Do you think it is realistic for Russia to attack a NATO country in the near future - such as Estonia, what scenarios are being talked about?
I. Gretsky: I don't think that the Kremlin will try to do something like that now - rather, Russia is acting according to a completely different scheme. We saw this in Georgia and Ukraine - it does not use armed forces until it is fully convinced that the population is mired in some kind of squabble and conflict, that the political decision-making process is paralyzed and the country is left alone against the aggressor, i.e. there are no allies to come to its aid. Estonia is not such a case. Estonia has an armed force, a political leadership, is integrated into international structures, has allies. Estonia will not be left alone.
But there are not a few people in Estonia who are sympathetic to Putin. Can Putin count on loyalty from the population?
There is no such problem among the younger generation in Estonia
I. Gretsky: Such people exist not only in Estonia - they can also be found in large numbers in Germany. The fact is that the Kremlin uses absolutely everything to undermine the internal consolidation of society, to create problems in the process of making political decisions. That is why it uses the Russian-speaking diasporas. But if you look at the population of Estonia as a whole, you can see that part of the older generation does not speak Estonian very well, is not particularly integrated into Estonian society, and may even show loyalty to Putin. While there is no such problem with young people - they perceive themselves as Estonians, as Europeans and value what they have. Their loyalty to the EU is not in question.
So, you want to say that Putin will not decide to attack Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland?
I. Gretsky: If he risks opening a second front, being in Ukraine - such scenarios are, of course, considered - I can assure you that Estonia is ready to repel Putin's attack.
You claim that the European security strategy should not be based on fragile illusions, such as the notion that only a democratic Russia can guarantee the security of the continent. Why?
I. Gretzky: Strictly speaking, Europe does not have any serious leverage to influence political processes inside Russia. Moreover, I will give you another example - Georgia. Against the background of all the support and enthusiasm of European politicians for the democratization of Georgia, it was offered the status of a candidate country for the EU. But Georgia went in the opposite direction. If it did not work out with Georgia, where is the reason to believe that it will work out better with Russia? Quite the opposite. The idea that Europe can influence what is happening in Russia leads to a certain relaxation and distracts attention from what is important. What is important is what is under the control of European countries. And what is it? This is the increase in defense spending in Europe, the resistance of European societies and support for Ukraine. Europe's security depends on these factors. What is happening in Russia is the work of the Russian opposition, of the Russian population, but in no case of Europe.
But you have a skeptical attitude towards the Russian opposition...
The opposition in exile has no real tools for influence
I. Gretsky: The problem is that among a part of the European political elite there is a certain hope that the Russian opposition, the anti-war activists will solve this problem, will become the future power when Putin leaves, when he dies or his mandate ends. It is clearly believed that the Russian opposition will come and change the face of Russia, and it will become less aggressive. I think that the opposition in exile does not have real levers for influencing political processes. Many of these people have been outside the real political process. They find themselves in political conditions that are greenhouse compared to Russian ones. And when they get there, they won't have the teeth and claws to seize power. They will be destroyed very quickly, they will be marginalized by the institutional players: by the clans, by the Federal Security Service, by the security forces. What arguments will they have to lead the process of transforming Russia?
Many people who professed pro-European views in the early 1990s believed that Russia had no other path than rapprochement with Europe. However, already in the mid-1990s, they quickly realized that the great-power narrative was a source of power. And look at how Putin solved the problem with the movement of soldiers' mothers. We saw this movement in the 1990s. And the main question that this movement posed was: why did our boys die? But Putin found the answer: money. Now he is offering the soldiers money, a contract with the Ministry of Defense. In addition, for the generation of the political elite that is now in power in Russia, a painful moment was the collapse of the Soviet Union. And in this story, Gorbachev was the main anti-hero. Why? Because from the point of view of Putin and his entourage, he turned out to be a weakling and a loser who simply let go of power... Putin is now faced with the problem of what power will look like after he leaves. But he will definitely not allow a new Gorbachev to come...
Today, people in Russia go to war for money. What does this mean? Will this, in your opinion, affect society?
There is a normalization of violence
I. Gretzky: This is a normalization of violence. 140 million may not participate, may not take up arms, may not go and kill Ukrainians. But they see all this and perceive it as the norm every day. For them, this is a background - something that is not subject to any criticism, discussion or reflection. A democratic society - what is called a normal European society - cannot grow out of this. This is one of the explanations why I believe that after this Putin, another Putin will come. These narratives are reproduced through social institutions - the family, the school, the army, the police, the prison. And the opposition does not have an answer on how to make these social institutions reproduce other narratives.
How will the situation with the elites and the war develop, in your opinion?
I. Gretsky: Putin is obviously doing everything possible so that the system can outlive him. We see how Putin excludes the disloyal, how he maintains competition within the vertical of power. We see that after Prigozhin's rebellion, large-scale shifts began. The point was to remove from power those who are accustomed to luxury, but are not ready to defend the system and behave passively in times of crisis. Instead, people who have been through the war are being attracted - whether directly or indirectly - who are thirsty and hungry for money and power and are ready to defend the regime at a lower price. Putin is trying to include them in order to strengthen the vertical of power, but this does not fundamentally change the vertical.
Political scientist Igor Gretsky is a research fellow at the International Center for Defense Studies. DW spoke with Gretsky in Estonia, where he has lived since 2022.
Author: Konstantin Eggert