Russia is pinning great hopes on the contained crisis in Transnistria. With its help, Moscow is seeking to kill several birds with one stone, namely: to replace the pro-Western leadership in the Republic of Moldova with a pro-Russian one, to stop the process of Moldova's accession to the EU and, if possible, even to force Kiev to resume the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine to Europe (formally in the interests of Moldova, but in reality to continue gas supplies to Slovakia, Hungary and Austria).
Russia is trying to achieve all these goals through the energy crisis that it initiated on the left bank of the Dniester at the end of 2024. This crisis, according to the Kremlin's plan, is expected to escalate into a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe by February 2025. (part of the controlled chaos strategy often used in Moscow).
Overall, the recent presidential elections in Moldova showed that the country's population is not united in its foreign policy orientation. Some of its citizens still look with admiration at Russia, as long as the latter does not lose hope of stopping Chisinau's European integration course and keeping its former colony in its own orbit.
Most of the supporters of Putin's dictatorship are concentrated in two autonomous regions within Moldova, Gagauzia and Transnistria, and it is with them that Russia has been working most closely over the past 2 years (after several coup attempts and the seizure of power in Chisinau by pro-Russian forces with the participation of fighters from the Wagner Group and other foreign mercenaries.
The key fact is that for 30 years a separatist region with a pro-Russian puppet regime, called the “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic“ (PMR), de facto received “blue fuel“ from Russia absolutely free. In this way, Moscow sponsored one of the zones of instability in the post-Soviet space, through which planned to restore its positions in these territories (the same applied to Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, as well as to Abkhazia and South Ossetia through Georgia).
Instead, de jure Moscow directed the demand to pay for the gas supplied to the left bank of the Dniester not to Tiraspol (the so-called capital of the Transnistrian region), but to Chisinau. The Moldovan government has never acknowledged its responsibility for the payments made to it, but at the formal level, Chisinau's debts to the Kremlin are growing and accumulating.
As soon as the European Union granted Moldova the status of candidate member, Moscow immediately demanded a significant payment for the gas supplied for decades to the pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria (and also sharply increased its price for the main part of Moldova). When Chisinau once again refused to settle Tiraspol's debt and the case was referred to international arbitration courts, Russia responded with tougher, more radical measures – announced a complete suspension of gas supplies to Transnistria until the debt is paid. This happened in December 2024, even before Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas through its territory on January 1, 2025. As for the main part of Moldova, its energy security was significantly strengthened in 2022 with the commissioning of a new pipeline for transporting gas from Romania.
Despite the fact that both Bucharest and Chisinau offered energy assistance to Tiraspol in a timely manner, the authorities of the Transnistria demonstratively rejected it, without giving any arguments in favor of their absurd decision. Later, Ukraine also offered to provide humanitarian energy supplies to Transnistria (both in the form of gas and anthracite coal).
However, Tiraspol obediently follows Moscow's instructions and refuses to provide assistance to the residents of the left bank of the Dniester. Russia's goal is to artificially create a humanitarian catastrophe in the Transnistrian region, accuse the pro-Western leadership of Moldova of irresponsible behavior towards its own population, provoke mass social and economic unrest, and achieve a change of government in the country. At the same time, Moscow will put pressure on Kiev, Brussels, and various international organizations, lobbying for the resumption of the transit of Russian "blue fuel" through Ukraine, emphasizing that this will help overcome the energy problems of the Transnistrian region.
It is also worth paying attention to the fact that the PMR is experiencing not only a shortage of natural gas, but also a serious shortage of electricity, since in recent decades electricity was generated at a local thermal power plant that operated... of course, on Russian gas, supplied free of charge in large quantities.
Currently, the Transnistrian CHP has urgently switched to working with coal, some of which was once imported from the Donetsk region of Ukraine, whose territories are now either under occupation or are the subject of active military operations. The reserves of anthracite coal in the PMR will last only until the end of January and the beginning of February (the intensity of use of this energy source also depends on how cold the two winter months will be this year).
In general, to ensure the proper functioning of the Transnistrian region, the local CHP must use a thousand tons of coal per day, which is a significant amount. Even if the PMR agrees to accept humanitarian aid and the European Union pays for the import of coal from Romania and Ukraine (negotiations are currently underway), these supplies will likely be insufficient due to the extremely large quantities of coal needed on the left bank of the Dniester.
With this in mind, Russia may try to kill another rabbit. For example, Moscow will offer to bring the coal that Tiraspol critically needs by sea from the ports of the Sea of Azov. Moreover, the Kremlin may even agree to bear all the costs of purchasing and transporting coal from South Africa. In this case, Turkey will be forced to let Russian barges with rescue coal through the Bosphorus.
In these circumstances, as some observers do not exclude, the Russians may try to hide weapons, ammunition, and even small special forces in the holds of their barges. However, Transnistria has no access to the Black Sea coast, and all this can only reach the Transnistrian Republic through Gjiruesti, the only port in Moldova on the Danube that has access to the Black Sea.
It is clear that Moldovan border guards and customs officers will conscientiously and thoroughly check all ships carrying cargo to the Transnistrian region, not to mention those in which Putin's Russia is involved (even if they are labeled as humanitarian supplies). As for the hypothetical attempt by the Russians to treacherously seize the port of Gjiruesti itself (as part of a special operation), most military analysts consider such a scenario to be extremely unlikely (although it cannot be ruled out theoretically).
Overall, recent events in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova show that Putin's authoritarian Russia feels confident enough to compete to restore its influence in the former USSR. At the same time, Moscow is currently constrained in conducting its hybrid wars and special operations with neighboring countries due to the war with Ukraine, which has been going on for almost three years. There is no doubt that a possible Russian victory in this war (or forcing Kiev into an unfair peace agreement) would only untie the Kremlin's hands and allow it to intensify the restoration of the empire/USSR in other areas.