The Magnitsky Act – the mirror in which Borisov looks at himself, but Goranov is seen

The “Magnitsky Act“ – the mirror in which Borisov looks at himself, but Goranov is seen… Or maybe someone else, but not Borisov. The story surrounding Boyko Borisov and the “Magnitsky Act“ is not from yesterday. The story is long, because there are many people on the list. Delyan Peevski has the longest experience, and the individuals who were sanctioned in 2023 are the former CEO of the “Kozloduy” NPP; Ivan Genov, the former Finance Minister Vladislav Goranov, the leader of the “Russophiles for the Revival of the Fatherland” party; Nikolay Malinov, the former CEO of the “Kozloduy” NPP; Alexander Nikolov and the former Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov. And everything surrounding the “Magnitsky“ law is not just another political storm. It is a symptom of a long-standing problem – the mixing of power, business and impunity.

The “Magnitsky“ sanctions are not imposed lightly. They are the result of long investigations, international intelligence data and a clear assessment that certain individuals have benefited themselves or others through corrupt practices. When the names of Peevski and Goranov appeared on the list, the reaction in Bulgaria was bipolar – shock on one side, and complete denial on the other.

Today, when Boyko Borisov assures that “a process is underway“ to remove Bulgarians from the sanctions list, society is asking itself: have these people really changed – or does the political situation simply demand it?

The problem is not whether the sanctions will be lifted, but whether Bulgaria has shown real results in the fight against corruption. Removing someone from the “Magnitsky“ list is not an administrative act – it is a moral assessment of the system that gave birth to it.

The paradox is that even after so many signals, public scandals and prosecutorial inspections, not one of those sanctioned has been convicted in Bulgaria. This is the strongest argument that the state continues to live with a double standard – one for the “ordinary“, another for the “strong“.

Borisov's political maneuvers – conversations with foreign representatives, assurances that “everything is under control“, – show one thing: instead of catharsis, we have a PR strategy. And when PR replaces justice, trust in institutions disappears.

Until Bulgaria shows that it can confront its own addictions, the “Magnitsky” law will continue to be not an American threat, but a measure of our own helplessness.