Veselin Stoynev's comment:
It is difficult to analyze the political behavior of GERB and its leader Boyko Borisov lately in a non-pathological way. They alternate between states of post-traumatic calm with bizarre performances and proud amnesia.
They hastily submitted the resignation of the "Zhelyazkov" cabinet because of the protests in December, but also because the opposition and President Rumen Radev insisted on it immediately. In his first television interview in a long time, the party leader Boyko Borisov said that they had to wait 20 days to adopt the 2026 budget – as if no one knows that the protests started precisely because of this budget.
Exotic, hey, that's it
At the consultations for a caretaker prime minister with the president, GERB's envoys launched the idea of Iliyana Yotova nominating an MP for speaker of the parliament, and GERB moving forward with his vote so that he could become caretaker prime minister. Even Borisov himself admitted that the idea was exotic - but it was downright psychiatric, especially since he almost accused Yotova of delaying the procedure with the caretaker government, and with the election of a new speaker of the National Assembly it would have been delayed even more. And neither he nor his party members substantiated their exoticism in essence, nor did they take responsibility for the changes in the Constitution that led to the misfortunes of the so-called. Home book and past not only with the votes, but also under the final edition of GERB.
Beyond the constant and already quite nervous political narcissism, bordering on megalomania (“I have brought GERB and Bulgaria to the heart of Europe“), Borisov's interview contained few requests for GERB's future political positioning. But a few specific vows cannot fail to tighten the hearts of pro-Europeans.
No judicial reform
GERB will not allow Bulgarians outside the EU to vote in more than 20 sections outside diplomatic and consular missions, because Borisov promised so to “Vazrazhdane“ (could they also be his informal coalition partners like DPS-New Beginning with their “shops for the people“, in which he did not believe, but there was no way he could refuse?).
GERB will not deal with judicial reform, especially not cooperate with PP-DB for it (and why did it vote on the judicial constitutional reform together with them?). And it will not even participate in the removal of the illegally occupying the post of Acting Prosecutor General Borislav Sarafov, because he was legitimate (and why did GERB support the legal changes last January that no one can be Acting Prosecutor General for more than 6 months?).
The mise-en-scène with greasy coffee and blue whiskey
In his interview, Borisov builds on Peevski's “greasy Turkish coffee“ with “blue whiskey“. The hypocrites from PP-DB had cuddled up with Peevski, drank their blue whiskey and talked caressingly, while Borisov left disgusted. And only when, after the collapse of the assembly, Peevski began to support Borisov, did PP-DB talk about the “Borisov-Peevski“ model.
It turns out that during the entire assembly, Borisov was a nobody, almost invisible and completely innocent, and there was only PP-DB – Peevski relations, and after the collapse of the assembly, Borisov and Peevski were not at all as close as Peevski was with the leaders of PP-DB. Peevski only supported Borisov (to be more convincing, he could have said – we didn't even eat and drink together). Logically, it is not clear why Peevski, who at that time was not even a formal leader, and of the smallest of the three formations in the assembly, is so desired, and Borisov, leader of the largest, is so on the sidelines that it seems he can do without him. Obviously, the mise-en-scene with Turkish coffees and blue whiskeys conceals the real political compromises and the real non-political dependencies.
PP-DB are the enemy, Radev - strategic exit
That is why in Borisov's election strategy the only open enemy will be PP-DB. Not only as a reaction to their campaign against the “Borisov-Peevski“ model, but because this is his only remaining way to conceal the “Peevski stigma“, by pointing to the “tainted Peevski“ on the lapel of his former political allies.
However, his strategic partner could be the new big player in the elections - Rumen Radev, who speaks of an oligarchy that is nameless, and avoids even mentioning the "Borisov-Peevski" model. Without entering into any direct agreements with him, Radev can, with his very presence on the party field, ease the measure of Borisov's non-deviation from Peevski.
If the former president also targets Peevski, removing Borisov from the “model”, this will be the best opportunity for the GERB leader to secure a more stable position, especially if Radev's formation becomes the first force. Then, with the humble strategy from the interview - “what the people have appointed me”, Borisov can provide him with support for governance. Whether it will be in a direct coalition or, as with Peevski in the “Zhelyazkov” cabinet - for a formal minority government, the important thing is to turn a political cycle around and for Borisov to survive in the future.