Even as the invasion of Ukraine continues, the Russian armed forces are increasingly testing European defenses with drones, manned aircraft, and warships.
These are not random errors or simple reconnaissance missions - the goal is to turn incursions into something "normal".
Behind each such provocation stands a rebuilt and increasingly efficient military-industrial machine: shipyards producing submarines capable of operating in icy waters; missile factories working in three shifts to stockpile long-range weapons; and explosives companies that are expanding their production to strategic scales.
That’s according to an analysis by Rebecca Lissner, a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Erin D. Dumbacher, a senior fellow for nuclear security at the Stanton Council on Foreign Relations.
A closer look at Moscow’s military procurement decisions shows why Europe should brace for continued Russian pressure that goes far beyond the war in Ukraine. In Russia’s naval and missile sectors – the most important for the European theater – three worrying trends stand out clearly: a rapid expansion of production capacity, a deliberate prioritization of strategic platforms, and investments aimed at long-term operational sustainability rather than a short-term wartime peak.
Unless NATO moves from reactive measures to a proactive and convincing form of deterrence – with clearly defined "red lines", a real offensive potential, and sustained support for Ukrainian drone innovations – Moscow will continue to dictate the terms of the confrontation long after the current stage of the war against Kiev.
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been severely hit by Ukrainian naval drones and long-range strikes. Moreover, Russia will have difficulty compensating for these losses due to the strategic "plug" of the Bosphorus. Turkey, as a NATO member, closed the straits to belligerent warships as early as 2022 under the Montreux Convention, a situation that is likely to remain until the end of the war.
If Russia were focused exclusively on Ukraine, it would make sense to de-prioritize shipbuilding and focus on land systems and aviation.
Instead, despite sanctions and chronic inefficiency, Russian shipyards have resolutely reoriented themselves to platforms that pose a direct threat to Europe. Fleets capable of operating in ice conditions, nuclear-powered support ships, and diesel-electric submarines dominate new orders. These platforms are designed to carry cruise missiles and electronic warfare systems in NATO’s most vulnerable sea lanes. And importantly, they are not designed to compete with the US Navy on the high seas, but to operate near European shores, especially around Northern Europe.
In 2023, the Baltic Shipyard - the flagship of the Russian naval industry in St. Petersburg - reported a loss of about $264 million. Just a year later, the result turned into a profit of $41 million after a series of government orders. Among them are nuclear-powered support ships intended for operations in the Arctic, a region where NATO holds exercises and where key undersea communications cables for Europe cross.
Steel consumption at the Baltic Shipyard has jumped 98% in just a year, and at the Vyborg Shipyard by 93% since 2022, showing the lengths Moscow is willing to go to subsidize the restoration of its naval potential.
In parallel, the authorities in St. Petersburg and the United Shipbuilding Corporation - majority-owned by the state-owned bank VTB - are pushing a plan to merge five shipyards into a single industrial cluster, with $2.6 billion earmarked for modernization. The goal is clear: to make the Russian naval industry faster, more resilient to disruption, and capable of large-scale mobilization.
The results are already visible.
"Admiralty Shipyards" continues the serial production of non-nuclear submarines, including the Project 636.3 "Yakutsk", launched for the Pacific Fleet in October 2024, as well as the "Kronstadt" class submarine of the "Lada" class, which entered service in early 2024 after a redesign of the project. These relatively small, conventionally powered submarines are significantly weaker than their nuclear counterparts on the high seas, but in the confined waters of the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, or the Mediterranean, they pose a serious threat.
Russia’s emphasis on arming its smaller combat platforms (both underwater and surface) with long-range cruise missiles further exacerbates existing gaps in European air defenses. This gives Russian commanders the ability to threaten the heart of Europe with long-range strikes from multiple directions—a tactic honed through years of multi-pronged attacks on Ukrainian cities and critical civilian infrastructure.
