Prominent voices in the Russian information space continues to emphasize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is only interested in peace negotiations with a full Ukrainian surrender.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) devotes a place to them in another analysis of the hostilities in Ukraine.
The Kremlin-linked Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist and founder of the ultra-nationalist publication "Tsargrad" Konstantin Malofeev said in an interview with the Financial Times (FT) published on December 2 that Putin would likely reject any other plan for peace talks that US President-elect Donald Trump proposed.
Also, Ukraine must be stopped from using Western-supplied long-range weapons and "remove" Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from office.
Malofeev also claimed that the war in Ukraine has helped strengthen Russia's relations with China, Iran and North Korea and revitalized Russia's economy and defense industry.
However, ISW continues to observe macroeconomic indications that the Russian economy is struggling to bear the brunt of inflation, ongoing international sanctions and labor shortages, and will face significant challenges in 2025, assuming Russia's war in Ukraine continued with the current one tempo.
Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently made similar statements. Malofeev's interview further shows that the Kremlin is not interested in negotiations, no matter who mediates.
Malofeev does not currently hold an official position in the Russian government, but his rhetoric is important given his ties to the Kremlin and influence among Russian ultranationalists.
Malofeev has previously promoted the Kremlin in justifying the war in Ukraine and continues to be an outspoken supporter of Putin.
Zelensky recently admitted that Ukraine must find diplomatic solutions to end the war and ensure the return of some parts of occupied Ukraine (including Crimea) in the future. But Malofeev's comments show that Putin remains opposed to good faith talks and is committed to destroying the Ukrainian state through military means.
The Kremlin continues to minimize the social impact of the war on the Russian population, while tacitly realigning the goals for what the Kremlin initially defined as a victory in Ukraine.
The Russian business publication Kommersant, citing internal sources, reported on December 1 that Russian officials, including from the presidential administration, have set the following goals for the leading United Russia party: for the 2026 election: achieving 55 percent of voter turnout and receiving 55 percent of the total number of votes; improving data for United Russia elections in 2021; and emphasizing the need for a positive framing of a possible end to the war in Ukraine.
"Merchant" also noted that the presidential administration is trying to outline "future outcomes" of war as "victory" in a way that is acceptable to both pro-war ultranationalists and less ideologically concerned Russian "liberals" by focusing the framing of the outcome of the war in a way that is acceptable to the "silent majority" in Russia. The Kremlin seeks to present any outcome of the war as a victory for the entire Russian population.
The Kremlin is likely to focus on achievements that are hard to pin down, such as "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine along with the retention of annexed Ukrainian territories, while reducing negative sentiment about the return of traumatized and wounded war veterans, regardless of how the war is going for Russian forces on the battlefield.
The administration of the Russian president is concerned about the reintegration of veterans into Russian society, indicating that the authorities are aware of the potential domestic consequences that the return of large numbers of disaffected veterans could have on Russian society.
Russia's unemployment rate is currently very low, but many Russian war veterans may find themselves unemployed if they return to civilian life.
The Kremlin is still unsure how the war will end, and is therefore trying to put in place pre-emptive societal conditions to deal with the war's long-term consequences, including finding a way to sell Russia's strategic and operational battlefield failures as victories.< /p>
Russia has not achieved its self-imposed goals of "denazification" or "demilitarization" of Ukraine, or seizing all Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions.
Russia's increased domestic production of Shahed drones has allowed Russia to increase the number of drones it uses in strike packages launched into Ukraine, but innovations in Ukrainian electronic warfare allow Ukrainian forces to respond more effectively to Russian strike packages. Ukrainian military expert Petro Chernyk told Ukrainian military publication ArmyInform on December 2 that Russia has increased production of Shahed drone bodies while continuing to rely on Iranian or Chinese imports for other drone components.
However, Ukraine seems to be responding to this influx of Shahed drones in kind. The number of Shahed drones or decoys reported to be "lost" (missing their intended targets) due to Ukrainian interference in electronic warfare, increased significantly in October and November 2024. Russia launched 105 Shahed drones into Ukraine on October 2, 78 of which were directly shot down by Ukrainian forces and 23 of which the Ukrainian Air Force reported as "lost" due to interference in radio electronic equipment (22 percent).
In contrast, Russian forces fired 110 rounds into Ukraine on the night of December 1-2, 50 of which were "deflected" due to Ukrainian intervention by the ERB (45 percent), and 52 of which Ukrainian forces overthrew.
Chernyk noted Ukraine's high strike rate and also emphasized that Ukraine has improved its EBM capabilities to the point where Ukrainian forces can either "land" The martyrs, to make them "get lost" or force them to deviate from their path and fly into Russian or Belarusian airspace.
Ukrainian radio interference has a significant impact on the effectiveness of these Russian strike packages, and in particular adds an increased burden on the joint Russian-Belarusian air defense umbrella. The independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on November 25 that 38 Russian Shahed drones entered Belarusian airspace on November 24 and 25, a record number of Russian drones violating Belarusian airspace.
Belarus scrambled planes to respond to the airspace violation - suggesting it was unprepared to receive errant Russian drones and that Russia did not foresee the impact of the Ukrainian intervention.