In February, French President Emmanuel Macron sparked heated discussions, announcing his readiness to deploy troops to Ukraine in the future. Soon, however, he simply disappeared from the radar, writes "Responsible Statecraft", the electronic portal of the American "Quincy Institute".
What changed? It turns out that there is a rather simple explanation for this behavior of the French president. Macron wants to go his own way, but as always, his options are not unlimited.
This dramatic change of course was welcomed by many in the US. Finally, a major European power has demonstrated a willingness to revive the liberal world order and set an example. A ray of hope pierces the gloom over besieged Ukraine: now the Europeans will shoulder at least some of the US burden to save the so-called "rules-based order” - at least in your own yard.
However, since then Macron has not only toned down his bellicose rhetoric, but has also failed to provide Ukraine with significant military and financial support befitting France's status as the West's leading economic and military power. Is Macron's intention to help Ukraine serious? Can the US trust him to help save the liberal world order?
Macron's approach to foreign policy
Contrary to common impression, Macron's foreign policy is not limited to saving the liberal world order. He studied at the international relations school of Hubert Vedrin, the French foreign minister (1997-2002) who coined the term “hyperstate”, criticized US dominance in a "moment of unipolarity” and advocated the return of "real politics”. Macron also respects the views of former prime minister Dominique de Villepin (2005-2007), known for his staunch opposition to the Iraq war and Western intervention. Finally, Macron drew inspiration from former President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012), who advocated simultaneously strengthening the European Union, deepening NATO membership, and rapprochement and reconciliation with Russia. Macron values and respects the alliance with the US, but he also realizes that the interests of Paris do not always coincide with the views of Washington.
Like many of his predecessors, Macron wants France to play its own role, remain relevant on the world stage and remain engaged with Russia, China and the Global South. "I will put an end to the neoconservative ideology imported into France,” he once declared.
When the conflict broke out in Ukraine, Macron tried to play the role of mediator. He thought he had a good enough personal relationship with Vladimir Putin to do so. In 2017, he received the Russian leader at the Palace of Versailles, giving him a rare honor. And in 2019, Putin arrived at the French presidential residence Fort Breganson - a sign that relations have become even more personal.
Macron himself visited Putin in Moscow in early February 2022, just a few weeks before the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. And just before this fateful step, Macron sincerely believed that with his phone conversation with the Kremlin, he had successfully prevented military action. But literally the next day, Putin called him and informed him that he had recognized the independence of Donbass. However, a full month later, he was still referring to Putin as “you” - in French culture it is a sign of friendship and informal communication. In June, Macron warned the West not to try to humiliate Russia - contrary to the firm position of London and Washington.
What has changed?
First, the French assessment of the balance of forces on the battlefield and the likely development of the conflict changed. Towards the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, French intelligence concluded that Ukraine was hopelessly losing, commented the German publication. The failed counter-offensive of the summer of 2023 "ate“ the best units of the ASU, Russia is replenishing its reserves faster than Kiev, and Western support is unlikely to return to the peak of the early months of the conflict. Therefore, unless there is a miraculous turnaround, the West will have to accept a decisive Russian victory.
Secondly, the elections for the European Parliament in June were approaching. All polls predicted a crushing defeat for the president's bloc, as Macron had nothing to boast about in his seven years in power. The sweeping economic reform program he promised in 2017 had to be abandoned because of the "yellow vest" in 2018, followed by the coronavirus pandemic. Macron needed arguments to run the European election campaign. He therefore continued to hint at direct French intervention until June 7, "the day of reflection". But by the end of June, he vowed not to send French troops to Ukraine in the foreseeable future.
The third consideration turned out to be Germany. In the first months of the conflict, Berlin announced an unexpectedly tough stance on Russia and proclaimed a so-called "tipping point", promising historic defense investment. The latter, however, alarmed France, and some in the military called on Macron to share with Chancellor Olaf Scholz his concern about Germany's military resurgence. One of them said: “We cannot say that in the last century we have always got along with the dreaded German army”. In other words, Paris could not remain indifferent to an arming Germany.
In this context, Macron tried to kill three birds with one stone with his February threat of military intervention.
First, he hoped that the open threat of direct intervention would change the Kremlin's calculations. Macron hoped that, faced with the prospect of a direct confrontation with a NATO country, Putin would become more accommodating in terms of diplomacy.
Secondly, Macron believed that this threat would cement his reputation as an effective leader of the EU and the West and an opponent of "Russian aggression”, as well as rally the electorate with a patriotic impulse ahead of the European Parliament elections.
Finally, thirdly, he believed that a hawkish stance would neutralize Germany's incentives to rearm. French leadership would deter Berlin from taking military steps against Russia. Moreover, from this point of view, even if Germany wanted to assert itself more strongly, it would in any case be abandoning Paris.
However, Macron never had serious intentions of direct intervention in Ukraine. He only hoped that his loud statements would make Putin uncomfortable. Meanwhile, the French military bluntly warned the president that their troops were unable to stand up to the much larger and battle-hardened Russian army, and that the modest expeditionary force would surely be annihilated without achieving anything. However, the role of the savior of Europe and the "free world” could boost ratings before the election and close the Pandora's box called German rearmament.
However, Macron's party suffered a defeat in the European elections in June. She also lost the parliamentary elections in July, although the defeat was not as crushing as many had feared.
The vast majority of French voters are categorically against sending troops to Ukraine. Unloved by voters, Macron will now not risk the lives of hundreds of his countrymen for a distant conflict that no one wants. Moreover, the exhaustion of Germany and the US has already led to a sharp reduction in financial and military support for Kiev. France has so far not expressed a desire to replace them in this direction.
Macron's diplomatic ploy did him little good, as Moscow didn't take the bait. Macron also knows exactly what Washington likes and "switches” of the right rhetoric whenever he needs to win his support. But as always, France remains a wayward ally of special interests.
France sold Serbia Rafale fighter jets
French President Macron ignored concerns about Serbia's ties with Russia and struck deals with Belgrade on fighter jets and nuclear energy that benefit Paris, notes Politico. after Macron's recent visit to the Serbian capital.
The agreements were reached despite concerns about the effect of the embrace between Paris and Belgrade, which maintains close relations with both Moscow and Beijing, and ongoing large-scale protests in Serbia over the expansion of its lithium mines.
Macron and his Serbian counterpart Aleksandar Vucic attended the signing of 11 bilateral agreements, including a bargain for 12 French Rafale fighter jets, the sale of critical raw materials such as lithium and the development of a civilian nuclear program for Serbia's growing energy needs.
"The agreement signed today is historically important,”, Macron said. "I see that many people are outraged by the fact that Serbia has relations with Russia and China... but I respect Serbia's sovereignty," Politico quoted him as saying.
The publication noted that most importantly, Serbia relied on France to support it whenever it was cornered by other European nations. In May, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe voted in favor of Kosovo - a former southern province of Serbia that declared independence in 2008 - to become a member of the organization.
France was among the countries that blocked the final vote in the Council of Europe, citing Pristina's inadequate efforts to establish the Association of Serbian Municipalities, a political body meant to represent Kosovo's Serbian minority.
Actually, French foreign policy interests are above all economic and financial, notes "Politico".