To hope to one day coexist peacefully with Russia, Western leaders, led by the Europeans, must urgently restore the channels of communication that have been cut off since the start of the war. This is what the famous Russian foreign policy expert and sinologist, 40-year-old Alexander Gabuev, argues in an article for the magazine "Foreign Affairs".
Gabuev is the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, a think tank based in Berlin. In 2023, the Russian state designated him a "foreign agent" - an arbitrarily assigned status designed to marginalize the targeted individual or organization.
The invasion of Ukraine, launched in 2022 by Russian President Vladimir Putin, changed the course of history. The war had direct consequences, of course, especially for the Ukrainians who were the victims of this brutal aggression, but it also profoundly transformed Russia, more than most outside observers can imagine.
No ceasefire, even one brokered by an American president who values his Russian counterpart, will be able to repair the damage: Putin has irrevocably made confrontation with the West the guiding principle of Russian society. And it will take much more than an end to hostilities in Ukraine for Russia to escape the situation of dependence in which its president has placed it vis-à-vis China.
The war has made Putin’s Russia a much more repressive society and has allowed hatred of the West to take root throughout Russian society. It is important to note that as of 2022 Since then, the Kremlin has waged a massive campaign to suppress political dissent, spread pro-war and anti-Western propaganda across the country, and create large segments of Russians who stand to gain materially from the conflict. Tens of millions of Russians, including top officials and many of the country’s wealthiest, now view the West as a mortal enemy.
Over the past three years, American and European officials have demonstrated remarkable resolve in countering the Russian president’s aggression. But they have also, sometimes unwittingly, played into Putin’s hands by fueling the narrative that the West is angry with Russia and that the conflict between the two countries is existential. The lack of a coherent, long-term approach to Russia, combined with rhetoric that suggests they are pursuing a larger agenda than they actually have, has undermined Western leaders’ strategy.
In 2024 For example, Kaia Kallas - then Prime Minister of Estonia and now, as Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union's top diplomat - said that Western leaders should not worry that NATO's commitment to a victory in Ukraine could lead to Russia's collapse. The Kremlin's propaganda machine quickly spread this statement to prove that the West's ultimate goal is actually the effective disintegration of Russia.
Domestic distrust
US President Donald Trump has compromised the unity of the transatlantic alliance in the hope of a quick end to the war. But even if Trump’s flirtations with Putin offer the prospect of a superficial warming of relations between the two countries, the Russian president’s internal distrust of the West makes true reconciliation impossible.
Ultimately, Putin cannot be sure that Trump will be able to persuade Europe to mend ties with Moscow, and he knows that the next American administration may simply make another strategic U-turn. Moreover, American companies are in no hurry to return to Russia, and Putin is unlikely to abandon the strategic relationship he maintains with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Still, the ugly nature of Trump’s appeasement strategy could encourage other leaders, especially in Europe, to pursue a more determined policy of containment or even openly demonstrate their hostility toward Russia.
Viewed in isolation, however, this strategy would be a mistake. Putin’s regime will almost certainly not collapse from within. Therefore, deterrence must remain, at least in the short term, the cornerstone of Western and especially European policy.
Russia's foreign policy must be rebalanced
One day, however, Putin will be gone. Russia’s next leaders will undoubtedly come from within his inner circle, but they will have more room to maneuver in setting the country’s course—and concrete reasons to deviate from it. Domestically, Putin’s Russia is weak, even if the population proves relatively docile. The most obvious solution for future leaders seeking to improve the country’s standing will be to rebalance its foreign policy. Europe must therefore prepare to seize the opportunity after Putin’s departure while simultaneously strengthening its strategy of deterrence toward Moscow.
European leaders must imagine a new kind of relationship with Russia and stop believing that the country must transform itself as radically as West Germany did after World War II if it is to become a strong economic and strategic partner for the West. They must also define the modalities of peaceful coexistence, such as arms control strategies and forms of economic interdependence that prevent the militarization of both sides.
