Poor Europe. This continent embodied the most lofty visions of peace and integration in the post-Cold War period. In the harsher era that followed, it has become a symbol of weakness. Today, the European Union is simultaneously squeezed by Russia, China and the United States. There are hints of a strategy that could allow Europe to navigate this era. The alternative is to become one of its victims. This is what Hal Brands, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, wrote in an article for Bloomberg.
The EU found itself in this situation largely because of its own decisions and failures. A continent that believed it had overcome harsh geopolitical realities at home has too often assumed it could overcome them in the outside world. By the 2010s, Europe had become, as the saying goes, dependent on Russia for energy, China for prosperity, and America for security. And now the time has come for all three bills to be paid. Russia began by gradually cutting off the countries on Europe’s eastern borders and using its energy leverage to weaken the continent’s response. Now, Russian leader Vladimir Putin is simply trying to break down Europe’s Ukrainian door while simultaneously harassing the entire region with sabotage, drone strikes, and other hybrid attacks. The worst may not be over: leaders in Germany, the Baltics, and elsewhere believe that an angry, hyper-revisionist Russia could test Europe severely before the end of this decade.
Many European leaders once saw Chinese demand as the engine of the EU’s prosperity. Some even viewed Beijing as a potential partner in a multipolar world. However, for years, China’s overcapacity and economic predation have threatened to gradually deindustrialize Europe. President Xi Jinping’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative aims to turn the region into a dependent territory within a Chinese-dominated supercontinent. China has fueled violent instability in Europe by facilitating Putin’s incursion into Ukraine.
During Donald Trump’s first term, Europe’s greatest fear was abandonment by the United States. In his second term, those fears have centered around increased pressure from China and Russia, as well as more pronounced hostility from the United States. To be fair, Trump’s demand for higher European defense spending is partly aimed at strengthening Europe. It reflects a sense that America’s NATO allies must be taken seriously before other major powers do. The problem is that Trump also despises weakness, which is why he has been pressuring European countries, first by negotiating a highly asymmetric trade deal and then by demanding that the continent hand over Greenland to Denmark. This has created a strong cross-pressure. Europe needs more strength to counter Trump’s more outrageous demands, but it also needs more stability in its relations with Washington to meet challenges from Moscow and Beijing. Recent events have vividly illustrated this dilemma, as Trump has escalated his demands for Greenland. They have also suggested the contours of a European response.
First: self-help. European military investment is increasing sharply. Key countries, mainly Denmark and Germany, are buying more weapons from European suppliers and less from the United States. The economic component of self-help involves implementing the competitiveness reforms outlined in 2024 by former European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi. Strengthening Europe’s power base will be the price of continuing the partnership with Trump’s America—and a prerequisite for survival if that partnership breaks down.
Second: diversification. The EU recently reached long-awaited trade deals with India and the Latin American trading bloc Mercosur. It is also pursuing pacts with members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. In the short term, none of this will lead to a sharp reduction in Europe’s trade dependence on the United States or China. In the long term, these initiatives could expand Europe’s capabilities and increase its resilience to pressure from all sources.
Third: Restraint and dialogue with Trump. Trump’s retreat on Greenland followed threats of serious economic retaliation from Europe. It showed that a willingness to impose real costs could dissuade Trump from the idea that NATO allies could be easily manipulated. Yet deterrence worked because key European interlocutors, such as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, quietly offered solutions to address legitimate security concerns in the Arctic. This allowed Trump to declare victory and withdraw. Such a strategy would not restore the pre-Trump status quo, and that’s a good thing. Rather, the goal should be to create a new basis for stability in the relationship—a situation in which a more assertive Europe takes on greater responsibility, even as the transatlantic bond remains intact.
This is the best way to mobilize the collective strength that the democratic world will need to contain multiple autocratic rivals at once, while preserving the possibility of—eventually—greater transatlantic economic cooperation against Beijing. Rearming Europe, even in the context of a more balanced NATO, will require huge costs and unpopular reform of overly generous welfare states.
"Europe" remains more of an idea than a reality: Different economic realities and strategic agendas divide East from West and North from South. The warning signs abound: Putin will try to divide and intimidate Europe. Trump, whose good ideas compete with his bad ones, might demand greater European autonomy while punishing countries that show more independence from the United States. But if Europe fails to stand on its own two feet, the continent once made up of empires will become their plaything. Such an outcome will only bring more pain and humiliation to Europe. Given the number and severity of the challenges facing the free world, it will ultimately not be in America’s best interests.