In the past few months, warnings about a new possible wave of mobilization in Russia have become more frequent. Both Western media and Ukrainian military intelligence write about this. Russian Telegram channels and independent media are actively discussing the possible mobilization after the so-called State Duma elections, which are in September.
There are reports of crowds of Russian men storming the Verkhny Lars border crossing with Georgia, as happened in the fall of 2022. The Russian authorities deny this, but this only increases the alarm, because everyone expects lies from the Kremlin to hide the preparations for mobilization. Moreover, it is really noticeable.
Do they have a plan?
In fact, nothing supernatural is happening that would indicate the intention to conduct a new, sudden and much more massive mobilization campaign than in 2023-2025.
The Russian army is definitely experiencing a shortage of fighters - as is the Ukrainian one. Moreover, Ukraine is mainly defending itself, currently applying many more technical innovations to the front, such as the latest versions of drones, which allows using fewer soldiers. Russia, on the other hand, is trying, albeit not very successfully, to attack, relying on attacks by small groups, which, however, leads to the death of many more fighters.
For its part, the Russian media, even those subjected to censorship, are reporting many facts indicating that the army is short of people. In many regions, there is no longer enough money to pay contract fighters, and the number of those signing new contracts is falling. One can no longer rely on hiring prisoners - their number in Russia has noticeably decreased.
At the same time, military commissions are gaining access to the data of all potential conscripts, the electronic draft, which until recently was only used to scare, is being activated in full force, and Putin will sign another decree that allows new officers to be recruited from the so-called "volunteers". All this shows that the Russian authorities are trying to fill the shortage of manpower at the front.
To clothe, shoe and feed
The main problems of a possible simultaneous large-scale mass mobilization have been known for a long time, as well as in the fall of 2022. The new soldiers must not only be assembled, but also trained, clothed, fed, led by commanders, and ultimately taken to the scene of the fighting so quickly that the enemy cannot prepare.
On all these points, Russia now has obvious problems, the biggest of which are probably in the areas of training, command, and logistics. In 2022, mobilization was carried out in stages, and thousands of untrained men nevertheless ended up in the army. If the effect is the same now, it will only sharply weaken the Russian front, instead of strengthening the offensive that Putin dreams of so much that he regularly lies about the successes of his army.
Therefore, if a rational analysis is made, it becomes clear that the current hidden and strengthened mobilization with new measures should be completely sufficient for the military, regardless of the plans for the future discussed by the General Staff.
What do Putin and his entourage hope for
Of course, there is a risk that the Kremlin is not thinking rationally, as it was in 2022. Russia failed to defeat Ukraine in a few days, but Putin and his entourage believed that there would not even be a war. Perhaps even now they mistakenly believe that they are capable of gathering a new half-million-strong army and making a breakthrough on the front, ending the war in the winter.
This requires a concentration of all forces. And a sign that things are heading in this direction would be the capitulation of Alexander Lukashenko and the obvious joining of Belarus in the project for a new offensive against Ukraine. However, such a thing is not in sight, despite Lukashenko's regular visits to Russia.
There is also no firm intention on the part of the Kremlin to once again stir up Russian society after the so-called "elections" and to cause a sharp jump in protest activity through open mobilization. Rather, there will be a new wave of repression in Russia against all those who are "for" ending the war within the framework set by the Kremlin. New prisoners are about to appear who may be forced to go to the front.
Author: Ivan Preobrazhensky