The moment of truth for Europe. Under this title, Foreign Affairs published an analysis by Wolfgang Ischinger, president of the Munich Security Conference Foundation Council and former German ambassador to the United States, dedicated to the geopolitical turn that occurred dramatically and scandalously on the last day of February 2025 and developed ostentatiously, presented live and on air by television cameras in the Oval Office of the White House.
The transatlantic alliance is under serious threat, but it is not yet doomed, Ischinger believes, and points out that just as Europe needs the United States to finally end the war in Ukraine, the United States will need Europe to successfully complete this task.
The disastrous meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance at the White House on February 28 led to a glaring moment of truth for the Western alliance. With the Zelensky affair and the end of U.S. support for Ukraine’s war effort, the Trump administration has shaken more than just Ukraine. The row has also called into question some of the fundamental principles that have underpinned the transatlantic relationship since World War II.
Panic has set in in European capitals. Some politicians and analysts are talking about the end of NATO or the end of the West. They are terrified of U.S. intentions. Is Washington actively seeking to undermine Ukraine’s long-term survival as a sovereign and free country? Is Trump attempting a "reverse Kissinger" by charming Russian President Vladimir Putin into abandoning his "marriage" with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and forging an unholy alliance with the United States? A huge gap has opened in transatlantic trust. This gap is bad for Washington’s global power projection and its image as a benign hegemon, and potentially disastrous for transatlantic cohesion and NATO’s vitality.
The challenge facing the West is daunting. But the alliance has endured periods of intense doubt before. On both sides of the Atlantic, there are strong arguments that can still save the Western alliance and support a continued strong U.S. presence and engagement in Europe. Europe itself can also do much to show why the United States is much stronger with it than without it.
THE MINSK MISTAKE
In the early 1990s, there were voices advocating the gradual dissolution of NATO after the end of the Warsaw Pact. But since Russia embarked on its path of revisionism over the past two decades—especially since 2014, when it seized Crimea and invaded the Donbas—NATO has not only endured, but has continued to grow. And it has become stronger in terms of cohesion, membership, and deterrence.
The Trump administration has caused a fundamental trust problem: for the first time, European leaders are unsure whether the United States remains committed to NATO and to America’s leadership role within it.
But the story is more complicated. It is crucial to remember that Trump played a vital role in defending Ukraine. Ukraine was able to repel the aggressor and survive a full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 because the United States began supplying Ukraine with lethal weapons, such as Javelin anti-tank missiles, during Trump’s first term. Without the Javelin, Russian forces might have been able to take Kiev within days, as originally planned. It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that Ukraine owes its survival in the critical days of early spring 2022 in large part to the support of the previous Trump administration. Why would Washington now want to abandon this remarkable success story, a story of the combined resolve and determination of the United States and Ukraine to uphold and defend the sovereign rights of a free country?
The United States is also well aware of the dangers of leaving Europe to deal with Russia alone. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, Washington largely decided to leave the confrontation with Moscow to the Europeans. The key vehicle for this was the so-called Minsk Process - negotiations aimed at settling the conflict in eastern Ukraine - and the so-called Normandy Four, the contact group composed of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine, which met periodically between 2014 and 2022. Unfortunately, the Minsk Process and the Normandy Four failed, and the vacuum of American leadership only encouraged the Russian side to escalate further, culminating in the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
These events are fatally reminiscent of the events of 30 years ago, when the bloody war in Bosnia led Europe to declare a "European Hour", which led nowhere. Only through the active political and military intervention of the United States was that war finally ended and peace was achieved through the Dayton Agreement of 1995.
Neither the first Trump administration nor the Biden administration repeated the mistake made by the Obama White House in 2014: they did not leave the resolution of the war in Ukraine to the Europeans, but decided to lead a remarkable international effort to support Ukraine. The new Trump administration has decided to take the lead again, this time to end the war after 11 years of conflict and annexation and three years of brutal full-scale invasion.
It is in Europe’s interest to welcome in principle this strategic engagement by the United States, which in fact prevents a greater shift in Washington’s focus from Europe to China. But to be successful, both sides of the Atlantic must quickly close the yawning trust gap. If that can be done, the crucial challenge then is finding a way to secure and implement a viable deal with Ukraine. First, Ukraine must be involved, and it will have to make sure that the outcome is fair and not a betrayal. Without active Ukrainian and European engagement, the Trump administration’s peace efforts may fail before they have even begun in earnest. That is why it will be in the US interest to quickly repair relations with Zelensky and the Ukrainian leadership after the confrontation at the White House on February 28.
IS AMERICA STILL A EUROPEAN POWER?
Behind the tension between Washington and Kiev is Europe’s role in the security equation. The US military presence in Europe has been increased in recent years, but it is far from equal to the hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers in Ukraine and in Russia’s western military districts. And Washington has categorically ruled out sending US troops to Ukraine. The Trump administration therefore needs its European partners, and has made this clear, asking European powers to secure or enforce a possible deal with Ukraine. In return, Europeans must be decisive enough to confront Washington with their own demands: adapting the American Revolutionary War slogan “No taxation without representation,” they must make it clear that there will be no military deployment without participation in peace talks. And Europe knows one thing: the deal, if it happens, is not simply about partitioning Ukraine or securing a quick ceasefire. It is about a lasting and secure peace agreement, about existential security concerns for all of Europe.
An even bigger question is how to deal with Russia. So far, there has been no meaningful signal from Moscow about possible concessions. Predictably, the Kremlin has set maximalist demands and will prove very difficult to back down from them. It is an illusion to believe that a lasting peace with Russia will blossom simply by fixing the line of contact in eastern Ukraine. Russia will make new, complex, and far-reaching demands, with questions of strategic stability, regarding US military installations in Eastern Europe, and will prove to be a costly and unreliable partner. Europe and the United States must be prepared for a long and painful process.
Above all, the urgent need for a new kind of European leadership comes to the fore. To protect their strategic security interests and restore the "thinned" alliance, European powers must show that they are capable of shouldering a greater burden, which strengthens the collective power of the alliance. France, Germany, Poland, and other like-minded neighbors should launch a major defense initiative, shaped around a core group of powers that are willing to speak with one voice on security issues. This European Defense Union - EDU - will agree to majority decision-making and will include the closest possible participation of the United Kingdom. The main objectives will include the creation of a consolidated and unified defence market and supply chain; the joint development, supply and maintenance of military equipment; and the joint training of military personnel. France and the United Kingdom, as nuclear powers, will be encouraged to explore options for an enhanced EDU contribution to extended, including nuclear, deterrence.
The best and most elegant way for the Trump administration to include both Europe and Ukraine, as well as European partners like Turkey, in a peace deal would be to restore the tried and tested Contact Group format, introduced in the 1990s to create a sense of unity and common purpose under US leadership. Washington can be reminded that it should be proud of this innovative and successful diplomatic format - a US invention. In Ukraine, it could provide the crucial ingredients needed to ensure that the war really ends.
Thirty years ago, diplomat Richard Holbrooke wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs, titled "America, a European Power" - without a question mark. Holbrooke predicted that "in the 21st century, Europe will still need the active American engagement that has been a necessary component of the continental balance for half a century". The essay concludes with a prophetic statement. "The task ahead is as daunting as its necessity is obvious. To shy away from the challenge would only mean paying a higher price later." Yes, Europe needs the United States to bring a final end to the war in Ukraine. But the United States will need Europe to successfully complete this task. Let us hope that the Trump White House will recognize this reality.