Finally, European leaders (as well as American politicians who do not share Trump’s sympathies for Putin) must begin to defend this vision by dispelling any ambiguity in communications about Russia, including, for example, statements about increasing national military budgets. Not everyone in the Kremlin shares Putin’s anti-Western obsession. In private conversations, many in the Russian elite acknowledge that the war in Ukraine was not only a moral crime but also a strategic mistake.
The easier it is for these pragmatists to imagine better relations with Western countries, the more likely they will be to prevail in the inevitable internal conflicts that will follow the end of the Putin era. Changing the West’s message to Russia is not only a good way to prepare for the future; This is also a good strategy for the present. If Western leaders stop feeding the Kremlin’s narrative that they are determined to foment perpetual confrontation with Russia, it could reduce the appeal of far-right and far-left populists who argue that the military-industrial complex is engaged in waging an endless war against the country.
But if, on the contrary, Western leaders continue to suggest that it is pointless to even consider the idea of mutually beneficial coexistence with Russia, they risk making future Kremlin leaders feel they have no choice but to perpetuate all of Putin’s positions, including his dependence on China, and thereby pushing them down a risky path.
Digital Iron Curtain
Long before the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine, and especially because of Putin’s repression, Russian society was already gripped by inertia and learned helplessness. In recent years, however, the Kremlin has implemented a massive social engineering project aimed at instilling a sense of distrust of the West in the Russian psyche. In September 2022, Moscow mandated that all schools hold weekly classes that spread pro-war propaganda under the guise of patriotism lessons.
The state has become more intrusive in entertainment and culture, forcing independent musicians, artists, and writers to leave the country, labeling dissident writers as "extremists", and staging show trials of progressive intellectuals who opposed the war.
Inspired by the Chinese Communist Party, the Kremlin has sought to create a digital iron curtain, banning Instagram and Facebook and slowing access to YouTube, which nearly half of Russians over the age of 12 still use daily. Naturally, an unexpected event, a "black swan" (in the words of philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb), could lead to the collapse of "Fortress Russia".
Indeed, the recent sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria shows that even the most authoritarian regimes are sometimes more fragile than they seem. But the sudden fall of Putin's regime remains unlikely. If the money needed to bribe potential critics runs out, Moscow can always compensate with more brutal repression. The war in Ukraine did not temporarily change Russian foreign policy: it changed it forever. Moscow now pursues three main goals in its foreign relations: developing alliances to support the military effort, supporting an economy weakened by sanctions, and getting revenge on the West for its support for Ukraine.
Russian authorities have invested heavily in building partnerships with regimes and organizations that also want the West to pay, notably North Korea, Iran, and their allies, such as the Houthis in Yemen. If the war ends and the United States lifts its sanctions, the Kremlin may decide to temporarily suspend some of its more belligerent anti-American activities, including supplying weapons to Washington’s enemies, such as the Houthis. But there is always the possibility of resuming these activities once the Trump team withdraws. The Kremlin has also worked over the years to maintain and strengthen its ties with developing countries around the world, offering them Russian products at very low prices and increasing its exports to India and the rest of Southeast Asia, as well as to Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.
With China - a relationship of dependence
The main thing to understand is that Russia is now resolutely oriented towards China. Before the war, the two countries had a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence: China certainly had more power, but Russia protected its rear by maintaining trade, financial, and technological ties with Europe. Since 2022, however, Putin has placed himself in a position of much greater dependence on China in exchange for its support in the war against Ukraine.
In fact, the Kremlin’s ability to last three years was due to the influx of critical weapons components from China. And the Russian economy has managed to stay afloat because China now buys 30% of Russian exports, compared to 14% in 2021, and Chinese products account for 40% of its imports, compared to 24% before the war. Beijing has also offered Moscow the opportunity to trade in yuan. Russia has bet that this dependence will be profitable for it in the future.
