The National Assembly should assign the Court of Accounts to inspect the mechanisms for determining and paying bonuses in ministries, as well as remuneration in the judicial system. This is proposed by the political leadership of “Yes, Bulgaria”, part of the PP-DB parliamentary group in the 51st National Assembly, and the inspection should be carried out on the basis of Art. 7, para. 1 of the Law on the Court of Accounts two performance audits.
“For years, the "Borisov-Peevski" corruption model has systematically and consistently turned some of the institutions into machines for repression and peculiar bludgeons, and others - into imitation institutions, said Ivaylo Mirchev **** systematically and consistently turned some of the institutions into machines for repression and peculiar bludgeons, and others - into imitation institutions. Formally, they work according to their powers and functions, but in reality they simply spend tens of millions without benefit to society”, states Ivaylo Mirchev.
The co-chairman of “Yes, Bulgaria” gives as an example the Court of Auditors, which indicates as a priority in its activity this year checks whether the law has been complied with when determining additional material incentives (DMS) in the public sector, as well as whether the size of the bonuses is adequate. However, the audit object will be the ministries of culture and sports, the Consumer Protection Commission, as well as seven secondary schools in Southern Bulgaria, which are small in terms of budget and number.
“In these schools, the bonuses paid per year to teachers hardly exceed the bonuses paid only to the chairman and deputy chairmen of the Court of Auditors. My recent research identified the champions of the DMS in the public sector - the Social Assistance Agency, the RIA, the General Labor Inspectorate and the State Fund "Agriculture". In addition, the most significant is the amount of bonuses paid in the judicial system - the Supreme Judicial Council, the Prosecutor's Office, which also remain outside the scope of the planned audits, Mirchev emphasizes.
The political leader is categorical that with such type of activity the Court of Auditors practically wastes tens of millions on unimportant and useless audits for society.
“The selection of objects for performance audit obviously and not by chance covers relatively insignificant organizations, instead of key institutions with high financial and public risk. International standards require the Court of Auditors to determine its audit program alone and without external influence. However, the evaluation criteria for performance audits explicitly include a sub-criterion "government priorities". These priorities should be the subject of an audit, not a criterion for selecting an audit. This creates the impression and real possibility of determining audits according to the political agenda, which contradicts the principle of institutional independence," Mirchev concludes.