallen sharply. They have lost all optimism about the Russian economy, their businesses, their incomes, etc. Even defense industry companies are no longer optimistic.
Is a coup possible with such special services?
G. Gudkov: I would still correct you: the work is not in the special services. They are a way of accumulating capital. All the services, all these generals, all these marshals - they are all driven only by money, they do not care at all about civil service and positions.
And in this they differ from the KGB?
G. Gudkov: Of course. The old KGB was completely uncorrupted, I know that for sure. The paradox is: the Soviet KGB was not infected with corruption - perhaps with the exception of the last few years. In general, in the KGB, as a separate class, there was no corruption. And now everything is eaten up by corruption. Now positions and ranks are needed to gain access to money, to enter some business, to get something, to get a share somewhere.
And how then will they organize a coup?
The role of the elites
G. Gudkov: Precisely because Putin threatens the interests of their future generations, their children, their grandchildren. They cannot study in the West, get treatment, graduate from university or enjoy their money. They cannot do anything with it, except go to some island or to Abu Dhabi. And they cannot even get drunk there, because in Abu Dhabi the law is like that. That's why they feel uncomfortable. They understand that they are on the periphery of the world. Yes, they can go to China or North Korea, but that's not very exciting.
What can push this corrupt but discontented, as you say, group of people to take action?
G. Gudkov: Through a combination of several factors. First - a military defeat. Russia is a country of emotions: everything that has happened so far - revolutions, upheavals, uprisings and coups - is the fruit of emotions, not reason. This means that a military defeat can cause deep internal and very sharp contradictions and unrest. Second - a deterioration in the economic situation. Third - the understanding that the leader is no longer a leader, because he is already old and has failed more than once. This is the understanding that nothing good awaits them with such a leader, that he is no longer a guarantor, but becomes a headache and a problem. Plus the effect of external pressure.
The accumulation of all these factors can lead to the fact that this huge number of people who are now with Putin, very quickly rethink their place and fate. And then they can, for example, block him in his bunker so that he stays there.
Author: Konstantin Eggert