For a long time, Central Asia was on the periphery of world politics and public attention around the world. Until recently, the ideas about the five republics in the region - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - were vague and clichéd - isolated (without access to the world ocean), underdeveloped countries, "Russia's backyard". In recent years, however, their importance and role have grown and significantly exceed these limited clichés.
The first attempt to open up - the 1990s
For the first time, Western governments, companies and societies began to show a more serious interest in the region due to its rich natural resources after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the strict authoritarian control of local leaders, the preserved strong economic, energy, military and other ties with Russia, including the labor migration of many people from Central Asian countries to work in their northern neighbor, do not allow for a particular consolidation of Western influence in the region.
Ankara was particularly enthusiastic about the new field of action that had opened up in the Turkic countries with a related language during the rule of President Turgut Özal. The United States also encouraged Turkish cultural and other expansion in the region - the opening of Turkish schools and universities, a number of which were connected to the network of the preacher Fethullah Gülen. According to Russian sources, through them, numerous CIA agents were infiltrated in the region and the movement's activities were banned in Russia.
At the same time, calculations are being made in Turkey that its role in this direction can compensate for its decreased importance for NATO after the collapse of the USSR. However, the 1990s are often called a "lost decade" for Turkey, because it went through political instability (short-term weak coalition governments), economic crises (1994, 1999, 2000), problems with internal separatism and the war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party. Due to these economic and political problems, Turkey also did not achieve significant successes in the Central Asian direction in the 1990s.
In order to strengthen its ties, Russia initiated talks to create measures to strengthen trust in the military field and mutual reduction of military forces in border areas with some of these countries. Thus, in the period 1996 - 1997, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and Tajikistan signed the relevant agreements and formed the so-called "Shanghai Five." The absence from the group of Turkmenistan, rich in natural gas, but living in strong self-imposed isolation, is striking.
Meanwhile, the establishment of power of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1996 raised concerns among these countries about the risk of religious extremism spreading to Central Asia, and this also became a sphere of cooperation between these countries. Uzbekistan joined them in 2001 and the organization was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It was gradually institutionalized - the contractual and legal basis for its functioning, headquarters, etc. were created.
In the next decade, other countries joined it as observers and members. The most important among them were the accession of India and Pakistan in 2017, and later - of Iran and Belarus, so that the organization currently has 10 member states and 17 observers or dialogue partners.
Again in focus - the war in Afghanistan
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington again turned its attention to this part of the world because of the war in Afghanistan and its proximity to the countries of Central Asia. Moscow reached out and allowed the US to use bases in these countries for the operation against the Taliban. Subsequently, however, after the start of the war against Iraq a year and a half later, Russia began to treat with greater distrust the motives for the American presence in the region, believing that it could be directed against its interests.
After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in November 2002, Turkish foreign policy gradually became more active in various directions. During the party's first term (2002 - 2007), emphasis was placed on European integration, and the war against Iraq in March 2003 and its consequences inevitably attracted Turkey's attention. During the party's second term and with the arrival of the ambitious and intelligent Professor Ahmet Davutoglu as Foreign Minister, Ankara launched initiatives in the Balkans, Africa and Central Asia.
In 2009, four countries - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey - established the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States, called the Turkic Council for short. The organization is primarily focused on cooperation in the cultural and educational sphere. It is striking that not only Tajikistan, which is linguistically and culturally closer to Iran, but also Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are absent from the founding members.
The latter fact is significant because, along with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan is the most numerous and influential regional state. An interesting fact is that the idea for the creation of the organization did not come from Turkey, but from Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev - a long-time supporter of Eurasian projects.
Shockingly for many, at the end of 2018, Hungary joined the organization as an observer. However, the move is not only explainable in terms of historical sentiments and a more or less real/imaginary (depending on the point of view) kinship of Hungarians with ancient Turks and modern Central Asians. Experiencing increasing criticism for its rule of law and policies within the EU, the government of Viktor Orbán (in power since 2010) began to seek to diversify its foreign policy and foreign economic ties. The country has maintained strong positions in Africa since the socialist era, actively attracts Chinese investments and is looking for new markets and partnerships in Central Asia.
A year later, in 2019, Uzbekistan applied for membership in the organization, and at the VIII Summit of the Council, held in Istanbul, Turkmenistan was also accepted as an observer. The summit is also key for two other reasons - it is a jubilee on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the modern statehood of the Central Asian countries and it was decided to rename the association into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).
This sets the ambition to go beyond purely cultural and educational cooperation and expand it into areas such as foreign policy, economics, energy and others. A permanent secretariat based in Istanbul, councils of presidents and foreign ministers, a Parliamentary Assembly, an international Turkic Academy, a Turkic Investment Fund and other bodies have been established. One of the ambitious projects of the OTS is the creation of a "Turkic Schengen" - citizens of these countries can travel between them without the need to use international passports, but only their internal identity documents.
Challenges to the realization of the goals of the OTD
The realization of these ambitious goals faces a number of challenges - in the economic, political, educational and energy spheres.
According to data from the Turkish Statistical Institute, the total volume of Turkey's trade with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for the first 6 months of 2026 reached 9.4 billion dollars with a positive balance for Turkey of about 615 million dollars. This makes about 19 billion dollars annually. According to these data for the first half of 2026, Turkey's largest trading partner among the Turkic countries is Kazakhstan ($1.5 billion), followed by Azerbaijan ($1.4 billion), Uzbekistan ($945.6 million), Kyrgyzstan ($594.4 million) and Turkmenistan ($83.6 million).