Russia’s missile production has also increased sharply since 2023. This is not simply an attempt to stockpile for the war in Ukraine. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia is producing between 115 and 130 long-range systems per month, a pace that allows it to build up arsenals far in excess of the immediate needs of the conflict.
The Kalibr cruise missiles, Kh-101/102 aircraft, and Iskander ballistic missiles rolling off production lines are threatening European capitals and NATO bases. The fact that Russia is using relatively few of these missiles in its regular strikes against Ukraine, relying instead on mass attacks with cheap Shahed drones, suggests that much of the production is being stockpiled for future operations outside the current war.
The modernization and expansion of production at the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant, a key producer of Iskander missiles and components for intercontinental ballistic missiles, further confirms this trend. Journalistic investigations indicate that since 2022, thousands of new machines have been introduced there and thousands of additional workers have been hired, with active hiring continuing into 2025.
In parallel, Russia is building a new facility at the "Biysk Oleum" plant, designed to produce up to 6,000 tons of high-energy explosives per year. The "Sverdlov" plant has received billions in state investment to increase the production of TNT - a key component for missile warheads. "MKB Novator", part of the "Almaz-Antey" concern, switched to a round-the-clock production regime for "Kalibur" and "Iskander" at the beginning of the war. And the Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant is ramping up serial production of the RS-28 Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, with major infrastructure upgrades scheduled for 2024.
These weapons give Moscow the opportunity to increase pressure on NATO.
Russian naval platforms armed with the "Caliber" operate at ranges that allow strikes on European capitals in both the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. Russian long-range strategic bombers - many of which have been re-equipped to carry such cruise missiles - regularly fly over and near the Barents and Norwegian Seas, turning NATO's northern approaches into training areas and gradually "normalizing" its military presence there.
Increasingly, Russian bombers and munitions are being deployed in forward positions, such as the recently modernized "Severomorsk-2" airfield on the Kola Peninsula, allowing for deep strikes on European targets, rather than maintaining a defensive, reactive posture.
Russia's expansion of its industrial capacity reveals a strategy aimed at making pressure on Europe relatively cheap and sustaining a prolonged confrontation over time. This creates the ability to simultaneously hold targets across the continent at risk from multiple directions, complicating the strategic dilemmas facing European defense.
In the maritime and missile spheres, Moscow has consistently tested NATO's unity and expanded the limits of the alliance's response. Limited responses - such as scrambled fighter jets, temporary airspace closures, or declarations without real consequences - only encourage a repetition on a larger scale. Therefore, NATO and the EU must clearly define and enforce "red lines", combine air defense with credible counterstrike capabilities, and maintain Ukraine's technological advantage.
"Red lines" must become real operational rules, not just press releases.
NATO should publicly define automatic responses to violations - drones to be intercepted by default, naval assets to be denied access to certain areas, and sanctions against accomplices to be imposed within 48 hours. Violations should lead to predictable and automatic costs. The alliance is already signaling a change in its approach - a step in the right direction, but so far only the first.
Deterrence also requires combining defense with offensive capabilities. "Wall of Drones" - built from sensors, electronic warfare and point defense - is necessary but insufficient, as is better integrated air and missile defense in Europe.
Effective deterrence requires the ability to strike back. European capitals should openly discuss long-range strike options—whether through cruise missiles, armed drones, or cyber assets—that would raise the cost of sabotage and incursions. A credible offensive capability changes Moscow’s calculations.
Finally, Europe should continue to support Ukrainian drone innovation, which is already functioning as a forward defense laboratory. The Ukrainian ecosystem – with mass production, rapid adaptation and combat testing – is developing capabilities that Europe will need.
Funding these innovations is not an act of charity, but an investment in security: a guarantee that when the pressure shifts to NATO territory, Europe will have the tools and tactics ready.
The Russian naval and missile buildup has been shaped by the war in Ukraine, but the risk extends much further.
This is already changing the security environment in Europe. Russia’s industrial investments are building a toolbox of coercion aimed squarely at European territory. If Europe continues to avoid articulating and asserting its own "red lines", Moscow will continue to write the script.