Since Beijing is Washington’s main adversary, the strengthening of Chinese power is tantamount to a strategic investment for the Kremlin in ending US global dominance in the world. This explains why Russia is now supplying China with weapons models that it did not want to share with it before 2022.
It has also encouraged its laboratories and universities to contribute to China’s innovation ecosystem, and to this end has implemented joint projects in the fields of natural sciences, applied mathematics, information technology and space. The number of Russians working for Chinese companies has increased dramatically.
In addition, Moscow now supplies Beijing with raw materials such as oil and gas at low prices via land routes, thus ensuring its access to resources in the event of a naval blockade, and sells it uranium for its nuclear program.
Strengthening deterrence
During his 2024 election campaign, Trump promised to "decouple" China and Russia. Now that he has been elected, he seems to be making some progress on that promise by getting closer to the Russian president. But his efforts, whatever they may be, will not be enough: Putin's Russia will always be a threat to Europe and the United States. Europe must persist in its strategy of deterring the Russian regime, and it must prepare to do so with much less support from Washington.
European leaders must continue to view this as a transatlantic endeavor, ideally conducted under the auspices of NATO or, if the Trump team decides not to participate, in cooperation with a team of experienced American allies, including foreign policy experts, military officials, and leaders of the American defense industry. The priority is to increase defense production. But this is not as simple as analysts sometimes claim.
If policymakers choose to strengthen Europe’s security without simultaneously seeking to stimulate the continent’s sluggish economic growth, they will only embolden populists who are positioning themselves against increased military spending and advocating a policy of appeasement with Putin. Europe and the United States must also oppose the “shadow war” of Russia.
Moscow has developed all sorts of tools to undermine the security and political institutions of democracies, including acts of sabotage, targeted assassinations, online disinformation, and election interference. The Kremlin is proud of these inventions, and it can be assumed that their use will continue even after the ceasefire in Ukraine.
In addition to strengthening deterrence, however, Western leaders, especially those in Europe, should begin to consider a different approach to Russia. The country that Putin’s successors will inherit can be expected to be deeply unbalanced, due to disproportionate investment in the military sector in recent years, declining access to modern technology, the country’s overreliance on China, and the exacerbation of already unfavorable demographic trends related to the war in Ukraine.
Given the huge investments made in the conflict by the military, intelligence, and law enforcement elites (and the profits they have made from them), Putin’s successors may initially be reluctant to make a definitive break with the past.
Even the most pragmatic Russians will not want an antagonistic relationship with China. Within the elite, however, a relatively large pragmatic faction understands that the war in Ukraine was a disaster and may be willing to gradually distance themselves from the most damaging aspects of Putin’s legacy if they can rely on Western proposals.
Preparing for the future
Changing the West’s message to Russia—and ensuring consistency in the new message—will not be an easy task, not least because Trump has shattered the unity of the transatlantic alliance. After all, not all European governments share the same view of Russia.
But European decision-makers and American policymakers who do not want to follow Trump’s preferred approach can start by concretely outlining the contours of a more stable security relationship. At the current pace, NATO and Russia will soon have a full arsenal of conventional weapons, including tanks and drones, as well as strategic weapons, such as hypersonic nuclear missiles.
The parallels with the Cold War are obvious: the risks are similar, and the solutions to address them are the same: adopting arms control measures with robust verification mechanisms and establishing communication channels to manage problems. Economic interdependence is already a source of prosperity for both Russia and the West. By the time Putin leaves the scene, Europe will likely have freed itself once and for all from its dependence on Russian products. If so, it would be able to resume imports of certain Russian raw materials without fear of compromising its independence and thus further diversify its supply chains. Restoring trade ties would also benefit Russia, as it would allow it to reduce its dependence on the Chinese market.
