On June 15, 2026, Alexander Lukashenko stated in an interview with the TV channel “Al Arabiya“ that it is unacceptable to transfer the war to the territory of Belarus and publicly apologized for the previous offensive rhetoric towards Ukraine. He emphasized that Belarus' direct participation in the war would bring “more harm than good“ and acknowledged the country's vulnerability, indicating that the Ukrainian side had identified about 500 potential targets on the territory of Belarus in case of direct participation in the war in Minsk. Explaining specific military risks, Lukashenko acknowledged the country's high vulnerability in case of mirror strikes from Ukraine. According to Lukashenko; “We do not want to go to war, because we understand that Belarus is very vulnerable militarily if Ukraine starts to attack Belarus in the same way as it attacks Russia. Such a position may indicate Lukashenko's desire to facilitate the cessation of full-scale military operations on the borders of Belarus. But so far these are just words that often did not coincide with the real actions of the “Belarusian father“. In addition, will the Kremlin allow Belarus to take actions that would contradict Moscow's aggressive imperial course? Be that as it may, such statements by A. Lukashenko testify to his pragmatic calculation aimed at preserving the stability of the authoritarian power he created.
Although cooperation in the military sphere between Belarus and Russia remains close, in June 2026 there were signs of tension in the military sphere between Minsk and Moscow. In particular, the top leadership of the Belarusian army forbade Russian officers from exercising direct command and supervision over the majority of Belarusian units, making an exception only for the Vitebsk and Brest assault brigades. Such a decision indicates Minsk's desire to retain control over its army and avoid complete subordination to the Kremlin.
06.05.26 Russian advisers to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of Belarus were not allowed to meet at the General Staff of this country. Subsequently, joint exercises on the mobilization and redeployment of troops in the areas of military operations, planned for June 28-30, 2026, were canceled. Such steps demonstrate a decrease in the level of operational interaction and coordination between the armies and testify to Minsk's desire to limit the risks of direct participation in the war, while maintaining a formal alliance with Moscow.
A. Lukashenko has repeatedly stressed that Belarus is not planning offensive actions, but is ready to defend itself together with Russia in the event of aggression, which allows Minsk to demonstrate loyalty to Moscow, while minimizing the risks of escalation. For European countries, such a position of Minsk is a reminder of the constant threat of using Belarus as a platform for hybrid actions by the Kremlin against EU and NATO countries.
Despite some tension in relations with Russia, Belarus continues to maintain infrastructure that is potentially useful to Moscow. The construction of launch sites for attack drones of the “Shahed“ type near Vitebsk, Slonim and on the territory of the former Bereza-Kartuzskaya concentration camp creates a threat of the use of unmanned aerial vehicles against Ukraine. Such actions create additional risks for the security of NATO's eastern flank and overall stability in Europe.
According to Lukashenko's statements, the issue of the direct participation of the Belarusian armed forces in military operations has been repeatedly and sharply discussed at the highest level with Putin. Minsk's current public position shows that the Belarusian side is trying to record a final refusal to participate directly in the Russian military campaign.
The events of June 2026 shed light on the internal contradictions in Minsk's military interaction with Moscow, where limiting Russian influence in the army is combined with maintaining logistical and infrastructural support, which allows Lukashenko to balance loyalty to Putin and attempts to reduce risks for his own regime.
Against the backdrop of tensions in the military integration between Minsk and Moscow, Alexander Lukashenko is actively trying to establish a dialogue with the United States. Using the visits of President Donald Trump's special envoy John Cole, O. Lukashenko is seeking a partial lifting of US sanctions against Belarusian enterprises and government officials, which would weaken Belarus' dependence on Russia and expand Minsk's room for maneuver in relations with Moscow.
Such contacts with Washington representatives are part of the Lukashenko regime's strategy to find alternative channels to weaken Moscow's political and economic influence on Minsk. It is important for European and American politicians to distinguish between these tactical steps and real reforms.
EU leaders are also trying to prevent the Kremlin's demands to involve Belarus in the war. On May 24, French President Emmanuel Macron called Belarusian ruler Alexander Lukashenko. According to AFP sources, Macron warned about the inadmissibility of Minsk's participation in Russia's war against Ukraine.
Primarily for the Baltic states and Poland, any changes in the nature of military interaction between Minsk and Moscow have a direct impact on regional security. Even a partial limitation of Russian influence on the Belarusian armed forces does not eliminate the need to maintain increased readiness on NATO's eastern flank, since Belarus remains an important element of the Russian military system in Europe.