Andrey Gyurov has not yet announced his candidacy, but is already receiving promises of support. Iliana Yotova, on the other hand, enjoys high approval - and the support of "Progressive Bulgaria". What are their chances? By Daniel Smilov:
Andrey Gyurov has not declared himself a candidate for the presidential elections in the fall, but is already receiving promises of support from political parties and civil associations. For the moment, he is also the only possible candidate who could stand any chance of success against the favorite Iliana Yotova. President Yotova, on the other hand, enjoys the support of "Progressive Bulgaria" (PB), and Rumen Radev's party itself is standing strong and has not actually lost electoral support according to what sociological research shows. Yotova enjoys nearly 50% approval and is currently leading this ranking among politicians, which is generally typical of incumbent presidents.
These facts are sure to discourage other candidates and many of them will simply participate in the presidential race on the Olympic principle: to make their name heard and attract supporters for certain political parties. A candidacy by Gyurov would be more ambitious: for her, the minimum would be to reach the runoff and perform decently in the second round. Is such a program feasible?
Support for Gyurov
According to the applications so far, Gyurov's possible candidacy would receive approval from the PP, DB and the Forum for Democratic Action. The electorate to which all three organizations speak is largely limited to PP-DB voters and the periphery of this group. After the split of PP and DB, the two formations generally retained their combined weight of about 14%. Although the split did not lead to a collapse in their support, no tangible increase was observed either. These trends are unlikely to change dramatically within two or three months, which means that Gyurov will have to seek support from other parties and voters.
His choice is not particularly large and comes down mainly to GERB, non-voters and supporters of Ahmed Dogan, as well as members of the MRF who are dissatisfied with Peevski. The problem with these options is that any one of them - successfully implemented - can sabotage the others. Non-voters are generally difficult to mobilize in elections that are not visibly watershed and do not occur during a severe crisis. Attracting them requires radicalization, and radicalization repels centrist voters. The supporters of the APS are perhaps closest to Gyurov and his views. The same applies to that part of the MRF that is fed up with the oligarchic domination of the people in their leadership. But these votes are generally few.
Open support from GERB would be a controversial gift for Gyurov and could sway some of his most staunch voters. More covert support for Gyurov from the GERB leadership risks remaining misunderstood by the electorate of Borisov's party - after all, this electorate is used to considering the PP-DB as its greatest enemy.
The main thing is whether GERB will come up with its own candidate in these elections or will support someone other than Gyurov. If GERB did not make a similar move with its own candidate, then Gyurov would have the opportunity to attract their voters as well.
The disappointment of pro-Europeans and the memory of the protests
Gyurov's chances are mostly related to the disappointment of pro-European voters, which Radev's new government has begun to cause. This disappointment is already felt in the decline in trust in the government, but it does not yet affect Radev himself or the PB. That is, this disappointment should not be exaggerated, but it is still a fact.
Its roots are threefold: fiscal irresponsibility with the adoption of a budget with an unjustified deficit of 5.7%, Radev's pro-Russian positions and the timid anti-corruption actions of the new rulers.
Radev came to power because of protests, the cause of which was brought by the "Zhelyazkov" cabinet a draft irresponsible budget for 2026. This budget, let us recall, was still intended to be within the 3% deficit. The protests erupted because of inflated expenses and an increase in the dividend tax. The budget proposed by Radev's government (already adopted by the majority in the National Assembly) inflates state spending much more than Zhelyazkov's. Capital investments alone have been increased by over 2 billion euros. The funds for "maintenance" of the administration and state bodies have also been seriously increased. All promised expenditures for municipalities have also been preserved. That is, Radev actually adopted the same policies as the government that left because of them, even seriously worsening the situation. This is political arrogance that the thinking part of the electorate will not fail to register.
Moreover, Radev's loosening of the fiscal belt is happening in an unpredictable international situation that suggests the simultaneous escalation of two wars - in Ukraine and in Iran. If the worst-case scenarios are realized, Bulgaria could find itself in an economic crisis environment with unjustifiably inflated spending and a large deficit. This is unlikely to appeal to voters who are in favor of disciplined and rational European governance.
The Breath of Russian Peace
Many are left with the impression that Rumen Radev has staked his political career on a victory for Russia in the war against Ukraine. First, he claimed that Ukraine would lose in a matter of days; then, that a nuclear state cannot lose; and now - that Europe and Ukraine have no answer to Russia's ballistic missiles. The latter is largely a fact, but it is strange then why Bulgaria does not want to participate in building an anti-ballistic program for Europe: that is precisely why the "coalition of the willing" was created, in which we demonstratively (albeit with a pirouette) did not want to join.
Wherever we look at the actions of the new government, the Russian bias is visible. It has even gone so far as to support discredited Russian oligarchs and priests with KGB origins. An attempt is also being made to disguise the pro-Russian bias as native Trumpism. It is not clear how this changes things - in general, nothing.
Pro-European voters hardly find all this acceptable. Yotova will have a hard time distinguishing herself from Radev for anything, although she has more European beliefs than he does. It is precisely its inability to distinguish itself that will give chances to openly pro-European politicians in the presidential race.
Anti-corruption timidity
The entire anti-corruption activity of the new government consists of the verbal skirmishes between Minister Demerdzhiev and Delyan Peevski. Even the MRF is no longer particularly impressed by them, because it systematically voted together with the new ruling majority and even supported its budget. What more should be known about the anti-corruption intentions of the ruling party in fact?
This "timidity" - diplomatically speaking - also opens up the opportunity for Andrey Gyurov and other pro-European candidates to try to attract those disappointed by Radev's first steps.
The whole problem with this strategy is not that it will not work. The trends are clear and if there are no changes on all three fronts of disappointment, it will only grow. The problem is that this cannot happen in two or three months, especially if one of them goes on vacation, as is likely. From this perspective, Gyurov's decision to postpone the announcement of his candidacy until September is at least controversial. His main opponent may be time, or rather the lack thereof.
An interesting campaign is shaping up, and perhaps for the first time it will be so strongly influenced by the course of the two wars, which quite directly affect both Bulgaria and Europe as a whole. Without seeming existentially important, the presidential elections may actually prove decisive for the political processes in our country for years to come. Neighbors and other well-wishers (sarcastically and ironically) praise the second mind of the Bulgarians, i.e. the decision that is made after the trouble has already happened. Why don't we surprise them with a good use of the first mind: as long as we have kept it, it will not wear out.
This text expresses the opinion of the author and may not coincide with the positions of the Bulgarian editorial office and the State News Agency as a whole.