The war between Russia and Ukraine continues without a decisive breakthrough on the battlefield in its fourth anniversary, but with increasing risks of exhaustion and strategic regrouping. Is there a chance for a serious change on the front in 2026, or will the conflict continue as a slow war of attrition? What is the real military significance of the new Russian weapons systems and to what extent are they a tool for psychological pressure on the West? Israeli military expert David Sharp spoke to FACT on the subject.
- Mr. Sharp, how do you assess the current stage of the Russia-Ukraine war? Is the conflict entering a strategic impasse, or do you see prerequisites for a serious breakthrough by one of the countries in 2026?
- I see the conflict as a war of attrition, in which at the moment the initiative is on the side of Russia. I do not see a situation in which Ukraine this year could make a large-scale breakthrough or significantly change the situation on the front and launch a successful offensive. This is related to the fact that Ukraine does not have enough reserves and is experiencing a serious shortage of personnel. The problem is in the combat capability of the units and their staffing.
Of course, there is also a shortage of resources in terms of military equipment and ammunition. In general, I do not see the prospect of a major Ukrainian offensive. Counterattacks or local counteroffensive operations are possible.
On the Russian side, the chances of a major breakthrough on the Ukrainian front are also not significant. They exist, but they are not great. Judging by the strategy and tactics of the Russian army over the past more than two years. Firstly, the Russian army also does not have many reserves, and the available ones cannot be called particularly combat-ready. The Russian command over the past two years has not shown the ability to simultaneously use large forces on a narrow section of the front with long-term strategic goals.
In addition, the technical specifics of the war - the massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) by both Ukrainians and Russians - greatly affects the course of hostilities.
- Drones on the battlefield in this war play a huge role and change strategic capabilities, including the possibility of a deep breakthrough. Has their use simply changed the way modern warfare is waged?
- Drones on the battlefield in this war really play a huge role and leave an imprint on the strategy and capabilities of the Russian army to make a major breakthrough. But I must make one reservation. If one of the participants were, for example, the United States Army with its military machine and air force, then we would see that traditional approaches - in particular, air superiority - continue to play decisive role. But that's another question.
In the current situation, I give little chance for Russia to achieve a significant and deep breakthrough.
But it has the initiative, both numerical and firepower superiority. It is gradually moving forward along the front, looking for weak spots in the Ukrainian defense, and when it finds them, it concentrates enough forces to make a breakthrough within the scope of this war. At the same time, Putin is counting on the exhaustion of Ukraine and its partners - that there will be difficulties with mobilization and that Western assistance, including from the United States, will decrease. This is his calculation - in parallel with territorial gains, to weaken Ukraine. Putin thinks like this: if in the future the resistance on the Ukrainian side weakens, the Ukrainians may agree to certain territorial concessions - in other words, to give him what he wants in the Donetsk region, namely the unoccupied part of it. Then one can think about some kind of cessation of the war. If this does not happen, we will continue to observe a slow advance, and Russia may believe that in a year or even less it will be able to seize what it needs. I emphasize again - the war is attrition. And here the main question is who will be exhausted faster.
- What is the military significance of the use of the Oreshnik missile system by Russia - is it more of a demonstration of deterrence, or a real attempt to change the balance of the battlefield?
- As for systems like Oreshnik, their military significance in this war is practically zero. Any system, whether it is Oreshnik or another, is important when it is available in large enough quantities. Single samples, even technologically interesting ones, rarely solve anything unless they perform a unique task. Oreshnik cannot solve such a unique task.
Moreover, the war with Ukraine does not require such a long range. Russia can also hit targets in Ukraine with other missiles - for example, the Iskander, Kinzhal or cruise missiles.
We do not even know the exact characteristics of the Oreshnik.
It is only known that its range is about 5-5.5 thousand kilometers. It is believed that the missile has six warheads in a separable warhead, but even this is not fully confirmed. Therefore, the Oreshnik is currently being produced in single units. It is essentially an experimental missile. Although it has already been fired twice at Ukraine, it does not significantly change the situation, because every day dozens and hundreds of other munitions are fired at Ukraine, which cause much greater damage.
“Oreshnik“ is more of a media and propaganda weapon – a tool for intimidating Europe with the message that Russia can reach any capital on the continent if necessary.
- Do I understand that the use of “Oreshnik“ is a signal from Russia to the EU and NATO countries: “We can reach you“?
- Yes, this is part of the media war – a signal to NATO and the EU. Putin's strategy since the beginning of the war has been to intimidate NATO countries into limiting their aid and being more careful with sanctions against Russia.
That is why the so-called nuclear blackmail is also used. “Oreshnik“ is one of the tools in this strategy.
When the missile was used in the Lviv region, its task was not only to intimidate the Ukrainians, but also the Poles. The very proximity to NATO borders was a message that such a missile could theoretically be used against Paris or London. If we are talking about a nuclear warhead - it would not change the balance. Russia has many other nuclear weapons. Even the appearance of a few nuclear “Oreshnik“ would not be of significant importance.
In a conventional conflict with NATO, the missile could reach Western targets, but the question is how many such missiles there are and what their real characteristics and accuracy are. In a limited number, their significance is comparable to the effect of several air bombs.
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David Sharp was born in 1974 in the USSR, in the territory of present-day Ukraine. He served 3.5 years in the Israeli army. For many years he has regularly collaborated with leading Russian- and Ukrainian-language media as a military commentator and analyst. In addition, he has worked as a military analyst in various media in Israel for more than 20 years.
To be continued…