The Bulgarian people are being subjected to a strange experiment. They have been given some party "Lego" blocks, from which they must assemble a party of Rumen Radev, for which 1/3 of the electorate seems to have already decided to vote.
The Bulgarian people are being subjected to a strange experiment. They have been given some party "Lego" blocks, from which they must assemble a party of Rumen Radev, for which a third of the electorate seems to have already decided to vote. The largest block is Rumen Radev himself in the form of a leader. The set also includes a flag in military green and a logo with an arrow forward and up; there are also signs with the name "Progressive Bulgaria". There are also small blocks such as "Fight the oligarchy", "No military support for Ukraine", ""Yes" to Russian gas", "European Bulgarian" and "Botash".
Only Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo could have assembled a masterpiece from this material, but the Bulgarian electorate is not despairing: the experiments in our country continue and the public sphere has become like a labor lesson. The truth is that a lot depends on who assembles the party from the elements presented so far. Depending on the assembling sympathizers and political majorities, one can get both European Bulgarianness and not so European Bulgarianness. And there are also variants in which something is obtained, composed of the defects of the other parties.
Radev's electorate
Rumen Radev's strategy of pre-election silence is bearing fruit for now: not only is his formation receiving enviable forecasts from sociologists, but also the public imagination is running wild about what the new hero actually represents. People who state that they have already decided to vote for him are divided into two almost equal groups. One is the Russophiles and the Eurosceptics (anti-Europeans), who want Bulgaria to be in the sphere of Russia and see in Radev their revenge. It is no coincidence that parties such as "Vazrazhdane" and BSP lose almost half of their electorate with the emergence of Radev's party: their voters have clearly decided to change horses.
The other half of Radev's electorate is rather pro-European and enraged by the outrages of Peevski and Borisov in domestic politics. Some of these voters are new and see a chance for a serious change in the status quo in the upcoming elections. Another part of them are disappointed voters from the periphery of PP-DB and GERB: both formations shrank as a result of Radev's appearance on the party scene. ITN and other small formations that once had anti-corruption intentions are practically disappearing from the electoral landscape for the same reasons.
The conclusion from this profile of Rumen Radev's voter is that the leader will have to keep the hopes of his two groups of voters alive for as long as possible. For now, he is doing so by remaining silent on divisive issues (almost on everything). But each of these two groups will try to pull the governing truncheon towards itself and take all the credit for the election result. This pulling has already begun. Pro-Russian spokespeople (whether volunteers or party-legitimate) are pushing the project in a pro-Russian and anti-European direction and describing it as the "Bulgarian Orban". Orbanists ruled everywhere in Eastern Europe (sic!), so it should be in our country (quite sic!). Other more moderate admirers of Radev describe him as a new modern left of the European type. They are not so vocal, but they exist too.
Options after the elections
Radev's strategy is actually to let the Bulgarians assemble it themselves from the parts that he sparingly gives them. The final creation will be obtained after the elections and will depend on their result. There are actually three options, and at the moment each of them has almost equal probability.
Something like "Vazrazhdane" with a more European face
This option could be implemented if Rumen Radev's formation gets the opportunity to govern together with "Vazrazhdane" or the BSP. The formula would be a secure minority government with the support of one of the two parties. Radev would not want to govern openly with "Vazrazhdane" and would prefer the BSP to provide the necessary votes, but at least for now this is not entirely realistic. But if "Progressive Bulgaria" is very close to the majority on its own and has a majority in parliament with "Vazrazhdane, this would be a dramatically different situation than the current one. At least on some strategic issues for the country - for example, support for Ukraine or energy policy - there would be an opportunity for openly pro-Russian positions and a radical change in the current course. So far, there have been at least two-thirds majorities in favor of Europe and NATO in Bulgaria's parliaments. If the described option is implemented, Bulgaria would be in a completely different position and the votes in parliament could turn out to be strategically divergent. We have not seen what the attitude of Radev's formation towards civil rights and freedoms is. In a majority with "Vazrazhdane", restrictions on individual freedoms of expression and association could easily be introduced, similar to those in Russia or at least Hungary. Of course, part of Radev's electorate (and perhaps even he himself) will certainly resist such a development. But they will be under very strong pressure from a vocal and intoxicated by their possible electoral result anti-European group. And it is very likely that this group will prevail and "Progressive Bulgaria" will turn out to be some kind of version of "Vazrazhdane".
European Bulgarianness
If Radev forms a majority with PP-DB, it is likely that a governing coalition similar to the one in the European Parliament will result. Radev's formation will be something like the "Italian Brothers" of Giorgia Meloni, and the PP-DB are a combination of the EPP (center-right) and "Renew Europe" (liberals). Radev may prefer to go to the Socialists and Democrats in this case: perhaps the name "Progressive Bulgaria" is precisely for this purpose. This is the most mainstream option for Radev, which would impress with his statesmanlike behavior. At the same time, however, this is an option that would disappoint the most vocal among his Russophile supporters, and would also create a meaningful conflict with his own understandings of the war against Ukraine and the need for Bulgaria from Russian energy projects.
Progressive oligarchy
It is possible that the election result will suggest a coalition between Radev and Borisov. This is the result that Borisov aims to achieve after the elections. To this end, Peevski will be temporarily hidden from the front line of politics and may even leave somewhere (obviously it will not be to Dubai, as things are going). Of course, as in previous cases of "departures", this will simply be a legitimizing maneuver for GERB's participation in the government: the symbiosis between Borisov and Peevski will not disappear with a magic wand.
More importantly, a major and real fight against corruption cannot follow from such a format of government. The "assembly" of GERB with PP-DB demonstrates the abilities for mimicry and adaptation of GERB and DPS, which will be demonstrated again. In order to reach the compromises needed by Borisov and Peevski, it is likely that Radev will receive some geopolitical compromises regarding European integration and Russian energy projects. This will probably be excused to the public as some kind of "Trumpism" in local conditions.
Overall, in the third option, corruption and the conquered state will probably remain the same, but at the expense of this, Bulgaria's European orientation will be partially compromised. This compromise will be potentially less than in the first option.
What will come out in the end?
Bulgarians are inventive people and can put together something else from the elements that Radev gives them. But like the old joke about the man who took home a part from the Soviet sewing machine factory every day, the disappointment that the assembly always resulted in a machine gun cannot be ruled out.
Hopefully this time something capable and useful for civilian use will come out.
This text expresses the opinion of the author and may not coincide with the positions of the Bulgarian editorial office and the State Gazette as a whole.