Comment by Ivaylo Noizi Tsvetkov:
The head of the Bundeswehr, Gen. Breuer, recently said that with regard to the war in Ukraine, there is a danger that the EU will miss the "narrative" in Putin's statements, i.e. not read the "fine print" - Russia seriously believes that it can attack a NATO country without caring about Article 5. Former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel seemed to add to this in a separate statement that the West underestimated Putin even before 2014 and this is the EU's biggest mistake.
Yes, we can laugh until we faint at the first Russian humanoid "alcorobot" (as they themselves jokingly called it on YouTube, "it worked out as usual", etc.), but beyond the digital jokes, there are also real serious questions.
The Baltic States are a target
After nearly 4 years of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the following worrying question arises, for example: is it possible that the West, including the self-confident Trump administration, is misunderstanding Putin's thinking, neglecting its own intelligence reports? And as if it does not take seriously the concept of "known future", bequeathed to us by people like the builders of post-war Germany Kurt Schumacher and Ludwig Erhard - that when all arguments against are exhausted, "the most likely thing will happen"?
That is, Here a skeptical philosophical assumption is required - that "the most likely of the most likely" is that Putin will attack the Baltic states (according to the analyses of "Wall Street Journal" and a number of other observers). At first with individual drone incidents, and then - due to NATO's nerves - and with the possible tragically familiar full offensive. For no other reason than because in Putin's mental construction of the world, the three Baltic states are part of the "Soviet legacy" and simply put - he considers them to have temporarily seceded.
And if Russian drones fly over Bulgaria?
Do you now understand where I am taking you? Guess which country in the very strategic corner of Southeast Europe is also part of the "primordial living space" of post-Sovietism, as well as of the late Russian empire. Vladimir Vladimirovich would much more easily swallow the formal "self-exclusion" of, say, Turkmenistan than the geopolitical losses in Eastern and Northern Europe, which became NATO outposts.
In other words, how does Putin imagine his next militaristic moves and, more importantly, where is Bulgaria? Are they also surrounding us with a red felt-tip pen on the European map on the wall in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation?
It is no coincidence that I began with the warning of Gen. Carsten Breuer - the neo-imperial Russian mindset is theoretically predictable, but practically not. Many cultural and historical factors prevent the Western collective mind from grasping the Russian "modus cogitandi", as was also evident from Trump's entire communication with Putin. "Here's the red carpet in Alaska, you're a great leader, I promised to fix this world, and most of all I want the Nobel Peace Prize", as if the American president sent an unspoken message. "Pazhivyom, we'll see, gopnik" (this is originally the St. Petersburg word for a juvenile delinquent who wants to be accepted into the mafia), Putin seemed to answer him, chuckling under his mustache.
And now I'm dreaming and getting scared: what if Russian drones fly over our Black Sea coast? Do you have the feeling that the current government, which is "fighting" cases like "Lukoil" like I won't say which with what, will react adequately, or that it would immediately take off yesterday's Euro-Atlantic suit so that a T-shirt with a "Russia" print could be seen underneath? Or will Radev finally have to put on the metaphorical shirt and bow to his father, who has branded us as a "traitorous and enemy state", which has somehow gone wrong in its geopolitical orientation over the past 25 years?
The question is not "if", but "when"
Okay, I'll entertain you for a bit, but here's something more serious. Rutte, the head of NATO, also spoke out recently - that the North Atlantic Treaty must be ready for an attack by Russia in the next 5 years. Zelensky said something to the same effect the other day - that the Russians want a "European war" by 2030. From there, the concept of the aforementioned “known future" emerges again. and that the question with Putin has long since ceased to be "if", but "when". Certain military analysts seemed to send a worrying "tweet" - in the conceptual future of war, the importance of the human factor is increasingly decreasing and, accordingly, that of the technological factor is increasingly increasing.
We know that the military is not the fastest mind in the world, but here it is worth starting to worry. That is, we should not underestimate the development of technology - as, by the way, is also seen in the parallel drone war in Ukraine. Here I will recall a magnificent British analyst - Andrew Moynon, who said that the Euro-Atlantic community did not realize what was at stake and did not react to the Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as to Putin's intervention in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar Assad.
And probably the most stupid thing on the part of the West is rooted mainly in the tragically late sanctions (most of them do not work, firstly, because there is no real consensus on them, and secondly, because Putin - again smirking under his breath - finds ways to circumvent them). We have yet to see what will actually happen with oil, but everything so far leads us to the conclusion of a positional economic war, which at least apparently cannot be won, and Russian aggression - contained.
By "contained" I understand probable concessions from the territory of Eastern Ukraine, but I also cannot bet that Putin would not encroach not only on the Baltics, but also on Moldova, and on... I dare not write it down. This is a difficult prognosis, because Russia's strategy, if it is decipherable at all, resembles a palimpsest - i.e. first we agreed on one thing, with an agreement, but then we erase the clauses and write something new on the same sheets of paper that we did not agree on. And this will probably be confirmed at the second possible Trump-Putin meeting.
And where is Bulgaria?
And where are we, the supposedly modest, but exquisitely thieving Bulgarians, spoiled, spoiled by the decades without war? How where - again straddled between two worlds, like the most beautiful frog from a joke.
Of these two worlds, one is superfluous, as Smirnensky said a century ago, albeit in a different context. And I, like the barefoot child in me, would not put even 10 euros on "русский мир", even though today's Russia is among the leading countries in spending a percentage of its gross domestic product on military purposes (over 7%, for comparison - for the USA it is 3.42%).
In general: Bulgaria does not seem to be worried about anything foreign policy, too busy turning its public spending into corruption capital for three or four people.
But there is always the anti-parable "what if" - and then we will be armed mainly with the Vazov disenchantment by Russia and bitterness like "oh, Slavic brothers, why have you come to the Balkan fields, unkind uninvited guests?"
There you go, guys. ("Here you go, guys.")