The disintegration of Russia is too great a risk to take
For real rapprochement between Russia and the West to occur, however, the criminal war that Putin has started against Ukraine will have to be ended. Even if Moscow and NATO were to begin arms control talks, particularly on missiles, it would be impossible to find a new balance while Kiev, under threat, continues to produce them.
Any future effort aimed at fully restoring economic ties with Russia would have to generate funds to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction or even offer some form of reparations. It is, of course, unlikely that Moscow would agree to the term "missile" appearing in an official document.
However, one could envisage, for example, a special tax imposed on Russian products sold in Europe that could generate funds for Ukraine for a predetermined number of years. Alternatively, international actors could create a fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine, to which Russia would contribute a certain percentage of GDP over a given period. Thus, the faster the Russian economy grows, the more money Ukraine will receive, which would encourage the EU to buy Russian products and invest in the country.
Many European countries will want Ukraine to participate in the development of future strategies for a post-Putin Russia. In Kiev, many believe that the most desirable outcome is one in which Russia emerges from the war permanently weakened, if not destroyed.
But such an outcome would hardly serve Europe's interests. The risks posed by the disintegration of this huge neighbor, which is home to an entire arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, are too great. Ukraine’s membership in NATO is unthinkable for Putin now, and his successors may be just as hostile to him.
More pragmatic Russian leaders may realize, however, that as a NATO member, Ukraine poses less of a threat to Russia than one driven by a desire for revenge and without an obligation to abide by the Alliance’s rules and values.
Building a new pragmatic relationship
To convey this new vision to the Russians, Western countries urgently need to restore the channels of communication that they neglected during the war. They must make it clear to the Russian population and elites that the Kremlin wants to isolate Russia from the West, not the other way around.
Thus, artists, scientists, intellectuals, and athletes who have not spread Russian war propaganda should not be excommunicated solely because of their nationality. Europe should also adjust its visa policy, as it is currently virtually impossible for Russians to travel within the continent.
In their public messages, Western leaders and senior officials should emphasize that they have nothing against the Russian people and that they disapprove of Putin’s disastrous strategic choices, as well as the negative impact of these choices on the prosperity and security of Russians themselves. Senior Western officials should also strengthen their relationships with Kremlin bureaucrats and the foreign policy elite, as they will become a key component of the Russian state apparatus once the current president leaves office.
A post-Putin Russia may seem like a distant and abstract future, especially after the failure of efforts to remove him from power, including the 2023 coup organized by the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. It may even seem counterintuitive to consider ways to restore ties with Moscow.
The cohesion that the West was able to create around the Ukraine issue before Trump’s reelection was a remarkable achievement. Today, with a pro-Putin president in the White House, European unity seems even more valuable. But many European countries, especially those on NATO’s eastern flank, want nothing to do with normalizing relations with the Kremlin, even after Putin’s departure.
Yet they will have to accept it. Western leaders have a duty to address the concerns of their own citizens, most of whom do not want a costly and endless confrontation with Russia. For imagining a new, pragmatic relationship with Moscow is far from a mere intellectual exercise and could serve as a tool to encourage Russia to begin a transition.
While Putin will never be receptive to signals of openness from the West, such signals could nevertheless be enough to weaken his regime after his departure. The Russian president has not groomed a successor because he fears the erosion of his power.
If he does eventually appoint one, it is likely that he will be far weaker than he actually is, allowing rival political forces to engage in a war for influence. Even without a fierce succession struggle, the transition after Putin could resemble the period after Stalin’s death in the 1950s. The emergence of a de facto collective leadership has allowed a shift toward liberalization and pragmatism.
Europe was unprepared for the recent election of Donald Trump as US president. It also risks being surprised by a sudden changing of the guard in the Kremlin unless the West takes a more active role in shaping its relations with a post-Putin Russia.
An endless war that swings from cold to hot and back again is not inevitable. But if Western leaders are slow to come to terms with the possibility of adopting a different vision, they risk playing Putin’s game by making confrontation with the West a permanent legacy.