The stormy 20th century brings Bulgaria such severe trials, that we entered the 21st century with a sense of relief, that we had left the bad behind. But we soon found that the challenges are eternal, especially for those living in a country in the center of the Balkans that regularly finds itself isolated from its neighbors. For the citizens, however, the most important challenges remain those related to internal politics, where for the three and a half decades of transition, we managed to establish a formally democratic, but in practice deeply corrupt state with a huge social divide, but a passive population that prefers to insult politicians and not to “vote for them”, thereby only confirming them in power.
This is how I started the reminder of the uprising that broke out 101 years ago, because I want to recall how in the past Bulgarians were ready to fight for their rights and freedoms. But, of course, I am not suggesting that we rise up today, but that we fight with means suitable for our age.
The centenary of the September Uprising passed quietly last year with a few conferences held in closed spaces. The revision of history in the transition years consigned to oblivion most events that once seemed epoch-making. This may be politically correct, but it is not historically correct, because the social function of history is to teach us lessons for today and tomorrow, and the most valuable are the lessons from dramatic events. This is exactly the September Uprising of 1923
Traditionally, the uprising is viewed through the lens of communist martyrology, and after 1944, also as a step towards the BKP's rise to power. However, it can also be placed in another context – of the series of events that followed the wars and national catastrophes, outlined the sharp turn towards new alternatives, outlined both by the BZNS, representing the majority of Bulgarians (78% live in the villages), and by the BKP (ts), inspired by the October Revolution in Russia. It is no coincidence that in the first post-war elections, Bulgarians threw the traditional parties out of power, and gave their trust to BZNS and BKP (so-called).
The bright agricultural leader Alexander Stamboliyski takes over the management on behalf of the village. But the attempt to dominate the village over the city unites the hitherto divided right-wing city parties, and their impotence to return to power with elections pushes them to the conspiracy. This led to the military coup on June 9, 1923 and the spontaneous resistance of farmers and communists against the coup. But while the BZNS calls its supporters for support, the leadership of the BKP (so-called) restrains its own, since (as Hristo Kabakchiev will write) it is a “coterie struggle between the individual wings of the bourgeoisie – the urban and rural”. This position is not surprising, given the bitter struggle between farmers and communists in agricultural management – it is enough to recall the fate of the Transport Strike of 1919–1920
Then the old communists Dimitar Blagoev and Todor Lukanov were convinced that the BKP should benefit from its parliamentary experience and from its 50-member parliamentary group. In the post-1917 choice between revolution and evolution, they bet on gradual, moderate changes.
But the young communists do not think so. The leadership of the Comintern in Moscow (actually Vasil Kolarov) telegraphed: “We are alarmed by the news that you are hindering the struggle in Pleven against the new government… As far as we can judge from here, the situation requires joint and decisive actions even with Stamboliyski, otherwise the current government will strengthen and defeat the communists. There is logic in this point of view as well. The logic later formulated by Bertold Brecht for the advance of National Socialism, destroying its opponents one by one.
Moscow's desire to assist in the growth of the revolutionary wave is natural. But it is also true that from the outside the struggle between farmers and communists seems pointless, as they face the common danger of the right-wing regime. And the spontaneous participation of communists in the resistance against the Devetoyun coup demonstrates that not everyone in the BKP thinks that the bloody overthrow of Stamboliyski is beneficial for the BKP. That is why the position of the Comintern finds supporters in Bulgaria as well.
After strategic and tactical disputes in the leadership of the BKP, at the beginning of August, the decision was reached “to correct the mistake” with a new uprising. How to “fix” a mistake trying to repeat the situation, but with an altered reality, is a question that vexes the minds of the left to this day. Either way, the decision to prepare for an uprising three months after Alexander Tsankov's government took full power is pushing Bulgaria's defeated leftists towards a revolutionary upsurge.
The preparation for an uprising is carried out according to all the rules: political, military leadership, building insurgent networks, financing. But the authorities are not inactive, and on September 12, in an attempt to prevent the uprising, the police arrested about 2,500 communists.
If it were true that communists, leftist farmers, and anarchists were being coerced by Moscow into a doomed uprising, the arrests would serve as justification for its failure. But something else happens. The very next day – September 13, Muglizh rises up, followed by numerous settlements in Starozagorsko, Novozagorsko, Chirpansko. The rebellion spread like wildfire, accompanied by the belief that success was certain. This is how the insurgents from the village of Medevo, Chirpansko see it on September 20: “The population is informed that the bourgeois power has been broken and the peasant-workers' councils have taken power into their hands in a peaceful and legal way… Therefore, the population is invited to devote themselves to peaceful and quiet work, paying no attention to rumors from wherever they are released”. Enviable self-confidence!
It was only on September 20 that the Central Committee of the BKP (so-called) decided that the uprising would break out on September 22 and 23 and that its center would become Northwestern Bulgaria. Georgi Dimitrov, Vasil Kolarov, Gavril Genov are at the helm. And while in southern Bulgaria the insurgents felt their powerlessness in front of the regular army and the mobilized "citizen-militiamen", in the other part of Bulgaria the detachments led by Ivan Peychev and Georgi Damyanov managed to capture Ferdinand, Berkovitsa, fought battles at Boychinovtsi, at Brusartsi, and Pope Andrei from Medkovets fought bravely, not according to his rank.
Short-lived successes do not change the unequal balance of power, and soon the final chord is reached – the pogrom. The coup d'état's revenge against the people who dared to take up arms is so cruel that it provokes an unprecedented reaction. Rarely has an event in modern history left such a deep imprint on literature. It is enough to list the names of Geo Milev, Anton Strashimirov, Nikola Furnadzhiev, Asen Raztsvetnikov, Angel Karaliichev, to make it clear that even if we erase the September Uprising from history, we can hardly erase it from literature.
The crackdown also provoked a reaction from foreign diplomats, regardless of the fact that their governments support the Bulgarian authorities. The words of British Minister Plenipotentiary William Erskine in the report to the Foreign Office are indicative of this: “the merciless measures applied in suppressing the rebellion, which in some cases amounted to massacres, were clearly not justified and accumulated a great charge of hatred against the government, which should be considered in the future”. A conclusion that predicts that the September Uprising of 1923 was only the beginning of civil opposition.
And my purpose with this text about the long-gone and almost forgotten event is to recall how our ancestors reacted to injustices, probably because they considered rights, freedoms and struggle as ideals more important than comforts and entertainment.
Source "May 24th Club"