However, this pales in comparison to the gigantic size of China's trade with these countries - it is estimated at over $63 billion according to customs data of the Central Asian countries and almost $90 billion according to Chinese customs data. According to Chinese data, the Celestial Empire's exports to these four countries in 2024 are as follows: Kazakhstan — $43.8 billion; Kyrgyzstan — $22.7 billion; Uzbekistan — $13.7 billion; Turkmenistan — $10 billion. This is an increase of about 200 times compared to 2000.
Another difficult task, due to the different interests of the countries, remains the development of common positions of the Turkic states on foreign policy issues. For example, Turkey would like the union to be a representative of the entire "Turkic world" and Ankara to be its spokesperson, with the OTD being a kind of support for its ambitions at the regional and global levels. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan prefer the emphasis to be on economic cooperation. Astana maintains partnership relations not only with Moscow, but also develops mutually beneficial energy cooperation with leading American and Western companies and therefore would not want to engage in initiatives that could complicate these relations.
The relations of the individual countries with Israel are also different. In recent years, Ankara and Tel Aviv have been in almost constant tense relations, while Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have excellent cooperation with Israel. The two Central Asian countries sell oil to Israel, and Baku purchases military equipment from it. They are further brought closer together by their common opposition to Iran. This makes it difficult for Turkey to gain support from the Turkic countries for its position on the Palestinian issue and the genocide in Gaza.
Despite the presence of mixed or Turkish schools and universities in a number of Central Asian countries, even in the educational sphere, relations are sometimes not entirely smooth, as in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, conflicts arose between local authorities and Ankara in connection with the demands of the Turkish government after the attempted coup in the country in 2016 to close schools linked to the F. Gülen network in these countries.
In terms of energy, the systems of a number of Central Asian countries remain connected to the Russian one. Countries such as Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan export their energy resources via routes through Russia. Another key player in the field is Beijing. China purchases large quantities of Turkmen gas via a three-line gas pipeline (A, B and C) along the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China route, with negotiations underway to build another line (D) via Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-China. This does not leave much scope for projects within the framework of the OTD.
Central Asia is indeed becoming central
In the last few years, the role of the region has grown exponentially. There are several factors for this - transport and energy corridors, the war in Ukraine, competition for rare earth elements.
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the large-scale initiative "Silk Road Economic Belt", later expanded to the global project "One Belt, One Road" (sometimes called "The New Silk Road"), which envisages financing of infrastructure (land and sea routes) and development projects around the world. Where does the Chinese president choose to announce this global project? In the Kazakh capital Astana - a gesture to the already mentioned Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his Eurasian vision.
This is no coincidence, since one of the branches of the "Belt and Road" project is planned to pass through Central Asia, the Caucasus and through Turkey to reach Europe. This road is an alternative to another large-scale transport corridor passing north through Russia. Its advantage is that it shortens the path to Europe by about 2,500 km.
The disadvantage - passage through difficult terrain, geographical restrictions in some places, for example, on the Georgian-Turkish border, crossing a number of state borders with the corresponding border, customs and health checks. Currently, about 7 million tons of cargo are transported annually along this route - many times less than the Trans-Siberian route before the war in Ukraine.
After the catastrophic loss of the Karabakh war in the fall of 2020, Armenia was forced to admit defeat and began negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey to normalize their relations. This fuels hopes that a multimodal (road and rail) transport route - the Middle Corridor - could pass through the Caucasus.
The importance of these plans for the EU and the US increased after the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 as an alternative to the Russian route. For Russia, this corridor is becoming a window for circumventing sanctions. For regional countries, such a corridor would reduce Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan's dependence on Russian road infrastructure.
Taking into account these developments, Turkey has stepped up efforts to implement earlier projects from its 2019 "Asia Again" strategy and in 2024 signed a $660 million loan with the World Bank to modernize the approximately 650-kilometer Divrigi-Kars railway line, which ends in the Caucasus.
Bulgaria could also benefit from these projects. The route through Central Asia is planned to reach the Kazakh Caspian Sea port of Aktau, from there by ferries across the sea to the Caucasus and end in Georgia and its Black Sea ports such as Anakiya, Batumi or Poti. Then the entry point to the EU could be either Constanta in Romania or our Black Sea capital Varna.
If the land extension of the route from Georgia through Turkey is chosen, then the entry point to the EU is either the Bulgarian-Turkish or the Greek-Turkish border. It is significant that despite the strained relations between Ankara and Athens, the two neighboring countries agreed to build a railway bridge over the Maritsa River.
Still, it is good not to cook the pan while the fish is still in the sea. Currently, Georgian ports need to be deepened because they do not have the capacity to accommodate deep-draft ships necessary for the transport of large quantities of cargo. The Kazakh, Georgian, Bulgarian and Romanian railways need modernization to allow for an increase in cargo transport capacity and speed.
Testimony to the region's increased importance for the US is the creation of the C5+1 format, i.e. the five Central Asian countries and Washington. The EU has also demonstrated increased interest - through the series of high-level conferences dedicated to the interconnection between the European Union and Central Asia "Global Gateway", the appointment of a special representative for relations with the region, the adoption by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) of a strategy for Kazakhstan for the period 2022-2027.
Among the main reasons for the increased interest of the European Union in Central Asia is the geological wealth of the region, especially rare earth elements, key to a number of modern technologies, as well as its demographic potential with a large and young population.
The geographically relatively close India is also actively moving into this region, which is closely monitoring the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The actions of Russia, China, the EU, the USA, Turkey and the OTD in Central Asia are turning the region into a zone of their competition in the spheres of economy, energy, culture, and minerals. This interest, however, gives regional countries more opportunities to diversify their foreign policy and foreign economic relations and a chance to take advantage of their once peripheral geographical location, which is becoming increasingly central to global geopolitics.
author: Mariyan Karagyozov